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Abstract 
 
 
 
The papers in this thesis explore the political economy of the macroeconomic 
imbalances that built up between advanced democracies during the Great 
Moderation—the long period of reduced macroeconomic volatility and low inflation 
that preceded the global financial crisis. More specifically, the papers focus on the 
role that institutions, political systems and electoral politics, and government 
demand-side policies played in the imbalances that emerged in real exchange rates 
and current accounts. The first paper uses macroeconomic data on OECD economies 
and a new statistical approach for causal inference in observational studies—the 
synthetic control method—to estimate the effect of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) on the current account balances of individual member states. This 
counterfactuals approach provides strong evidence that the introduction of the EMU 
was responsible for the divergence in current account balances among member 
states. The second paper maps out the complex set of interrelationships between 
varieties of capitalism, growth models, and political systems in advanced 
democracies. The new approach to comparative political economy developed in the 
paper provides a theoretical framework that helps explain the current account 
divergence between the export-led coordinated market economies (CMEs) and the 
consumption-led liberal market economies (LMEs). The third paper brings modern 
macroeconomics back into political science. The paper sets out a suite of simple open 
economy macroeconomic models and uses them to show how governments pursuing 
different demand-side policies can result in persistent current account imbalances 
between countries within a system of independent inflation-targeting central 
banking. Taken together, the papers provide important theoretical arguments and 
empirical evidence on the political (and political economic) drivers of the 
macroeconomic imbalances that were a crucial precursor to the worst global 
economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s.  
 
 
8 
Contents 
 
 
 
Declaration 3 
Acknowledgments 5 
Abstract 7 
List of figures 9 
List of tables 12 
List of abbreviations 14 
List of ISO country codes 16 
1.  Introduction 17 
2. Estimating the effect of the EMU on current account balances: A 
synthetic control approach 
26 
3. The comparative political economy of growth models in advanced 
democracies 
73 
4. Open economy macroeconomics and political science: Demand-side 
policies and external imbalances in advanced democracies 
142 
5.  Conclusion 223 
Appendix A 232 
Appendix B 240 
Appendix C 247 
References 249 
 
     
  
 
 
9 
List of figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Current account balances, 1990-2007 ..................................................... 18	
 
Figure 2.1. Trends in current account balances (as a % of GDP) between 1980 and 
2010: Austria, France, Greece, Italy and Spain vs. their synthetic control units.
 .......................................................................................................................... 48	
Figure 2.2. Current account balance gaps (in percentage points of GDP) between 
Austria, France, Greece, Italy and Spain and their synthetic control units: 1980 
to 2010 .............................................................................................................. 52	
Figure 2.3. Current account balance gaps (in percentage points of GDP) between 
Austria, France, Greece, Italy and Spain, and their synthetic control units, with 
full donor pool and donor pool excluding Denmark, Hungary, Poland and the 
UK: 1980 to 2010 .............................................................................................. 56	
Figure 2.4. Placebo EMU introduction in 1990: Current account balance gaps (in 
percentage points of GDP) between Austria, France, Italy and Spain, and their 
synthetic control units: 1980 to 1998 ................................................................ 59	
Figure 2.5. Placebo EMU introduction in 1991: Current account balance gap (in 
percentage points of GDP) between Greece and Synthetic Greece: 1980 to 2000
 .......................................................................................................................... 60	
Figure 2.6. Ratio of post-EMU MSPE to pre-EMU MSPE: Austria and donor pool, 
France and donor pool, Greece and donor pool, Italy and donor pool, and Spain 
and donor pool .................................................................................................. 62	
Figure 2.7. Robustness test: Leave-one-out distribution of the gaps (in percentage 
points of GDP) between Austria, France, Greece, Italy and Spain, and their 
synthetic control units: 1980 to 2010 ................................................................ 66	
 
Figure 3.1. Average annual contributions of consumption and exports to GDP 
growth, 1994-2007 ............................................................................................. 75	
Figure 3.2. Change in trade openness, 1994-2007 ..................................................... 91	
Figure 3.3. Financial globalisation of fifteen advanced democracies, 1980-2007 ..... 110	
Figure 3.4. Change in real effective exchange rate (price competitiveness), 1994-2007
 ........................................................................................................................ 114	
 
 
10 
Figure 3.5. Average disposable income inequality and the average annual 
contribution of consumption to GDP growth, 1994-2007 ............................... 119	
Figure 3.6. Average disposable income inequality and coordination of wage setting, 
1994-2007 ........................................................................................................ 120	
Figure 3.7. Average disposable income inequality and the average annual 
contribution of consumption to GDP growth in the CMEs, 1994-2007 .......... 121	
Figure 3.8 Average annual growth in household indebtedness and real house prices, 
1996-2007 ........................................................................................................ 134	
Figure 3.9. Short-term (up to one year) consumer credit to households, 2007 ....... 137	
 
Figure 4.1. Volatility of real GDP growth in advanced democracies, 1970 Q1 – 2012 
Q2 ................................................................................................................... 147	
Figure 4.2. Consumer price inflation, 1980-2007 ..................................................... 150	
Figure 4.3. Short-term interest rates, 1980-2007 ..................................................... 150	
Figure 4.4. Current account balances (as a % of GDP) ......................................... 152	
Figure 4.5. Real effective exchange rate (price competitiveness) index (1994=100), 
1994-2007 ........................................................................................................ 153	
Figure 4.6. Real effective exchange rate (price competitiveness) index without major 
primary commodity exporters (1994=100), 1994-2007 .................................... 154	
Figure 4.7. Average annual contributions of consumption and exports to GDP 
growth, 1994-2007 ........................................................................................... 156	
Figure 4.8. Adjustment to an increase in autonomous consumption in the 3-equation 
open economy model with a fixed exchange rate, r = r *  ; Δe = 0  .................. 194	
Figure 4.9. Adjustment to an increase in autonomous consumption in the open 
economy 3-equation model with flexible exchange rates and no time lags ...... 195	
Figure 4.10. Adjustment to an increase in autonomous consumption in the open 
economy 3-equation model with flexible exchange rates and time lags .......... 197	
 
Figure 5.1. Current account balances, 1990-2015 ................................................... 228	
 
 
 
11 
Figure A.1. Current account balance gaps (in percentage points of GDP) between 
Austria, France, Greece, Italy and Spain, and their synthetic control units, with 
full donor pool and donor pool excluding middle-income countries: 1980 to 2010
 ........................................................................................................................ 234	
Figure A.2. Current account balance gaps (in percentage points of GDP) between 
Austria, France, Greece, Italy and Spain, and their synthetic control units, with 
full donor pool and donor pool including Bulgaria and Romania: 1980 to 2010.
 ........................................................................................................................ 237	
 
Figure B.1. Average annual contributions of consumption and net exports to GDP 
growth, 1994-2007 ........................................................................................... 244	
 
  
 
 
12 
List of tables 
 
 
 
Table 2.1. Country selection: Pre-EMU MSPEs between EMU member states and 
their synthetic control units .............................................................................. 42	
Table 2.2. Weights for synthetic control units ......................................................... 43	
Table 2.3. Current account balance predictor means in the pre-EMU period for 
Austria, France, their synthetic control units and the full donor pool: 1980-1998
 .......................................................................................................................... 45	
Table 2.4. Current account balance predictor means in the pre-EMU period for 
Italy, Spain, their synthetic control units and the full donor pool: 1980-1998 .. 46	
Table 2.5. Current account balance predictor means in the pre-EMU period for 
Greece, Synthetic Greece and the full donor pool: 1980-2000 ........................... 47	
Table 2.6. Average current balance gaps (in percentage points of GDP) between 
Austria, France, Greece, Italy and Spain, and their synthetic control units in 
the pre- and post-EMU periods ......................................................................... 51	
Table 2.7. The effect of the EMU on current account imbalances: Panel difference-
in-differences estimates ..................................................................................... 69	
 
Table 3.1. LMEs vs. CMEs: Average annual contributions of consumption and 
exports to GDP growth, and the average annual GDP growth rate, 1994-2007 
 .......................................................................................................................... 82	
Table 3.2. LMEs vs. CMEs: Average wage coordination, trade openness and 
household savings rate, 1994-2007 .................................................................... 87	
Table 3.3. LME vs. CMEs: Current account balances, 1994-2007 ............................ 92	
Table 3.4. LMEs vs. CMEs: Share of manufacturing in total employment and gross 
value added, 1994-2007 ..................................................................................... 95	
Table 3.5. LME vs. CMEs: Employment protection for permanent and temporary 
workers, 1994-2007 ............................................................................................ 97	
Table 3.6. Average public expenditure on tertiary education, gross enrolment ratio 
in tertiary education, and employment share in knowledge-intensive services in 
the CMEs, 2000-05 ............................................................................................ 99	
 
 
13 
Table 3.7. LMEs vs. different groups of CMEs: Disposable income inequality and 
relative redistribution, 1994-2007 .................................................................... 117	
Table 3.8. The importance of high-skill and technology intensive manufactures and 
high-ICT services to total exports in the CMEs, 2005 .................................... 123	
Table 3.9. Average public sector employment and trade union density in the CMEs, 
1994-2007 ........................................................................................................ 126	
Table 3.10. LMEs vs. different groups of CMEs: Household indebtedness, 1995-2007
 ........................................................................................................................ 128	
 
Table 4.1. National Index of Approach to Credit during the 2000s ........................ 209	
Table 4.2. Change in cyclically adjusted government primary balances, 1994-2000 
and 2000-2007 ................................................................................................. 217	
 
Table A.1. Variable definitions and data sources ................................................... 232	
Table A.2. Weights for current account balance predictors in synthetic control units
 ........................................................................................................................ 233	
 
Table B.1. LMEs vs. CMEs: Average annual contributions of consumption and 
exports to GDP growth, and the average annual GDP growth rate, 1961-1979
 ........................................................................................................................ 240	
Table B.2. LMEs vs. CMEs: Average annual contributions of consumption and 
exports to GDP growth, and the average annual GDP growth rate, 1980-2007
 ........................................................................................................................ 241	
Table B.3. LMEs vs. CMEs: Current account balances, 1994-2015 ........................ 242	
Table B.4. Electoral systems and the average proportionality of electoral outcomes, 
1994-2007 ........................................................................................................ 243	
  
 
 
14 
List of abbreviations 
 
 
 
AD Aggregate Demand 
AIAS Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
AMECO Annual Macro-Economic Database 
CME Coordinated Market Economy 
CPE Comparative Political Economy 
CRA Community Reinvestment Act 
DG ECFIN Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
DSGE Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
EC European Commission 
ECB European Central Bank 
EMU European Monetary Union 
EU European Union 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GVA Gross Value Added 
ICT Information and Communications Technology 
ICTWSS Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts 
ILO International Labour Office 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IRS International Risk Sharing 
IS Investment–Saving 
ISIC International Standard Industrial Classification 
LME Liberal Market Economy 
MIP Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure 
MME Mixed Market Economy 
 
 
15 
MSPE Mean Squared Prediction Error 
NAIRU Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment 
NK New Keynesian 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PPP Purchasing Power Parity 
PR Proportional Representation 
SGP Stability and Growth Pact 
SMD Single Member District 
SNB Swiss National Bank 
SUTVA Single Unit Treatment Value Assumption 
SWIID Standardized World Income Inequality Database 
UIP Uncovered Interest Parity 
UK United Kingdom 
US United States 
WZB Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
16 
List of ISO country codes 
 
 
 
OECD (2011b) 3-digit ISO country codes: 
 
Australia AUS 
Austria AUT 
Belgium BEL 
Canada CAN 
Chile CHL 
Denmark DNK 
Finland FIN 
France FRA 
Germany DEU 
Greece GRC 
Hungary HUN 
Ireland IRL 
Israel ISR 
Italy ITA 
Japan JPN 
Korea KOR 
Mexico MEX 
Netherlands NLD 
New Zealand NZL 
Norway NOR 
Poland POL 
Portugal PRT 
Spain ESP 
Sweden SWE 
Switzerland CHE 
Turkey TUR 
United Kingdom GBR 
United States USA 
 
 
  
 
 
17 
1 
  
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
In my view … it is impossible to understand this crisis without reference to the 
global imbalances in trade and capital flows that began in the latter half of the 1990s 
 
—Ben S. Bernanke, Chairperson of the Federal Reserve, March 10th 2009 * 
 
 
The global financial crisis of 2008-09 culminated in the most severe economic 
downturn in the world economy since the Great Depression of the 1930s. As 
Chairperson Ben Bernanke’s words at the nadir of the crisis illustrate, policymakers 
and economists were quick to point the finger of blame at the current account 
imbalances that built up between countries prior to the crisis. Figure 1.1 shows the 
current account balances of a selection of OECD countries between 1990 and 2007. 
We can see that current account balances diverged markedly from the second half of 
the 1990s onwards. There is also a distinct geographical nature to the divide; the 
northern European economies and Japan accumulated surpluses and the southern 
European and English-speaking economies accumulated deficits. 
 
 
                                         
* This excerpt is taken from Chairperson Ben S. Bernanke’s speech Financial Reform to 
Address Systemic Risk, which was delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations in 
Washington D.C. on March 10th 2009. Bernanke was the Chairperson of the Federal Reserve 
between February 2006 and February 2014. This quote also appears in Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2009, 131). 
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Figure 1.1. Current account balances, 1990-2007 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2016. 
 
Current account imbalances made the global economy vulnerable to a financial crisis 
as they reflected the build up of dangerous asset price and credit bubbles and left 
current account deficit countries vulnerable to a sudden stop in external financing 
(Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti 2012; Lane 2012; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2012). 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012, 252) find strong empirical evidence that current 
account balances in run-up to the crisis “widened beyond levels consistent with 
sustainable medium-term positions”. 
The central objective of my thesis is to better understand the current account 
imbalances that emerged during the Great Moderation—the long period of reduced 
macroeconomic volatility and low inflation that preceded the global financial crisis 
in 2008-09. †  This is important from an academic perspective, as there are many 
interesting puzzles still to be solved, such as: Why did the external balances of the 
north and south of the Eurozone diverge during the 2000s? Why did the English-
                                         
† The term Great Moderation was first introduced by Stock and Watson (2002). 
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19 
speaking countries amass substantial deficits and the northern European countries 
amass substantial surpluses during the Great Moderation? Why did governments 
and central banks not intervene to dampen down the current account imbalances? 
Why did some countries have consistently superior export performance than others? 
Better understanding the imbalances is also crucial for policymaking in the post-
crisis world. If politicians and policymakers are to take steps to avoid dangerous 
imbalances re-emerging in the future, then they first need a clear idea of the political 
and economic mechanisms that drove the pre-crisis imbalances. 
The economic drivers of the imbalances have been thoroughly studied (Blanchard 
and Milesi-Ferretti 2012; Lane 2012; Obstfeld 2012; Obstfeld and Rogoff 2009), but 
the political (and political economic) drivers of the imbalances have received much 
less attention. The three papers in my thesis (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) aim to fill this 
gap in the literature by looking at the role of institutions, political systems and 
electoral politics and government demand-side policies in the imbalances. The 
remainder of the introduction looks at each of these three areas in turn and discusses 
how they intersect with the papers in my thesis, as well as highlighting the points of 
departure of my work from the previous literature. The following subsections 
emphasise two notable features of the thesis: (i) it uses a range of methods—Chapter 
2 uses advanced quantitative methods; Chapter 3 uses mixed methods; and Chapter 
4 uses formal modelling; and (ii) it has important interdisciplinary elements; while it 
is firmly rooted in political science, it seeks to incorporate frontier concepts, ideas, 
and models from macroeconomics. The substantive contributions of my three papers, 
as well as their implications and limitations, will be discussed in Chapter 5 of the 
thesis. 
 
Institutions 
One of the biggest and most ambitious institutional changes in recent economic 
history was the introduction of the European Monetary Union (EMU). The EMU 
irrevocably fixed exchange rates among the countries that joined. It also meant 
member states had to cede control of monetary policy to the European Central Bank 
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(ECB) and commit to operating fiscal policy within the confines of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). The theoretical literature has picked out several channels 
through which the EMU drove the current account imbalances between the north 
and south of the currency union during its first decade, such as its effect on 
competitiveness in countries with different wage-setting institutions (Johnston, 
Hancké, and Pant 2014), its effect on cross-border lending from the north to the 
south (Hale and Obstfeld 2016), and its effect on fiscal deficits (Efthyvoulou 2012). 
In contrast, the empirical literature has yet to come consensus about whether the 
current account imbalances were driven by the EMU (Belke and Dreger 2013; 
Campa and Gavilan 2011; Schmitz and von Hagen 2011) or factors outside of the 
currency union, such as the rise in oil prices and the emergence of China as a major 
exporter of low value-added goods (Chen, Milesi-Ferretti, and Tressel 2013; 
Guerrieri and Esposito 2013). Chapter 2 of the thesis aims to fill this gap in the 
literature by using macroeconomic data on OECD economies and a new statistical 
approach for causal inference in observational studies—the synthetic control 
method—to estimate the effect of the EMU on the current account balances of 
individual member states. This is the first time this method has been used to study 
the effect of the EMU on current account balances. The method is uniquely well 
placed to shed new light on the debate because it creates counterfactuals that show 
what would have happened to the current account balances of individual member 
states had they not joined the euro. In other words, it allows estimation of the 
causal effect of the EMU on current account balances. 
Institutions also form a cornerstone of Chapter 3 of the thesis, specifically the 
complementary political–economic institutions at the heart of varieties of capitalism. 
Hall and Soskice’s (2001) influential framework divides the advanced democracies 
into two groups: liberal market economies (LMEs), where firms coordinate primarily 
via market mechanisms and hierarchies, and coordinated market economies (CMEs), 
where firms coordinate primarily via non-market relationships and resolve many of 
their problems through strategic interaction. Varieties of capitalism is often referred 
to as a supply-side approach to comparative political economy (e.g. Baccaro and 
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Pontusson 2016). In Chapter 3, I develop a new approach to comparative political 
economy (CPE), which combines both the supply side (political–economic 
institutions) and the demand side (demand drivers of growth and government 
demand-side policies) of the economy. The chapter argues and empirically 
demonstrates that the northern European CMEs pursued export-led growth models 
during the Great Moderation and the LMEs (the English-speaking countries) 
pursued consumption-led growth models. The chapter provides a strong theoretical 
underpinning as to why current account imbalances emerged between the CMEs and 
the LMEs during the Great Moderation. 
The varieties of capitalism framework focuses on differences in institutions 
between countries (or groups of countries). The Great Moderation also saw 
institutional changes that occurred across the OECD countries, as ideas changed 
around best practices for macroeconomic management and economic policymaking.  
Two of these changes indirectly contributed to the build up of current account 
imbalances: the move to independent inflation-targeting central banking and the 
opening of financial markets. As emphasised in Chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis, these 
changes, paradoxically, gave governments more discretion to pursue demand-side 
policies that supported the national growth model. This was especially true in the 
consumption-led LMEs, where the growth model favoured policies aimed at 
expanding domestic demand. 
These institutional changes were critical enablers for governments in the LMEs to 
pursue expansive demand-side policies because they enhanced credibility in financial 
markets and anchored inflation expectations. This gave the LMEs easy access to 
external borrowing and the ability to run persistent current account deficits 
(without pressure for adjustment). A similar argument holds for the southern 
European economies, who acquired a credible low inflation regime when they joined 
the EMU. This novel argument provides a potentially more plausible reason than 
the mitigation of the time-inconsistency problem in monetary policymaking (Barro 
and Gordon 1983) for why a government with an output target below equilibrium 
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would voluntarily give up control of monetary policy to an independent central 
bank. 
 
Political systems and electoral politics 
The role of politics in the current account imbalances of the Great Moderation has 
been all but ignored in the literature up until now. In the new approach to CPE set 
out in Chapter 3 of the thesis, political systems and electoral politics play a central 
role. 
Lijphart’s (1984, 2012) widely used typology for classifying political systems 
divides countries into consensus democracies and majoritarian democracies. 
Consensus democracies typically have proportional representation (PR) electoral 
systems that produce coalitions governments, representative parties, and interest 
group involvement in policymaking. In contrast, majoritarian democracies typically 
have majoritarian electoral systems that produce single-party governments, 
leadership parties, and government control over policymaking (Soskice 2007). 
In Lijphart’s terminology, the CMEs are consensus democracies and the LME are 
majoritarian democracies. Chapter 3 argues that the distinct political systems of the 
LMEs and the CMEs exert a strong influence on the long-term electoral viability of 
different growth models. Parties in majoritarian systems have to compete for the 
median voter and governing is closely tied to winning elections. Representative 
parties in consensus democracies, on the other hand, safeguard the long-term 
interests of their constituents and have to work with interest groups (e.g. unions, 
employers’ associations) to set policy. Majoritarian political systems therefore 
provide a strong electoral incentive to pursue a growth model centred on consumer 
spending, whereas consensus political systems are better suited to a growth model 
built around long-term export sector competitiveness. 
There are two further avenues through which political systems reinforce the 
LMEs’ consumption-led growth model and the CMEs’ export-led growth model. As 
Rogowski and Kayser’s (2002) model of regulation shows, majoritarian electoral 
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systems with high vote-seat elasticities tilt policy in favour of consumers, while PR 
electoral systems with low vote-seat elasticities tilt policy in favour of producers. 
The greater clarity of responsibility in majoritarian systems also means that 
governments in the LMEs are held more accountable for short-term economic 
performance at the ballot box (Powell and Whitten 1993). 
The theory of political behaviour underpinning the new approach to CPE in 
Chapter 3 of the thesis sees the promotion of national growth models, and advanced 
sectors especially, as a valence issue for voters (as do Iversen and Soskice (2015b)). 
Chapter 3 argues that there is a strong electoral incentive for governments to 
support national growth models, and hence pursue policies that further contribute to 
current account divergence. This link between politics and current account 
imbalances has been underexplored in the previous literature. Understanding the 
political origins of the imbalances is particularly important for the future, as it 
provides reason to be pessimistic that governments in advanced democracies will 
unilaterally take action to correct current account imbalances should the re-emerge. 
 
Government demand-side policies 
A demand-side policy is any government policy aimed at affecting domestic demand, 
such as monetary policy, fiscal policy, and the encouragement (or mitigation) of 
credit expansion.‡ In the era of independent inflation-targeting central banking, only 
the latter two policies remain in the hands of governments. 
The new approach to CPE set out in Chapter 3 argues that governments in 
advanced democracies have a clear electoral incentive to pursue policies that support 
the national growth model (as discussed in the previous subsection). These demand-
side policies reinforced the divergence in current account balances between the 
export-led CMEs and the consumption-led LMEs during the Great Moderation. 
The fourth chapter of the thesis (co-authored with David Soskice) looks at 
government demand-side policies through the lens of modern macroeconomics. The 
                                         
‡ The terms credit encouragement and credit mitigation are borrowed from Fuller (2015). 
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dominant models of the macroeconomy used in political science (see Persson and 
Tabellini 2000) leave no place for government demand-side policies to affect 
macroeconomic outcomes beyond the very short run, because they are still rooted in 
new classical theory from the 1970s and 1980s (Iversen and Soskice 2006b). These 
models are also typically closed economy, which means they are unable to provide 
any insights into current account imbalances. We try to bridge the gap between the 
empirical evidence from the Great Moderation and the macroeconomic models used 
in political science by setting out a suite of simple modern open economy 
macroeconomic models. 
The models presented in Chapter 4 show how governments can influence the 
economy in the medium run and how persistent current account imbalances can 
arise within a system of inflation-targeting central banking. We hope the models can 
re-invigorate the long dormant research agenda at the intersection of macroeconomic 
and policies science. The chapter also provides empirical evidence that governments 
in the LMEs and the CMEs pursued systematically different demand-side policies 
during the Great Moderation—as the theory of political behaviour set out in 
Chapter 3 would predict. We show that governments in the LMEs encouraged credit 
expansion more than those in the CMEs (Fuller 2015), and that the fiscal stance of 
the LMEs loosened more than the fiscal stance of the CMEs during the 2000s. This 
divergence in demand-side policies helped drive the current account imbalances 
among advanced democracies during the Great Moderation. 
 
An overview of what comes next 
 
The remainder of the thesis is made up of three separate papers—each a self-
contained piece of research—and a concluding chapter. Chapter 2 uses the synthetic 
control method to estimate the causal effect of joining the EMU on the current 
account balances of individual member states. Chapter 3 explores the complex set of 
interrelationships between growth models, varieties of capitalism and political 
systems in advanced democracies. It then uses these insights to shed new light on 
the pre-crisis current account imbalances, as well as cross-country variation in the 
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evolution of income inequality and credit expansion. Chapter 4 develops a set of 
simple modern open economy macroeconomic models and uses them to: (i) show 
that governments can have medium-run effects on the macroeconomy, and (ii) show 
how governments pursuing different policies can lead to persistent macroeconomic 
imbalances within a system of independent inflation-targeting central banking. In 
the final chapter, I discuss the substantive contributions of the paper, point to some 
of the limitations in my analyses, and provide some promising avenues for future 
research.  
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2 
 
Estimating the effect of the EMU on current 
account balances: A synthetic control 
approach* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The European sovereign debt crisis wrought major political and economic damage 
on the European Monetary Union (EMU). This led to a reassessment of the pre-
crisis period of economic growth and stability in the EMU, shifting attention to the 
macroeconomic imbalances that emerged between member states, especially those in 
current account balances. This paper uses macroeconomic data on OECD economies 
and a new statistical approach for causal inference in observational studies—the 
synthetic control method—to estimate the effect of the EMU on the current account 
balances of individual member states. This counterfactuals approach provides strong 
evidence that the introduction of the EMU was responsible for the divergence in 
current account balances among member states in the run-up to the euro crisis. The 
results suggest that the EMU effect operated through multiple channels and that 
fundamental changes to the institutional framework of the EMU may be required to 
safeguard the currency union against a re-emergence of dangerous external 
imbalances in the future. 
 
* A version of this paper was published as: Hope, David. 2016. “Estimating the Effect of the 
EMU on Current Account Balances: A Synthetic Control Approach.” European Journal of 
Political Economy 44: 20–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.05.002. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The European sovereign debt crisis (hereby referred to as the euro crisis) put severe 
economic and political strain on the European Monetary Union (EMU) and even 
cast doubt on the future of the wider European project. The no-bail-out clause 
enshrined in the Treaty of Rome (1957) was broken multiple times, harsh austerity 
measures plunged the periphery of the currency union into a prolonged recession, 
and political tensions rose both within and between member states.1 
The euro crisis prompted a reassessment of the EMU, which had been labelled a 
“resounding success” by the European Commission (2008, 3) after its first decade. 
When countries joined the EMU and adopted the euro they relinquished control of 
monetary policy to the European Central Bank (ECB) who assumed responsibility 
for stabilising member state economies following economic disturbances. While the 
ECB achieved its main policy goal—average euro area inflation was just above the 
Bank’s 2% target between 1999 and 2008—, the narrow focus on average inflation 
masked significant divergence among member states. The period after the 
introduction of EMU up until the euro crisis was characterised by differentials in 
inflation, but also in growth, real exchange rates and current account balances 
(Carlin 2013; Lane 2006). 
This paper focuses on the current account imbalances that emerged among EMU 
member states prior to the euro crisis. On the tenth anniversary of the EMU in 
2008, current account balances ranged from -14.5% of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) in Greece to 5.6% of GDP in Germany.2 The current account balance is 
defined as the trade balance (export minus imports) plus net interest and profit 
receipts from abroad (Carlin and Soskice 2015). It captures inflows and outflows of 
both goods and services and investment income. Iversen, Soskice and Hope (2016) 
                                         
1  The Treaty of Rome was signed in March 1957 and is officially known as the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC). For more information on 
EEC/EU treaties, see: http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm 
2 Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2015. 
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show that the EMU’s current account imbalances had a distinct geographical 
pattern, with the southern European economies (and Ireland) amassing substantial 
deficits and the northern European economies amassing substantial surpluses. They 
also argue that the imbalances were self-reinforcing, as the northern economies trade 
surpluses were being reinvested into the fast-growing southern economies (also see 
Hall 2012). 
If a country is running a current account deficit it signals that they are a net 
borrower from the rest of the world. Persistent current account deficits therefore 
signal rising external indebtedness, which can reflect the accumulation of 
government debt (as in Greece and Italy), private sector debt (as in Ireland and 
Spain), or a combination of the two (as in Portugal). Sizeable external deficits can 
pose serious economic problems. To the extent that they reflect the overheating of 
the non-tradables sector they can damage the competitiveness of the export sector. 
This problem is particularly acute in a currency union (such as the EMU) because of 
the inability to devalue the nominal exchange rate to restore competitiveness. Large 
current account deficits also make economies more vulnerable to external economic 
shocks because of the risk of a sudden stop in the capital inflows financing the deficit 
(Lane 2012). 
The global financial crisis of 2008-09 shook financial market confidence, making 
investors reluctant to lend to the EMU’s deficit countries and pushing up their 
government bond yields (von Hagen, Schuknecht, and Wolswijk 2011; Sturm 2011). 
This escalated into a sovereign debt crisis due to unique features of the EMU; the 
lack of a credible lender of last resort and the lack of a banking union (De Grauwe 
2013; Iversen, Soskice, and Hope 2016; Moro 2014). However, it is clearly no 
coincidence that the countries that on average ran current account deficits during 
the first decade of EMU—Italy, Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal—were those 
that later became embroiled in the euro crisis (Brancaccio 2012; Carlin 2013). 
This paper investigates the extent to which the introduction of the EMU was 
responsible for the current account imbalances that emerged between member states 
in the 2000s. Given the role that current account imbalances played in the euro 
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crisis it is crucial to the next generation of euro area policymaking that the part 
played by the EMU (and its institutional framework) in driving the imbalances is 
better understood. As Bertola et al. (2013) clearly state, any credible strategy for 
getting the EMU back on track needs to address the balance-of-payments crisis as 
well as the sovereign debt and banking crises. 
My study uses a new statistical approach for causal inference in observational 
studies—the synthetic control method (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2010, 
2011, 2015; Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003)—to investigate the effect of the EMU on 
the current account balances of individual member states. The method constructs 
counterfactuals, or ‘synthetic control units’, which show what would have happened 
to the current account balances of member states had they not joined the EMU. The 
synthetic control units are constructed as a weighted average of OECD countries 
outside of the EMU. The difference between the actual current account balances of 
member states and their synthetic counterparts provides an estimate of the causal 
effect of the EMU on the current account balances. 
The synthetic control method has previously been used to assess the economic 
benefits of the EU (Campos, Coricelli, and Moretti 2014), the impact of the Stability 
and Growth Pact on government debt in euro area countries (Koehler and König 
2015) and the effect of the EMU on GDP per capita (Fernández and Perea 2015) 
and real exchange rates (El-Shagi, Lindner, and Schweinitz 2016). To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first time this approach has been used to study the effect of 
the EMU on current account balances. The synthetic control method has several 
advantages over traditional cross-country regressions and comparative case studies. 
First, the counterfactuals-based approach allows me to directly estimate the causal 
effect of the EMU on current account balances. Second, the control units are created 
using a transparent and data-driven procedure, which is often not the case in 
comparative case studies (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2015, 2). Lastly, the 
method avoids the model-dependent extrapolation that is common in regression-
based analyses (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2015, 3; King and Zeng 2006). 
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the theoretical 
and empirical literature on the EMU and current account balances. Section 2.3 sets 
out the synthetic control methodology. Section 2.4 presents the results of the 
synthetic control analysis. Section 2.5 tests the internal validity of the results by 
carrying out a number of placebo and robustness checks. The final section provides 
some concluding remarks. 
 
2.2 Literature review: The EMU and current account balances 
 
A rich literature on the macroeconomic effects of the EMU has emerged since the 
euro was introduced in 1999. Previous studies have investigated the effect of the 
EMU on a whole range of economic indicators, such as trade (Baldwin 2006; 
Baldwin et al. 2008; Bun and Klaassen 2007; Micco, Stein, and Ordoñez 2003), 
foreign direct investment (Petroulas 2007; De Sousa and Lochard 2011), cross-border 
banking (Blank and Buch 2007; Coeurdacier and Martin 2009; Spiegel 2009), real 
exchange rates (El-Shagi, Lindner, and Schweinitz 2016), GDP per capita 
(Fernández and Perea 2015), and wage growth and unemployment (Grüner 2010; 
Mikosch and Sturm 2012). Mongelli and Vega (2006) provide an overview of the 
early literature on the effects of the EMU on economic performance, financial 
structures and product and labour market institutions. 
A large number of scholars have also studied the effect of the EMU on current 
account balances. Starting with the theoretical side, the literature has identified 
three main channels through which the EMU contributed to current account 
divergence among member states. The first is the competitiveness channel. The 
EMU fixed exchange rates between member states and removed the ability of 
countries to devalue to restore external competitiveness. It is also well documented 
that the wage-setting institutions of EMU member states vary greatly in their 
capacity to restrain wage growth, particularly in sheltered sectors (Hancké 2013; 
Johnston, Hancké, and Pant 2014). The divergence in real unit labour costs among 
member states under EMU therefore led to differences in the price competitiveness 
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of their products on world markets and the emergence of current account imbalances 
between the north and south of the currency union (Hall 2012, 2014; Iversen, 
Soskice, and Hope 2016). 
The second channel is the financial integration channel. The EMU furthered 
integration in banking and capital markets and dramatically reduced the borrowing 
costs for the less-creditworthy member states in the south. The delegation of 
monetary policy to the ECB—a credible independent inflation-targeting central 
bank—upon joining the EMU, gave the southern European economies credibility in 
financial markets and the ability to borrow externally (with little pressure for 
adjustment) (as highlighted by Iversen, Soskice and Hope (2016) and discussed 
further in Section 4.4 of Chapter 4 of the thesis). This increased capital flows from 
the north to the south, leading the former to accumulate current account surpluses 
and the latter to accumulate current account deficits (Bertola et al. 2013; Hale and 
Obstfeld 2016). Current account imbalances fuelled by cross-border borrowing can 
be viewed as benign if they reflect a reallocation of resources from high-income 
countries with abundant capital to low-income countries with better growth 
prospects and investment opportunities (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002). However, 
they can be a cause for concern if the capital is channelled into sectors that do not 
improve the productive capacity of the economy (such as real estate) or if they delay 
the pace of necessary but politically costly structural reforms (Fernandez-Villaverde, 
Garicano, and Santos 2013; Lane 2012). 
The final channel is the fiscal deficit channel. The Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) was introduced alongside the EMU. It set out the restrictions on the deficits 
and debt that member state governments could accumulate. However, its weak 
enforcement mechanisms and the lack of constraints on fiscal policy during upswings 
led to both expansionary fiscal stances in boom times and the return of politically-
motivated fiscal boosts in election years (Buti and Van Den Noord 2004; 
Efthyvoulou 2012; Mink and De Haan 2006). The threat of politically costly 
reprimands and fines that came with the SGP also increased the incentives of 
politicians to underplay the size of budget deficits in official forecasts, especially in 
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the lead up to elections (Brück and Stephan 2006). Fiscal policy shocks can lead to 
an appreciation of the real exchange rate if they raise the demand for non-tradable 
goods relative to tradable goods, which then worsens the current account balance 
(Abbas et al. 2011). This crowding out of net exports is compounded if the central 
bank reacts to the fiscal stimulus by raising the real interest rate (to keep inflation 
at target) (Carlin and Soskice 2015). (The adjustment of a small member of a 
common currency area to a fiscal stimulus is set out in more detail in Section 4.4 of 
Chapter 4 of the thesis.) 
Ample empirical evidence has been found to support the three channels 
highlighted by the theoretical literature. Arghyrou and Chortareas (2008) and Belke 
and Dreger (2013) investigate the effect of differences in external competitiveness on 
the current account balances of EMU member states and find a significant negative 
relationship between real exchange rates and current account balances. Schmitz and 
von Hagen (2011) and Hale and Obstfeld (2016) find evidence that the EMU 
significantly increased capital flows from the relatively richer northern member 
states to the relatively poorer southern member states. There are also a number of 
empirical studies that find that the EMU led to an increase in expansionary and 
electorally-motivated fiscal policy (Buti and Van Den Noord 2004; Efthyvoulou 
2012; Mink and De Haan 2006), as well as a rise in overly optimistic budget deficit 
forecasts aimed at misleading electorates, especially in the run up to elections 
(Brück and Stephan 2006). In turn, there is also robust evidence that fiscal policy 
expansions in EMU countries result in a deterioration in the trade balance (Beetsma 
and Giuliodori 2010; Bénétrix and Lane 2010). 
In contrast to the large body of literature that the EMU drove the current 
account imbalances between member states, some recent contributions find that 
factors external to the EMU also played an important role. Chen, Milesi-Ferretti 
and Tressel (2013) and Guerrieri and Esposito (2013) find evidence of several 
external trade shocks—the sharp rise in oil prices, the emergence of China as a 
major exporter of low-value added manufactured goods and the movement of 
continental European production chains to Central and Eastern European 
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countries—that affected the northern and southern EMU member states differently 
during the 2000s, and hence contributed to the current account imbalances. 
The empirical literature on the EMU’s current account imbalances is plentiful but 
currently fails to get to the bottom of the extent to which the EMU was responsible. 
The synthetic control method used in this paper is uniquely suited for addressing 
this gap in the literature as it allows me to estimate how much of the current 
account balance changes were caused by the EMU and how much were driven by 
external factors. 
 
2.3 Methodology: The synthetic control approach 
 
The synthetic control method provides a rigorous quantitative framework for 
carrying out comparative case studies in political science (Abadie, Diamond, and 
Hainmueller 2010, 2011, 2015; Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003). The method uses data 
driven procedures to construct a control unit from a pool of potential control units, 
such that the “synthetic control” unit best “approximates the most relevant 
characteristics of the unit(s) exposed to the event of interest” (Abadie, Diamond, 
and Hainmueller 2010, 494). The approach is a significant improvement on other 
procedures for selecting control countries in comparative case studies, which often 
rely too heavily on researchers’ subjective measures of affinity between countries 
(Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2010, 493). The rigorous, quantitative way in 
which the control unit is chosen gives us more confidence the results can be 
interpreted as the causal effect of the event of interest. 
In my case the event of interest is the introduction of the EMU. The countries 
that joined the EMU adopted the euro, but they also saw other institutional 
changes, such as the ceding of control of monetary policy to the ECB and the 
introduction of the SGP, which restricted member state governments’ control over 
macroeconomic policy. This study uses the synthetic control methodology to produce 
counterfactual current account balances for individual member states showing what 
would have happened had they not joined the EMU. It then looks at the difference 
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between the actual and counterfactual series to quantify the causal effect of joining 
the EMU. 
I start by formally setting out how the synthetic control is constructed. I follow 
the methodology set out in Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2015). At this stage 
I describe the process in general for a country of interest. I will discuss which EMU 
member states have been selected for my study, and why, in Section 2.4. I have a 
sample of  J + 1  countries, where unit  j = 1  is the country of interest, and units 
 j = 2  to  j = J + 1  are the potential control units. More specifically in this study, 
 j = 1  is an EMU member state and  j = 2  to j = 16  are fifteen OECD economies 
that did not join the single currency. The fifteen potential control units are referred 
to as the ‘donor pool’ and are discussed in more detail at the start of the next 
section. I initially assume that I have a balanced panel dataset, which varies across 
J + 1  countries and T  time periods. In addition,  T  is split into two times periods, 
 T0 , representing the pre-EMU period, and T1 , representing the post-EMU period. In 
my case, I have data from 1980-2010 and the EMU was introduced at the start of 
1999, so T0  runs from 1980-1998 and  T1  runs from 1999-2010. The pre-EMU and 
post-EMU periods differ only for Greece, which joined the EMU at the start of 2001. 
The aim of the synthetic control method is to create a control unit that best 
replicates the pre-EMU characteristics of the country of interest, but did not 
experience the event being tested (i.e. did not join the EMU). As there is no one 
country that exactly resembles the country of interest, but did not join the EMU, it 
will be more accurate to use a weighted average of a number of non-EMU countries 
from the donor pool. The synthetic control method is the approach used to find 
these weights, which I shall term W = (w2,...,wJ +1 ′) ,  where 
0 ≤ wj ≤ 1 for j = 2,...,J + 1 and w2 + ... + wJ +1 = 1 . Hence  W  is the (J × 1)  vector of 
country weights that are used to construct the synthetic control unit. The synthetic 
control unit can then be compared to the country of interest in the outcome variable 
(current account balance as a % of GDP) in the post-EMU period to estimate the 
causal effect of joining the EMU. 
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Following Mill’s Method of Difference, Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2015, 
3) suggest that the country weights should be selected such that the pre-EMU 
characteristics of the synthetic control unit best match those of the country of 
interest. In this application, only those characteristics that influence the current 
account balance should be relevant to selecting the optimal weights, W * . I therefore 
define  XC  as a (k × 1)  vector of pre-EMU current account balance predictors for the 
country of interest. These ‘predictors’ are macroeconomic variables that are known 
to influence the current account balance. The predictors will be discussed in more 
detail in the next section. I then aim to match these as well as possible to a matrix 
of pre-EMU current account balance predictors for the donor pool. I define this as 
 XDP , which is a  (k × J )  matrix. The vector XC −XDPW  then defines the difference 
between the country of interest and each country in the donor pool for each of the 
pre-EMU current account predictors. The vector of optimal weights, W *,  is defined 
by: 
 
 
W * = argmin
w
[XC − XDPW ′] v[XC − XDPW ],              (1) 
where  v  is a (k × k)  matrix showing the relative importance of each current account 
balance predictor in minimising the equation. 
It is clear that  v  will have a large effect on  W * . It is therefore important that 
those current account balance predictors that have the most power in determining 
the current account balance of the country of interest should be given the most 
weight. I use the technique proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003, 128) for 
selecting  v , which chooses the current account balance predictor weights such that 
the resulting synthetic control unit best reproduces the trajectory of the current 
account balance of the country of interest in the years before the introduction of the 
EMU. More formally, v*  is defined by: 
v* = argmin
v∈V
[ZC − ZDPW
*(v) ′] [ZC − ZDPW
*(v)],  (2) 
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where  V  is a set of all non-negative diagonal  (k × k)  matrices,  ZC  is a (T0 × 1)  
vector of pre-EMU current account balances for the country of interest and  ZDP  is a  
 (T0 × J )  matrix of pre-EMU current account balances for the donor pool. The 
equation is subject to the constraint that  v* = 1 , such that the optimal weights for 
the synthetic control are given by  W
* =W(v*) . 
The last step in the process is to retrieve the treatment effect (i.e. the effect of 
the EMU on the current account balance of the country of interest). I define YC  as 
a (T1 × 1)  vector of post-EMU current account balances for my country of interest 
and  YDP  as a  (T1 × J )  matrix of post-EMU current account balances for the donor 
pool. The effect of the EMU is simply the difference between the actual current 
account balance of the country of interest and that of the synthetic control unit in 
the post-EMU period. The effect of the EMU is therefore defined as  YC −YC
* , where 
YC
* =W *YDP .
3 
The central testable assumptions of the synthetic control method are that the 
synthetic control unit matches the country of interest well on current account 
balance predictors and that it can closely replicate the trajectory of the country of 
interest in the outcome variable (i.e. the current account balance) in the pre-EMU 
period. Unlike the closely related difference-in-difference method, however, you do 
not also need to assume that the effect of unobserved factors on the current account 
balance are constant over time. Put another way, the model allows for time-varying 
confounders at the country level. The generalisation does come with a price; 
however, as it means assuming linear relationships between outcomes in the post- 
and predictors in the pre-EMU period. 
                                         
3 The synthetic control analysis in this paper is a partial rather than a general equilibrium 
empirical model, which means that it does not take into account the knock-on effects on the 
donor pool countries of a country of interest not joining the EMU. The synthetic control 
method cannot be undertaken without this simplification because it relies on the Stable Unit 
Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) to make causal inferences, which assumes that there 
are no interferences between units (Rubin 1980). 
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Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2015, 4) state “if the number of 
preintervention periods in the data is large, matching on preintervention outcomes 
helps control for unobserved factors and for the heterogeneity of the effect of the 
observed and unobserved factors on the outcome of interest”. In other words, the 
country of interest and its synthetic counterpart could only produce similar 
trajectories in current account balances over the long pre-EMU period if they were 
“alike in both observed and unobserved” current account balance predictors (Abadie, 
Diamond, and Hainmueller 2015, 4). Therefore, if the pre-EMU trends in current 
account balances for the country of interest and its synthetic control unit are close 
enough before the introduction of the EMU, and I assume there are no confounding 
factors that emerge during the post-EMU period and affect my country of interest 
differently from those in donor pool, I can put any deviation after the EMU is 
introduced down to the EMU itself. 
Member states made a decision to join the EMU, whereas some countries in the 
donor pool (e.g. Denmark, Sweden and the UK) had the option to join but chose not 
to. This can pose a problem when estimating the effect of the EMU using statistical 
methods. In an ideal world, some countries would have randomly joined the EMU 
and others would not have, mitigating any potential biases in estimating its effect. 
This is clearly not what happened.  The synthetic control methodology sidesteps the 
issues associated with member states ‘selecting into’ the EMU, however, because it 
does not require exogenous assignment to treatment; it only assumes that the time-
point of adoption is exogenous. The synthetic control units are constructed to match 
my countries of interest as closely as possible on observed and unobserved factors 
that affect the current account balance in the pre-EMU period. This means that, for 
member states, any factors that might have influenced their decision to join the 
EMU and their current account balance (i.e. potential sources of selection bias) are 
taken into account when constructing the synthetic control units.  
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2.4 Empirical analysis and results 
 
Data 
The data sample used for the study is an annual country-level panel dataset that 
covers the period from 1980-2010. The EMU was introduced in 1999, which gives a 
pre-EMU sample running from 1980-1998 and covering 19 years. The post-EMU 
period runs for 12 years from 1999. The only exception is Greece, which joined the 
EMU at the start of 2001; the pre-EMU period for Greece ends in 2000 and the 
post-EMU period begins in 2001. 
The post-EMU period ends in 2010, which is the beginning of the euro crisis (the 
bailouts started from mid-2010 onwards). This allows me to assess the effect of the 
EMU on current account balances during the successful first decade of the single 
currency as well as during the global financial crisis. The time period fits with the 
main aim of the paper, which is to assess the effects of the EMU on current account 
balances in the run up to the euro crisis. However, there is also an important 
methodological reason for ending the post-EMU period in 2010. The euro crisis 
represents a large structural event that affected the current account balances of 
individual OECD economies to varying degrees. While it is plausible that the global 
financial crisis affected all OECD economies, it is clear that some of the donor pool, 
such as countries with close trade relationships with EMU countries or large 
holdings of EMU sovereign bonds, were more exposed to the euro crisis than others. 
The euro crisis therefore represents an asymmetric shock to OECD current account 
balances and including the years after 2010 in the analysis would risk confounding 
my estimates of the EMU’s effect. 
The donor pool for the synthetic control analysis is composed of 15 OECD 
countries that did not join the EMU: Australia, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Hungary, 
Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, the UK and 
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the US. 4  The donor pool only includes OECD countries, as “it is important to 
restrict the donor pool to units with outcomes that are thought to be driven by the 
structural process as for the unit representing the case of interest” (Abadie, 
Diamond, and Hainmueller 2015, 3). The countries of interest in my study are all 
OECD members, making them economically and politically comparable to the donor 
pool. The non-EMU OECD countries are therefore a suitable control group for the 
study. Following El-Shagi, Lindner and Schweinitz (2016), the donor pool comprises 
both high- and middle-income countries to increase the likelihood that all the 
current account predictors of the countries of interest can be well matched.5 This is 
particularly important given that some EMU member states, notably Greece, 
Portugal and Spain, had considerably lower living standards than the high-income 
non-EMU OECD countries upon joining the single currency. 
 In order to guard against confounding the estimates of EMU’s effect, countries 
were not included in the donor pool if they were “subject to structural shocks in the 
outcome variable during the sample period of the study” (Abadie, Diamond, and 
Hainmueller 2015, 3). Norway and Switzerland were therefore excluded from the 
donor pool because they experienced large current account balance shocks during the 
post-EMU period. Norway’s current account surplus jumped from 5.5% to 14.7% of 
GDP between 1999 and 2000, driven by an exogenous shock to the oil price. The 
price of Europe Brent crude oil tripled between January 1999 and September 2000.6 
Switzerland current account surplus collapsed from 10.8% to 3% of GDP between 
2007 and 2008. 7  This reflected Switzerland’s heavily finance-orientated economy 
                                         
4 Following Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2015), I do not include Iceland in the donor 
pool due to its small size and unusual economic structure. 
5 As additional robustness tests, I also carry out the synthetic control analysis with two 
modified donor pools. The first excludes the five middle-income countries: Chile, Hungary, 
Mexico, Poland and Turkey. The second adds two non-EMU non-OECD countries that 
accumulated large current account deficits during the 2000s: Bulgaria and Romania. The 
results are shown in Figures A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A1. The main results of the paper are 
robust to using these alternative donor pools. 
6 Source: US Energy Information Administration. 
7 Source for Norwegian and Swiss current account balances: IMF World Economic Outlook 
Database, October 2015. 
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(much more so than any EMU member state in the study) and the huge losses that 
the Swiss banking system took on their foreign subsidiaries during the financial crisis 
(SNB 2009). The dramatic structural shock to the Swiss current account balance in 
2008 shows the uniquely high exposure of the Swiss current account balance (among 
my sample) to a shock in global financial markets, and ultimately their unsuitability 
as a donor country. 
The outcome variable in the analysis is the current account balance (as a per 
cent of GDP). The current account balance predictors in the analysis are a set of 
macroeconomic variables that are known to influence the current account balance. 
They have been selected based on the literature on current account balances and the 
EMU set out in Section 2.2 and the previous empirical literature on the economic 
determinants of current account balances (see, for example, Chinn and Prasad 2003; 
Gruber and Kamin 2007; Schmitz and von Hagen 2011). I account for the 
competitiveness channel by including measures of the price level of exports (relative 
to the US) and trade openness (%). I account for the financial integration channel 
by including measures of total investment (as a % of GDP), domestic credit to the 
private sector (as a % of GDP), GDP per capita (PPP) and GDP growth (%). 
These variables cover both the benign catching up scenario where credit flows from 
rich to poor countries and the credit bubble scenario where capital inflows are 
channeled into unproductive sectors. I account for the fiscal deficit channel by 
including measures of public debt (as a % of GDP) and the government primary 
balance (as a % of GDP). In addition to these variables, I also include a measure of 
domestic demand growth (%), which Belke, Oeking and Setzer (2015) show is 
important in explaining exporting dynamics and consequently current account 
balances in the countries that ran persistent current account deficits in the post-
EMU period (France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain).  
All current account predictors are available for the entire pre-EMU period (1980-
1998), apart from GDP growth (1981-1998), total investment (1984-1998), public 
debt (1986-1998), government primary balance (1990-1998) and domestic credit to 
private sector (1991-1998). The current account predictors are averaged over the 
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pre-EMU period as part of the estimation process (see Section 2.3), so it does not 
pose a problem for the analysis if they are not available for entire pre-EMU period. 
The data for the analysis were collected from the IMF, the World Bank and the 
Penn World Tables (see Table A.1 in Appendix A1 for a full list of definitions and 
data sources). 
 
Country selection 
As mentioned in the Section 2.3, one of the central testable assumptions of the 
synthetic control method is that the synthetic control unit can closely replicate the 
pre-EMU current account balance trend of the country of interest. Only in the cases 
where this assumption holds can I be confident of obtaining causal estimates of the 
EMU’s effect. In order to test whether the assumption holds, I carry out the 
synthetic control analysis described in Section 2.3 for all the founding EMU member 
states (except for Luxembourg) and Greece (which joined in 2001). 8  Table 2.1 
reports the mean squared prediction errors (MSPEs) in the pre-EMU period, which 
measure of closeness of fit (lower numbers indicate a better fit) between the current 
account balances of the EMU member states and their synthetic control units. 
The table shows that the closeness of fit varies widely across countries, ranging 
from 0.63 in France to 10.04 in Portugal. It is unsurprising that the method does not 
produce good synthetic control units for all EMU member states; as the method 
creates a control unit from a convex combination of countries in the donor pool, it is 
unlikely to work for all countries, especially those that have pre-EMU current 
account balance trends that are more extreme than the countries in the donor pool. 
 
 
 
 
                                         
8 The synthetic control analysis was carried out in R using the Synth package. As in Abadie, 
Diamond and Hainmueller (2015) and El-Shagi, Lindner and Schweinitz (2016), Luxembourg 
is excluded due to its small size and its unusual economic structure. 
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Table 2.1. Country selection: Pre-EMU MSPEs between EMU member states and 
their synthetic control units 
 Pre-EMU MSPE 
Austria 1.52 
Belgium 4.41 
Finland 3.87 
France  0.63 
Germany 3.75 
Greece 2.08 
Ireland 6.55 
Italy 0.87 
Netherlands 3.94 
Portugal 10.04 
Spain 1.19 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: The pre-EMU period runs from 1980-1998 in all countries except Greece, where it runs 
from 1980-2000. The figures in bold are those under the 2.5 threshold for inclusion in the 
main synthetic control analysis. 
 
In order to restrict the analysis to the cases where the central assumption holds, I 
select only those member states where the pre-EMU MSPE is below 2.5 (shown in 
bold in Table 2.1). Hence the synthetic control analysis in the paper focuses on five 
countries: Austria, France, Greece, Italy and Spain. This country selection approach 
is similar to the approach taken by Billmeier and Nannicini (2013), who use a pre-
treatment root MSPE threshold as a criterion for deciding which synthetic control 
results to present graphically in their paper. 
The threshold of 2.5 seems a reasonable upper limit on pre-EMU trends closely 
matching. As we shall see in Figure 2.1, the current account balances of the 
synthetic control units for the five countries under the threshold closely track their 
actual current account balances in the pre-EMU period. In addition, the first 
member state above the threshold (Germany) has a MSPE nearly twice as large as 
the first member below the threshold (Greece); hence, the closeness of fit in the pre-
EMU period worsens considerably once we go beyond the five member states with 
the lowest MSPEs. 
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The synthetic control units 
The synthetic control analysis involves choosing the country weights (W * ) such that 
the weighted average of the control units best reproduces the current account 
balance predictors of the countries of interest in the pre-EMU period. Table 2.2 
shows the weight each country in the donor pool takes in the synthetic control units 
of my five countries of interest. To take one country as an example, we can see that 
Synthetic Austria is a convex combination of Australia (21%), Hungary (18%), 
Japan (39%), Korea (1%) and Poland (21%); with all other countries in the donor 
pool receiving a weight of zero. The country weights are different for each country of 
interest because they have different values for the current account predictors (and 
different current account trajectories) in the pre-EMU period. 
 
Table 2.2. Weights for synthetic control units 
 
Synthetic control weight 
Synthetic 
Austria 
Synthetic 
France 
Synthetic 
Greece 
Synthetic  
Italy 
Synthetic  
Spain 
Australia 21%  -    30%  -    9% 
Canada   -     -     -    15%  -    
Chile  -     -     -     -    1% 
Denmark  -    15%  -    16% 2% 
Hungary 18%  -     -     -    1% 
Israel  -     -     -     -     -    
Japan 39% 23%  -    6% 11% 
Korea 1%  -     -     -    2% 
Mexico  -     -     -    16% 37% 
New Zealand  -     -    34%  -     -    
Poland 21%  -    13%  -     -    
Sweden  -    36%  -    48% 1% 
Turkey  -    10% 22%  -     -    
United Kingdom  -    15%  -     -    36% 
United States  -     -     -     -     -    
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: Weights rounded to the nearest per cent so may not sum to 100%. 
 
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 show the current account balance predictor means in the 
pre-EMU period (1980-1998) for Austria, France, Italy and Spain, and their 
synthetic counterparts. The far right-hand column of the two tables shows the 
 
 
44 
predictor means for the full donor pool.9 Greece joined the EMU in 2001 so the pre-
EMU period is longer for Greece than the other countries of interest. Table 2.5 
shows the current account predictor means in the pre-EMU period (1980-2000) for 
Greece, Synthetic Greece and the full donor pool. 
We can see that the countries of interest are much closer to their synthetic 
counterparts on the majority of current account balance predictors than they are to 
the full donor pool, hence the synthetic control analysis produces better comparison 
units for the countries of interest than the simpler approach of averaging over the 
full set of non-EMU OECD countries in the donor pool. In cases where current 
account balance predictors do not match closely this likely indicates the predictor 
receives a small weight in the calculation of the synthetic control unit—i.e. given the 
other predictors, the predictor does not have substantial power predicting the pre-
EMU current account balance trajectory of the country of interest.10 
Tables 2.3 to 2.5 show that there is a weighted average of OECD economies than 
did not join the EMU that can reproduce the economic attributes that determine 
the current account balances in my countries of interest before the introduction of 
the EMU. As discussed earlier, this is one of the central assumptions of the synthetic 
control methodology. The tables therefore help underpin my confidence that any 
difference between the countries of interest and their synthetic counterparts in the 
post-EMU period can be interpreted as the causal effect of the EMU. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
9 I choose to present data on the donor pool as an unweighted average, rather than as a 
population-weighted average such as that used in Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2015). 
The latter approach would unduly weight the averages towards the larger countries in the 
sample (e.g. the US), which is not appropriate for my study, where the outcome variable is 
current account balance (as a % of GDP). 
10 The weight each current account predictor takes in the minimisation of Equation (1) is 
shown in Table A.2 in Appendix A1. 
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Table 2.3. Current account balance predictor means in the pre-EMU period for 
Austria, France, their synthetic control units and the full donor pool: 1980-1998 
 
Austria 
Synthetic 
Austria France 
Synthetic 
France 
Full donor 
pool 
GDP per capita (PPP,  
current international dollars) 19,236 13,622 18,252 16,871 13,492 
Trade openness (%) = 
merchandise exports and 
imports as a share of GDP  
at current PPPs 
74% 30% 49% 58% 42% 
Domestic absorption growth 
(constant prices, 2005 $US, 
annual percentage change) 
2.1% 2.4% 1.9% 2.3% 3.1% 
Price level of exports  
(relative to US prices, price 
level of US GDP in 2005 = 1) 
0.61 0.58 0.61 0.61 0.58 
GDP growth (constant prices, 
annual percentage change) 2.2% 2.4% 2.1% 2.7% 3.3% 
Total investment  
(as a % of GDP) 27% 26% 22% 24% 24% 
Public debt  
(as a % of GDP) 60% 67% 44% 64% 63% 
Government primary balance  
(as a % of GDP) 0.3% 0.6% -1.0% 0.8% 1.5% 
Domestic credit to private 
sector  
(as a % of GDP) 
93% 104% 85% 107% 73% 
Current account balance  
(as a % of GDP) -1.0% -1.0% 0.2% 0.1% -1.9% 
Source: Author’s calculations. See Table A.1 in Appendix A1 for a list of sources for the 
underlying variables. 
Note: All variables are averaged for the 1980-1998 period. Except for: GDP growth (1981-
1998), total investment (1984-1998), public debt (1986-1998), government primary balance 
(1990-1998) and domestic credit to private sector (1991-1998). The last column presents the 
unweighted average for the full donor pool. 
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Table 2.4. Current account balance predictor means in the pre-EMU period for 
Italy, Spain, their synthetic control units and the full donor pool: 1980-1998 
 
Italy 
Synthetic 
Italy Spain 
Synthetic 
Spain 
Full donor 
pool 
GDP per capita (PPP,  
current international dollars) 18,530 17,083 14,196 13,029 13,492 
Trade openness (%) = 
merchandise exports and imports 
as a share of GDP  
at current PPPs 
40% 67% 34% 34% 42% 
Domestic absorption growth 
(constant prices, 2005 $US, 
annual percentage change) 
2.1% 1.9% 2.8% 2.8% 3.1% 
Price level of exports  
(relative to US prices, price level 
of US GDP in 2005 = 1) 
0.59 0.61 0.59 0.59 0.58 
GDP growth (constant prices, 
annual percentage change) 1.9% 2.4% 2.7% 2.8% 3.3% 
Total investment  
(as a % of GDP) 21% 22% 23% 23% 24% 
Public debt  
(as a % of GDP) 105% 69% 52% 52% 63% 
Government primary balance  
(as a % of GDP) 2.9% 2.0% -0.3% 1.3% 1.5% 
Domestic credit to private sector  
(as a % of GDP) 55% 83% 75% 78% 73% 
Current account balance  
(as a % of GDP) -0.5% -0.7% -1.3% -1.3% -1.9% 
Source: Author’s calculations. See Table A.1 in Appendix A1 for a list of sources for the 
underlying variables. 
Note: All variables are averaged for the 1980-1998 period. Except for: GDP growth (1981-
1998), total investment (1984-1998), public debt (1986-1998), government primary balance 
(1990-1998) and domestic credit to private sector (1991-1998). The last column presents the 
unweighted average for the full donor pool. 
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Table 2.5. Current account balance predictor means in the pre-EMU period for 
Greece, Synthetic Greece and the full donor pool: 1980-2000 
 
Greece 
Synthetic 
Greece 
Full donor  
pool  
GDP per capita (PPP,  
current international dollars) 13,796 13,298 14,218 
Trade openness (%) = 
merchandise exports and  
imports as a share of GDP  
at current PPPs 
32% 33% 43% 
Domestic absorption growth 
(constant prices, 2005 $US, 
annual percentage change) 
2.0% 3.2% 3.2% 
Price level of exports  
(relative to US prices, price level 
of US GDP in 2005 = 1) 
0.53 0.55 0.58 
GDP growth (constant prices, 
annual percentage change) 1.6% 3.2% 3.4% 
Total investment  
(as a % of GDP) 26% 24% 24% 
Public debt  
(as a % of GDP) 82% 42% 62% 
Government primary balance  
(as a % of GDP) 1.7% 1.6% 1.8% 
Domestic credit to private sector  
(as a % of GDP) 32% 61% 75% 
Current account balance  
(as a % of GDP) -3.4% -3.2% -1.9% 
Source: Author’s calculations. See Table A.1 in Appendix A1 for list of sources for the 
underlying variables. 
Note: All variables are averaged for the 1980-2000 period. Except for: GDP growth (1981-
2000), total investment (1984-2000), public debt (1986-2000), government primary balance 
(1990-2000) and domestic credit to private sector (1991-2000). The last column presents the 
unweighted average for the full donor pool. 
 
Empirical results 
Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of current account balances in my countries of 
interest and their synthetic counterparts between 1980 and 2010. The first thing to 
note is that the evolution of current account balances in the actual countries and 
their synthetic controls match closely before the introduction of the EMU. This 
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satisfies the other central assumption of the method, that the synthetic controls can 
closely track the movement of the actual data over the long pre-EMU period. 
 
Figure 2.1. Trends in current account balances (as a % of GDP) between 1980 and 
2010: Austria, France, Greece, Italy and Spain vs. their synthetic control units. 
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database October 2015; Author’s calculations. 
Note: The vertical dotted lines show when countries joined the EMU. All countries joined in 
1999 except Greece, which joined in 2001. 
 
In all five countries the trajectory of the country and its synthetic control unit 
diverge significantly after the EMU is introduced. In Austria, the actual current 
account moved dramatically into surplus in the post-EMU period, whereas Synthetic 
Austria remained in deficit. In the other four countries, actual current account 
balances deteriorated much more than the current account balances of the synthetic 
control units in the post-EMU period. Although the results do not cover all the 
EMU member states, they do provide strong empirical support for the hypothesis 
that the introduction of the EMU caused the current account balances of member 
states to diverge. 
The causal effect of the EMU on current account balances is calculated as the 
gap between each country and their synthetic counterpart in the post-EMU period. 
Table 2.6 shows that the EMU had a significant negative effect on the current 
account balances of France, Greece, Italy and Spain. The average gap in the pre-
EMU period was close to zero for all four countries but the post-EMU average gaps 
ranged between -2.3 percentage points in France and -5.0 percentage points in 
Greece. The opposite held in Austria, where the average post-EMU gap was 3.6 
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percentage points. The results imply that the EMU improved the current account 
position of Austria and worsened the current account position of France, Greece, 
Italy and Spain.  
 
Table 2.6. Average current balance gaps (in percentage points of GDP) between 
Austria, France, Greece, Italy and Spain, and their synthetic control units in the 
pre- and post-EMU periods 
 Average current account balance gap  (in percentage points of GDP) 
 Austria France Greece Italy Spain 
Pre-EMU 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.0 
Post-EMU 3.6 -2.3 -5.0 -4.5 -4.3 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: The pre-EMU period runs from 1980-1998 for all countries except Greece, where it 
runs from 1980-2000. The post-EMU period runs from the year after the end of the pre-EMU 
period until 2010.  
 
The causal effect of the EMU is plotted over time in Figure 2.2. The figure shows 
that current account balance gaps grew over time during the first decade of the 
EMU, apart from a brief period in the early 2000s in Greece, and to a lesser extent 
Spain, that likely reflected the slowdown of these economies during the global slump 
of the early 2000s. The effect of the EMU peaks in Austria, Spain and Greece in 
2007-08, just on the eve of the global financial crisis. The current account balance 
gaps in these countries then fell back (toward zero) as a result of the crisis. Italy and 
France’s current account balance gaps were much less affected by the global 
financial crisis. 
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Figure 2.2. Current account balance gaps (in percentage points of GDP) between 
Austria, France, Greece, Italy and Spain and their synthetic control units: 1980 to 
2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: The vertical dotted lines show when countries joined the EMU. All countries joined in 
1999 except Greece, which joined in 2001.  
 
The synthetic control analysis cannot directly test the relative importance of the 
channels (or mechanisms) identified in the literature review in Section 2.2 in driving 
the current account imbalances but the results do provide some insights. There is a 
clear difference in the size of current account balance gaps (and underlying deficits) 
in the southern European countries at the onset of the global financial crisis; gaps 
(and deficits) were significantly larger in Greece and Spain than France and Italy 
(see Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2). In addition, Greece and Spain had much less 
sustainable external debt positions (Fernandez-Villaverde, Garicano, and Santos 
2013) and experienced bigger falls in their current account gaps (and underlying 
deficits) when the global financial crisis hit (see Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2). This fits 
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with the financial integration channel playing a larger role in the Greece and Spain 
than elsewhere. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010, 2012) show that abnormally large 
current account deficits, such as those fuelled by excessive domestic credit 
expansion, were associated with sharp current account reversals during the global 
financial crisis. The large pressure for external adjustment in Greece and Spain after 
the crisis hit was at least partly driven by financial markets suddenly no longer 
viewing these countries as credible borrowers—i.e. a sudden stop in capital inflows 
(Lane 2012). The financial integration channel clearly intersected with the fiscal 
deficits channel in Greece, where the government grossly mismanaged the public 
finances and borrowed excessively on international debt markets (Featherstone 2011; 
Katsimi and Moutos 2010). 
The competitiveness channel is likely to have affected all five of the countries. 
Greece, Italy and Spain do not possess the wage bargaining institutions to restrain 
wage growth and once they joined the EMU they could no longer devalue to regain 
competitiveness. In contrast, Austria belongs to the group of coordinated market 
economies (CMEs) in northern Europe that have coordinated wage bargaining that 
ties wage growth in the sheltered sector to that in the export sector (Johnston and 
Hancké 2009; Johnston, Hancké, and Pant 2014). France sits somewhere in between; 
it can to some extent limit wage growth through state-imposed wage coordination 
(Johnston, Hancké, and Pant 2014), but it is much less export-orientated than the 
northern European CMEs and often grouped with the southern European economies 
as a mixed market economy in the varieties of capitalism literature (Hall 2014; 
Iversen, Soskice, and Hope 2016). It is well documented, however, that France saw 
its cost competitiveness vis-à-vis Germany (its biggest export competitor) 
deteriorate during the 2000s (Bouchoucha 2015; Kierzenkowski 2009). The 
introduction of the EMU in a set of countries with different wage-setting institutions 
led to a divergence in real unit labour costs and consequently current account 
balances (Carlin 2013; De Grauwe 2013; Johnston, Hancké, and Pant 2014). The 
north–south competitiveness differential is likely to take time to correct because 
wages are downwardly rigid and can often only be adjusted gradually (Bertola et al. 
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2013), and because efforts to improve relative competitiveness in the south are 
slowed by continued wage restraint in the north (Brancaccio 2012). This could be 
one potential reason why the current account balance gaps in Italy and France, 
where the competitiveness channel is likely to have been relatively more important, 
were largely unaffected during the global financial crisis. 
The main results of the synthetic control analysis provide ample empirical 
evidence that the EMU drove the accumulation of current account deficits in the 
southern European economies prior to the euro crisis. While only one northern 
European surplus country is directly tested in my analysis, I believe the Austrian 
result implies that the EMU also drove the imbalances across the northern Europe 
surplus economies. The northern European CMEs share distinct political-economic 
institutions and wage bargaining systems and are driven strategically by export-
orientation (Hall 2014; Iversen, Soskice, and Hope 2016); and like Austria, the other 
northern CMEs saw their real units labour costs and current account balances 
diverge from those of the southern European economies during the 2000s (Carlin 
2013; De Grauwe 2013). Hence, the main results of the study provide empirical 
evidence that the EMU caused the current account imbalances not just in my 
countries of interest but across the euro area as a whole. 
 
2.5 Placebo and robustness tests 
 
The results presented so far suggest that the EMU drove the current account 
imbalances between member states in the run-up to the euro crisis. It is important 
to carry out further tests, however, before we can be confident in the credibility of 
the findings of the synthetic control analysis. This section reports the results of a 
selection of placebo and robustness checks—mirroring those carried out in Abadie, 
Diamond, and Hainmueller (2015)—to test the internal validity of my results. As an 
additional robustness test, I also re-estimate the main results using a panel 
difference-in-differences design. 
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Spillovers robustness test 
One potential bias in this study could be if there were spillovers to the current 
account balances of the countries in the donor pool from the introduction of the 
single currency. For example, if the EMU altered patterns of trade outside of the 
euro area. The presence of spillovers would violate the Stable Unit Treatment Value 
Assumption (SUTVA), which assumes that there are no interferences between units 
(Rubin 1980). SUTVA violations should be small in my case because by design the 
countries that form the synthetic control were not part of the EMU, and therefore 
did not have their exchange rates irrevocably fixed to the EMU members states 
during the post-EMU period. In addition, as the control countries were outside the 
EMU, their transactions costs from trade and their currency risk on cross-border 
banking flows were not reduced in the same way as my countries of interest by the 
introduction of the single currency. 
It is, however, difficult to rule out spillovers completely in countries that traded a 
lot with EMU member states during the post-EMU period. It is theoretically unclear 
in which direction spillovers would bias my results, especially as the donor pool 
contains both current account surplus and deficit countries, but in order to allay any 
fears they may be driving the results of the synthetic control analysis, we re-run the 
analysis excluding the four countries that traded the most with the euro area during 
the post-EMU period. This results in the removal of two middle-income countries, 
Hungary and Poland, and two high-income countries, Denmark and the UK, from 
the donor pool.11 We limit the removal to four countries because we need to ensure 
the donor pool is still sufficiently large to produce good synthetic control units. 
Figure 2.3 shows that the main results are robust to the removal. In fact, the 
estimated effect of the EMU in Italy and Spain is slightly larger without these 
countries in the donor pool, suggesting that if spillovers are present, they are 
actually leading to an underestimation of the EMU’s effect in these two countries. 
                                         
11 The donor pool countries were ranked according to the average proportion of total trade 
(exports + imports) that occurred with euro area countries over the post-EMU period (1999-
2010). Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, December 2015. 
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Figure 2.3. Current account balance gaps (in percentage points of GDP) between 
Austria, France, Greece, Italy and Spain, and their synthetic control units, with full 
donor pool and donor pool excluding Denmark, Hungary, Poland and the UK: 1980 
to 2010 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: The vertical dotted lines show when countries joined the EMU. All countries joined in 
1999 except Greece, which joined in 2001. 
 
In-time placebos 
The next set of tests is the in-time placebos, which reassigns the event of interest 
(i.e. the introduction of the EMU) to a period prior to when it actually occurred. A 
large EMU effect could undermine the credibility of the main results. In my study, 
the pre-EMU period for Austria, France, Italy and Spain runs for 19 years; hence I 
reassign the EMU to 1990 for these countries, which is the middle of the period and 
nine years before the euro was actually introduced. As Greece joined the EMU in 
2001, their pre-EMU period runs for two more years. I therefore reassign the 
introduction of the EMU to 1991 for the Greek test. 
 The next step is to carry out exactly the same synthetic control analysis as 
before but using the altered time periods.12 Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 show that the 
current account balance gaps for all countries except Italy are small in both the pre- 
and post-euro periods and fluctuate around zero, indicating the placebo introduction 
                                         
12  The only change in the specification in Austria, France, Italy and Spain is that the 
government primary balance and domestic credit to the private sector are dropped as 
predictors because no data is available during the 1980-1989 period. As the government 
primary balance is available from 1990, only domestic credit to the private sector is dropped 
in the Greek analysis.  
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of the EMU has no significant effect on current account balances. In Italy, the 
placebo shows a positive current account balance gap opening up prior to the actual 
introduction of the EMU. However, this does not undermine the main results, 
because Italy was a deficit country during 2000s, hence to the extent to which these 
pre-EMU effects were present, they would likely lead to an underestimation of the 
EMU effect in Italy in the main results. 
Taken together, the results of the in-time placebos suggest that the current 
account balance gaps in the main results are driven by the introduction of the EMU 
and not the inability of the synthetic control units to replicate actual current 
account balances. 
 
Figure 2.4. Placebo EMU introduction in 1990: Current account balance gaps (in 
percentage points of GDP) between Austria, France, Italy and Spain, and their 
synthetic control units: 1980 to 1998 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: Vertical dotted line marks the date of the placebo EMU introduction (1990). 
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Figure 2.5. Placebo EMU introduction in 1991: Current account balance gap (in 
percentage points of GDP) between Greece and Synthetic Greece: 1980 to 2000 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: Vertical dotted line marks the date of the placebo EMU introduction (1991). 
 
It is evident that the eventual EMU member states knew about the currency union 
well in advance of 1999, and that the member state governments pursued restrictive 
macroeconomic policies during the 1990s in order to achieve the Maastricht 
convergence criteria (a set of targets for macroeconomic indicators) required to join 
the single currency. The in-time placebo tests, however, help to dispel fears of 
anticipatory effects invalidating the results of the synthetic control analysis, because 
they show that the EMU had no significant effect on the current account balances of 
my countries of interest (excluding Italy) before the introduction of the EMU. One 
potential reason for this could be that the 1990s saw macroeconomic management in 
advanced economies shift towards independent inflation-targeting central banking, 
hence the non-euro OECD countries that make up the synthetic control units were 
pursuing similarly tight macroeconomic policies to my countries of interest during 
latter part of the pre-EMU period. Additionally, many countries in the donor pool 
were also pursuing restrictive fiscal policies during the 1990s to reduce the 
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government deficits (and debt) that built up during the economic downturn of the 
early 1990s (as discussed further in Section 4.6 of Chapter 4 of the thesis). 
 
Across-country placebos 
The second type of placebo study I carry out is an across-country placebo. This 
reassigns the introduction of the EMU to countries in the donor pool one at a time, 
providing a distribution of placebos effects (i.e. the effect of adopting the single 
currency) for OECD countries in my sample that did not participate in the EMU. If 
my baseline results are credible, then the effect of the EMU should be significantly 
larger for my countries of interest than countries in the donor pool. The across-
country placebo must be carried out separately for the five countries in my study. 
For each country of interest, the synthetic control method must be carried out 15 
times, each time reassigning the event of interest to a different country in the donor 
pool (and dropping the relevant country of interest into the donor pool). 
According to Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2015), the results of the across-
country placebo are best interpreted by comparing ratios of the post-EMU mean 
squared prediction error (MSPE) to the pre-EMU MSPE, as shown in Figure 2.6. 
The MSPE is a measure of the closeness of fit between a country’s actual current 
account balance and that of its synthetic control. The MSPE ratio is higher when 
the effect of the EMU on the current account balance is larger. However, the 
measure also takes into account how well the synthetic control for each country can 
approximate the pre-EMU trend in current account balances. A large current 
account balance gap in the post-EMU period is not strong evidence of the EMU 
having a large effect if the synthetic control unit does not tightly match the current 
account balance of the country of interest in the pre-EMU period. Put another way, 
a high post-EMU MSPE is not suggestive of the EMU having a sizeable effect on the 
current account balance when the pre-EMU MSPE is also sizeable. 
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Figure 2.6. Ratio of post-EMU MSPE to pre-EMU MSPE: Austria and donor pool, 
France and donor pool, Greece and donor pool, Italy and donor pool, and Spain and 
donor pool 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: The pre-EMU period runs from 1980-1998 for all countries except Greece, where it 
runs from 1980-2000. The post-EMU period runs from the year after the end of the pre-EMU 
period until 2010. 
 
Austria, Greece, Italy and Spain have by far the largest post- to pre-EMU MSPE 
ratio of the 16 countries in their respective samples. We can use the distribution of 
ratios to compute a p-value (as in Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller 2015, 11). If 
the null hypothesis (that the EMU has no effect) was true, the probability of finding 
a ratio as large as the one observed for Austria, Greece, Italy and Spain would be 
just 1/16 or 0.0625. The MSPE ratio in France is the second highest in the sample 
to Sweden, which means the French p-value is 2/16 or 0.125. However, Synthetic 
Sweden is overwhelmingly dependent on France (it receives a 79% weight in the 
synthetic control) and hence the Swedish result would not be robust to the type of 
test carried out in the next subsection. 
I can use the p-values calculated for my countries of interest and Fisher’s 
(1932) combining function to calculate a combined p-value across my five 
independent studies. 13  The joint null hypothesis is that all of the separate null 
                                         
13 The combined test statistic is calculated as −2 ln(pi)
i=1
k
∑ , which has a  χ 2  distribution with 
2k  degrees of freedom, where k  is the number of independent tests being combined. 
0 5 10 15 20 25
JPN
KOR
DNK
AUS
GBR
ISR
HUN
POL
MEX
USA
CAN
TUR
CHL
NZL
SWE
ESP
Post-euro MSPE / Pre-euro MSPE
 
 
65 
hypotheses are true (i.e. that the EMU has no effect on current account balances in 
all five countries). The overall p-value from my synthetic control analyses is 0.00120, 
which is highly statistically significant at any conventional level. Taken together, 
the p-values from my synthetic control analysis therefore suggest that the main 
results of the study are very unlikely to have been driven by chance. 
 
Leave-one-out robustness test 
The leave-one-out robustness test is to assess whether the baseline results are 
sensitive to the removal of any one country from the synthetic control units. This is 
to avoid the case where the results are driven by one country. Carrying out the 
robustness test for a country of interest involves re-running the synthetic control 
analysis a number of times, each time leaving out one of the countries that make up 
the synthetic control unit (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2015). For example, 
Synthetic Austria is made up of Australia, Hungary, Japan, Korea and Poland. The 
test involves removing each of these five countries in turn from the donor pool and 
re-calculating the synthetic control analysis. The results of the test are shown in 
Figure 2.7. 
We can see that the main results of the synthetic control analysis are robust to 
the removal of any individual country from the synthetic control units. In other 
words, the current account balance gaps are very similar between the synthetic 
control units and the leave-one-out synthetic control units. The French and Italian 
tests do show some variation in the size of the current account balance gaps but the 
main qualitative result still holds up; the EMU led to a significant deterioration in 
current account balances in both countries. Taken together, the leave-one-out 
robustness tests provide evidence that one particular country is not driving the main 
results of my study. 
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Figure 2.7. Robustness test: Leave-one-out distribution of the gaps (in percentage 
points of GDP) between Austria, France, Greece, Italy and Spain, and their 
synthetic control units: 1980 to 2010 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: The vertical dotted lines show when countries joined the EMU. All countries joined in 
1999 except Greece, which joined in 2001.  
 
Panel difference-in-differences results 
The final robustness test in the paper is to re-estimate the results using a panel 
difference-in-differences design. If the results are comparable to those of the 
synthetic control analysis, it adds further credibility to the main results of my study. 
I estimate two models using the same dataset as the synthetic control analysis. The 
dataset includes my five countries of interest and the fifteen donor pool countries 
and covers 1980-2010. In both models the dependent variable is current account 
balance (as a % of GDP) and the independent variables of interest are an EMU 
dummy, which is one for my five countries of interest from 1999-2010 and zero 
otherwise, and an interaction term, which interacts an Austria dummy (1 for 
Austria and zero otherwise) and the EMU dummy. The interaction is included 
because the synthetic control results show that the EMU effect in Austria (large and 
positive) was very different from the other four countries of interest (large and 
negative). Model 1 then includes both country and year fixed effects; and Model 2 
further adds the full set of current account predictors (covariates) used in the 
synthetic control analysis. I use two-way clustered standard errors to account for 
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69 
dependencies between observations both within countries and within time periods. 
Table 2.7 reports the results of the panel difference-in-differences estimation. 
 
Table 2.7. The effect of the EMU on current account imbalances: Panel difference-
in-differences estimates 
Model (1) (2) 
EMU -3.50 ** -2.69 ** 
 (1.52) (1.07) 
 [0.021] [0.011] 
Austria * EMU 5.43 *** 2.28 ** 
 (1.51) (1.12) 
 [0.000] [0.041] 
Observations 620 593 
R -squared 0.15 0.36 
Country fixed effects ✓ ✓ 
Year fixed effects ✓ ✓ 
Covariates ✗ ✓ 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: This table shows the coefficients from panel difference-in-differences regressions. The 
two-way clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses and the p-values are shown in 
brackets; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1. The dependent variable is current 
account balance (as a % of GDP). The standard errors are two-way clustered by country and 
year. 
 
The results show that the EMU exerted a statistically significant negative effect on 
the current account balances of the five EMU member states in the sample. The 
statistically significant interaction term shows a large countervailing EMU effect in 
Austria. The coefficients in Model 1 are of a comparable size to those in the 
synthetic control analysis (see Table 2.6). The coefficients in Model 2 are somewhat 
smaller but are still statistically significant and have the expected signs. The results 
of both models therefore corroborate the main findings of the synthetic control 
analysis. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
The European sovereign debt crisis put severe economic and political strain on the 
EMU and prompted a reassessment of the EMU’s supposedly successful first decade. 
This turned the spotlight onto the substantial macroeconomic imbalances that 
emerged between member states after the introduction of the euro, and the 
divergence in current account balances in particular. 
This paper investigates the extent to which the introduction of the EMU was 
responsible for the current account imbalances that arose between member states. 
More specifically, I use macroeconomic data from OECD countries and a 
counterfactuals-based approach—the synthetic control method—to estimate the 
causal effect of the EMU on the current account balances of individual member 
states. This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the effect of EMU on 
current account balances, which has yet to come to a consensus about whether the 
imbalances were caused by the EMU (Belke and Dreger 2013; Campa and Gavilan 
2011; Schmitz and von Hagen 2011) or by factors external to the currency union 
(Chen, Milesi-Ferretti, and Tressel 2013; Guerrieri and Esposito 2013). The 
synthetic control approach is ideally suited to fill this gap in the literature as it 
shows us what would have happened to the current account balances of member 
states had they not joined the EMU. 
The results of the study show that the introduction of the single currency caused 
a significant deterioration in the current account balances of France, Greece, Italy 
and Spain, and significantly improved the current account position of Austria. The 
similarity of political-economic institutions across the northern European CMEs, as 
well as comparable trends in real exchange rates and current account balances 
during the 2000s, suggests that the Austrian result is also likely to hold in the other 
northern European CMEs. In other words, the EMU is likely to have caused the 
accumulation of current account surpluses across the northern European CMEs. The 
main results of my study therefore imply that the EMU drove the current account 
imbalances not just in my countries of interest but across the euro area as a whole. 
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Policymakers in the euro area have started to pay more attention to external 
imbalances in the wake of the euro crisis. The European Commission’s 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) aims to identify and correct 
macroeconomic imbalances, including those in the current account.14 However, the 
results of my study provide reason to be skeptical about whether the MIP will 
succeed in achieving its goals. I find the EMU drove the imbalances, and hence 
changes to the EMU’s institutional framework, and not just better monitoring of 
external balances, may be required to avoid the imbalances reemerging in the future. 
In addition, my results suggest that policy intervention, such as, for example, fiscal 
devaluation (see Bertola et al. 2013) is likely to be necessary to close the 
competitiveness gap that opened up between the north and south during the 2000s, 
especially given continued wage moderation in the north. 
This paper makes a valuable contribution to the large body of empirical literature 
on the macroeconomic effects of the EMU by using the synthetic control 
methodology to provide causal evidence that the EMU drove the euro area’s current 
account imbalances in the run up to the euro crisis. However, it is important to 
acknowledge the limitations of my synthetic control analysis, as this helps to 
identify important areas for future research. First, while the results suggest that the 
EMU’s effect on current account balances operated through multiple channels (see 
Section 2.4), the synthetic control analysis does not explicitly test the causal 
mechanisms. It is clear that we still require a better understanding of the underlying 
mechanisms if the next generation of euro area policymaking is to successfully 
safeguard the EMU from dangerous external imbalances. The methodology is also 
unable to produce good synthetic control units for all member states (see Section 
2.4). It is therefore crucial that future research provides rigorous empirical evidence 
on the effect of the EMU on the current account balances of the surplus economies 
other than Austria; especially Germany, which built up a huge current account 
                                         
14  For more information on the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/macroeconomic_imbalance_pr
ocedure/index_en.htm 
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surplus and lent heavily to southern Europe during the 2000s. Lastly, the analysis 
does not include the years beyond 2010 due to the high risk of confounding the 
estimates of the EMU’s effect (see Section 2.4). A quick look at the post-2010 data 
shows that the burden of adjustment to the euro area’s current account imbalances 
has fallen squarely on the shoulders of the deficit countries in the south. Exploring 
the role of the EMU in the distinct pattern of current account adjustment since the 
euro crisis is likely to be another fruitful avenue for future research. 
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3 
 
The comparative political economy of growth 
models in advanced democracies 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper argues that growth models in advanced democracies are dependent upon 
both varieties of capitalism and the logic of political competition. It demonstrates 
empirically that the coordinated market economies with consensus political systems 
pursued export-led growth models during the Great Moderation and liberal market 
economies with majoritarian political systems pursued consumption-led growth 
models. The paper uses the growth models lens to develop a new approach to 
comparative political economy that incorporates both the supply side (political–
economic institutions) and the demand side (demand drivers of economic growth 
and government demand-side policies) of the economy. The approach emphasises the 
strong influence that political systems have on the long-term electoral viability of 
different growth models. The approach helps to explain one of the major empirical 
phenomena of the Great Moderation: the dramatic divergence in real exchange rates 
and current account balances among advanced democracies. It also allows me to 
provide fresh insights on important on-going debates in comparative political 
economy surrounding the roles of both income inequality and credit expansion in 
post-Fordist growth. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
In the Fordist era of mass production and consumption that characterised the 
advanced democracies from the end of the Second World War until the late 1970s, 
economic growth was underpinned by rapid growth in both wages and productivity 
(Glyn 2007). The dominant growth model in advanced democracies during the 
Fordist era was the wage-led growth model, in which household consumption and 
investment were the primary drivers of demand (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016). 15 
The wage-led growth model collapsed along with the Fordist system in the late 
1970s under the combined weight of short-term upheaval (industrial conflict and 
stagflation) and longer-term structural trends (deindustrialisation and declining 
union membership and strength) (Hope and Soskice 2016). The post-Fordist era that 
followed has been characterised by a number of secular trends in the global economy 
such as globalisation, deindustrialisation, the information and communications 
technology (ICT) revolution, and financialisation (Hall 2015; Wren 2013b). 
Governments and firms in advanced democracies have had to respond to the 
challenges and opportunities created by these trends. At the top of their list of 
challenges was to find a replacement for the wage-led growth model, one that could 
deliver prosperity in the highly globalised and interconnected post-Fordist world. 
Baccaro and Pontusson (2016) find that advanced democracies have pursued one 
of two growth models in the post-Fordist era: export-led or consumption-led. A 
central claim of their growth models approach to comparative political economy 
(CPE) is that growth models are not dependent of varieties of capitalism. They see 
their approach as a demand side alternative to the supply-side dominated varieties 
of capitalism literature. Figure 3.1 shows the contributions of consumption and 
exports to GDP growth in fifteen advanced democracies during the Great 
                                         
15 Table B.1 in Appendix B1 shows the large average annual contributions of consumption to 
GDP growth across advanced democracies during the 1960s and 1970s. 
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Moderation—the long period of reduced macroeconomic volatility and low inflation 
that preceded the global financial crisis in 2008-09.16 
 
Figure 3.1. Average annual contributions of consumption and exports to GDP 
growth, 1994-2007 
 
Source: European Commission's Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG 
ECFIN) AMECO Database (03/05/2016 update). 
Note: See Appendix B2 for a guide on how to calculate annual contributions to GDP growth 
and more information on the data source for the figure. The markers in the figure correspond 
to varieties of capitalism. The grey squares are CMEs and the black circles are LMEs. 
 
In line with Baccaro and Pontusson (2016), the figure shows that advanced 
democracies pursued different growth models during the Great Moderation. The 
countries in the top left-hand corner pursued consumption-led growth models and 
the countries in the bottom right-hand corner pursued export-led growth models. 
What is also clear from the figure is that growth models were closely correlated with 
varieties of capitalism. The black circles in the figure are the liberal market 
economies (LMEs), which were predominantly consumption-led, and the grey 
                                         
16 The term Great Moderation was first introduced by Stock and Watson (2002). 
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squares are the coordinated market economies (CMEs), which were predominantly 
export-led. This provides strong evidence against Baccaro and Pontusson’s (2016) 
argument that post-Fordist growth models cannot be delineated along varieties of 
capitalism lines.17 
This paper argues that you need to incorporate both the supply and demand 
sides of the economy, as well as political systems, in order to understand the 
trajectories of advanced democracies during the Great Moderation. The 
complementary political–economic institutions at the heart of varieties of capitalism 
represent the supply side and the demand drivers of growth and the demand-side 
policies of governments represent the demand side. Political systems play a key role 
in holding everything together through their influence on the long-term electoral 
viability of different growth models. 
The paper does not seek to test specific causal hypotheses but rather to use 
theory and empirical evidence to illuminate the complex set of interrelationships 
between growth models, varieties of capitalism, politics and policy in advanced 
democracies. The growth models approach I develop helps to explain one of the 
major empirical phenomena of the Great Moderation: the dramatic divergence in 
real exchange rates and current account balances among advanced democracies. It 
also provides a fresh perspective on important on-going debates in CPE surrounding 
the roles of both income inequality and credit expansion in post-Fordist growth. 
The main tenets of the new approach to CPE developed in this paper and the 
key findings of the empirical analysis are: 
Varieties of capitalism, political systems, and growth models are deeply intertwined. 
Post-Fordist growth models are rooted in political-economic institutions; the CMEs 
are driven strategically by export-led growth and the LMEs are driven strategically 
by consumption-led growth. Despite institutional and structural change in the CMEs 
during an era of deindustrialisation, coordinated capitalism has ultimately remained 
resilient, and the CMEs continue to be firmly export-led. The consensus political 
                                         
17 See Hope and Soskice (2016) and Martin (2016) for further critical discussion of Baccaro 
and Pontusson (2016). 
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systems of the CMEs and the majoritarian political systems of the LMEs are 
complementary to their growth models and provide a strong electoral incentive for 
parties on both sides of the partisan divide to pursue policies that support the 
national growth model. 
Divergent growth models helped fuel macroeconomic imbalances. The mutually 
reinforcing growth models of the CMEs and the LMEs were a major contributor to 
the dangerous current account imbalances that emerged among advanced 
democracies during the Great Moderation. Government demand-side policies, such 
as fiscal policy and the encouragement (or mitigation) of credit expansion, supported 
growth models and further contributed to the imbalances. The move to independent 
inflation-targeting central banking and the opening of financial markets, 
paradoxically, gave governments in advanced democracies more discretion to pursue 
demand-side policies over this period. 
Income inequality only affected growth models at the margin. The Kaleckian ideas 
brought into CPE by Baccaro and Pontusson (2016) suggest that a more equal 
distribution of income will result in higher household consumption. Contrary to 
these ideas, I find that the highly inegalitarian LMEs were the most consumption-
led during the Great Moderation. This is not to say that, ceteris paribus, 
redistribution from rich to poor will not boost consumption but rather that other 
factors related to varieties of capitalism, such as wage coordination, are more 
important than the income distribution in driving growth models. Within the 
export-led CMEs, however, the distribution of income did have some second-order 
effects on growth models. The more egalitarian Nordic CMEs had a higher 
contribution of consumption to growth than the less egalitarian continental 
European CMEs (and Japan). 
Credit expansion was central to the LMEs’ consumption-led growth model. The 
rapid growth in credit in the LMEs, which was encouraged by their governments, 
helped to prop up consumption directly, through consumer credit, and indirectly, 
through its effect on house prices. While often overlooked, the Nordic CMEs and the 
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Netherlands also saw rapid credit expansion during the Great Moderation. This did 
not undermine their export-led growth models, however, because it was centred on 
housing and had a much smaller effect on consumption than the expansion of credit 
in the LMEs. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 takes an in-depth 
look at the links between varieties of capitalism and growth models. Section 3.3 
investigates the role of political systems, electoral politics and government demand-
side policies in growth models. Section 3.4 focuses on the relationship between 
growth models, income inequality and redistribution. Section 3.5 focuses on the 
relationship between growth models, credit and housing. The final section provides 
some concluding remarks. 
 
3.2 Varieties of capitalism and growth models during the Great 
Moderation 
 
The growth models pursued by advanced democracies during the Great Moderation 
were correlated with Hall and Soskice’s (2001) varieties of capitalism (as shown in 
Figure 3.1). However, correlation does not imply causation, and it is necessary to 
provide some theory as to why this clustering occurs. The link between varieties of 
capitalism and growth models is currently underdeveloped in the CPE literature. 
This section aims to fill that gap. 
 
The varieties of capitalism approach 
Hall and Soskice’s (2001) varieties of capitalism approach to comparative political 
economy puts the firm at centre stage. The framework identifies five spheres—
industrial relations, skill formation, corporate governance, inter-firm relations and 
employer–employee relations—in which firms must solve coordination problems by 
developing relationships with other actors in the economy. A central pillar of the 
varieties of capitalism approach is that firms resolve these coordination problems in 
distinctive ways in different nation states. The two ideal types of political economy 
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identified are liberal market economies (LMEs), where firms coordinate primarily via 
market mechanisms and hierarchies, and coordinated market economies (CMEs), 
where firms coordinate primarily via non-market relationships and resolve many of 
their problems through strategic interaction. 
The political-economic institutions that underpin each variety of capitalism are 
complementary to one another, so no actor has an incentive to deviate from the 
status quo. A key consequence of LMEs and CMEs having distinct institutional 
frameworks is that they possess comparative advantages in different activities. 
LMEs specialise in high-technology manufacturing and services, as flexible labour 
and capital markets mean firms are well equipped to pursue strategies based on 
radical innovation. In contrast, in CMEs with long-term relationships between 
actors, specific-skilled workforces and patient capital, firms are better placed to 
pursue strategies based on incremental innovation, and therefore CMEs tend to 
specialise in more traditional manufacturing industries such as capital goods (Hall 
and Soskice 2001; Soskice 1999). 
The sample of advanced democracies analysed in the paper comprises the ten 
CMEs identified by Hall and Soskice (2001), as well as five of the six LMEs. 18 The 
CME group consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and Sweden; and the LME group consists of 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 
                                         
18 Ireland is excluded from the LME group on the grounds that it is a big outlier when it 
comes to growth; its average GDP growth rate over the sample period was 7.4%, which was 
nearly twice as high as the next fastest growing economy Finland, which saw average growth 
of 4% (Source: European Commission AMECO Database, 03/05/2016 update). Ireland’s 
institutional configuration also differed from the textbook LME case. Its wage bargaining 
was more centralised, which along with high levels of inward FDI helped exports make a 
much bigger contribution to growth than in the other LMEs, particularly in the 1990s 
(Barnes and Wren 2012). The mixed market economies (MMEs) of southern Europe (France, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) are also excluded from the analysis as they lack 
institutional coherence and (partly as a consequence) did not possess a consistent growth 
model during the Great Moderation. In addition, the paper focuses on advanced democracies 
and a number of the MMEs were much less developed than the LMEs and CMEs at the start 
of the sample period. The average GDP per capita of Greece, Portugal and Spain was 
$11,521 in 1994, compared to $25,955 for the fifteen countries analysed in the paper (Source: 
IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2016). 
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large varieties of capitalism, macroeconomic policy, and welfare state literatures in 
CPE focus on these countries (or a very similar set of countries) (e.g. Esping-
Andersen 1990; Iversen 2005; Martin and Swank 2012; Pontusson 2005; Thelen 2014; 
Wren 2013b). Thus, to be able to build on and develop the theoretical insights in 
the existing literature, I need to examine the same set of cases (countries) (Gerring 
2011). 
 
Growth models during the Great Moderation 
The nascent comparative political economy literature on growth models defines a 
nation’s growth model by the relative contributions that the different components of 
aggregate demand—consumption, investment, government spending and net exports 
(exports minus imports)—make to overall GDP growth (Baccaro and Pontusson 
2016; Hope and Soskice 2016). 
GDP growth could in theory be driven by any of the four components of 
aggregate demand that contribute positively to growth—consumption, investment, 
government spending and exports. However, as in Baccaro and Pontusson (2016), I 
focus on the two dominant demand drivers of the post-Fordist era: consumption and 
exports. The other two components of aggregate demand played an important 
supporting role but were not the main engines of growth in advanced democracies 
during the Great Moderation. Government spending growth reflects the stance of 
fiscal policy, which I argue in Section 3.3 was typically chosen to reinforce national 
growth models during the Great Moderation—i.e. fiscal policy was more restrictive 
in export-led CMEs than it was in the consumption-led LMEs. Investment-led 
growth was more associated with fast-growing emerging economies building up their 
infrastructure and production capacities than with advanced democracies. For 
example, investment (gross fixed capital formation) accounted for 22% of GDP on 
average across the fifteen countries in the sample between 1994 and 2007, whereas it 
accounted for 35% of GDP in China over the same period.19 
                                         
19 Source: OECD Annual National Accounts (data accessed June 2016). 
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Table 3.1 shows the average annual contributions of consumption and exports to 
GDP growth in the fifteen advanced democracies in the sample between 1994 and 
2007, as well as their average GDP growth rate.20 The average annual contributions 
reflect both the importance of consumption and exports to GDP (their weights in 
GDP) and how quickly they are expanding (their growth rates).21  I focus on the 
period from 1994 to 2007, which is referred to throughout as the Great Moderation. 
I choose to start in 1994, as this is when the advanced democracies had fully 
emerged from the economic downturns of the early 1990s, which were particularly 
acute and long lasting in Sweden and Finland. The reason for concentrating on the 
Great Moderation is twofold. First, the period coincided with two major changes in 
the macroeconomic regimes of advanced democracies—the introduction of inflation-
targeting central banking and the opening of financial markets—that underpinned 
post-Fordist growth models (see Section 3.3). Second, it was the period when growth 
models became particularly entrenched and persistent macroeconomic imbalances 
emerged among advanced democracies (as will be discussed later in the section). 
The countries in the table are divided into LMEs and CMEs. We can see that 
consumption typically made a larger contribution to GDP growth in the LMEs and 
exports typically made a larger contribution to GDP growth in the CMEs. I 
therefore define the LMEs’ growth model as consumption-led and the CMEs’ growth 
model as export-led.  
 
 
 
 
                                         
20 The paper concentrates on exports and not net exports because exports and imports have 
very different drivers, and because the CMEs are specifically geared towards export 
promotion. However, Figure B.1 in Appendix B1 shows that the same patterns emerge for 
growth models if we replace the contribution of exports to GDP growth with the 
contribution of net exports to GDP growth. 
21 Appendix B2 shows how annual contributions to GDP growth are calculated and provides 
more information on the data source. 
 
 
82 
Table 3.1. LMEs vs. CMEs: Average annual contributions of consumption and 
exports to GDP growth, and the average annual GDP growth rate, 1994-2007 
 
Average annual 
contribution of 
consumption to  
GDP growth (%) 
1994-2007  
Average annual 
contribution of 
exports to  
GDP growth (%) 
1994-2007 
Average annual  
GDP growth (%) 
1994-2007 
Liberal market 
economies 
 
 
 
Australia 2.4 0.8 3.7 
Canada 1.9 1.8 3.2 
New Zealand 2.3 1.4 3.6 
United Kingdom 2.4 1.5 3.0 
United States 2.4 0.6 3.2 
Average 2.3 1.2 3.4 
 
 
 
 
Coordinated market 
economies  
 
 
Austria 1.0 2.8 2.6 
Belgium 0.9 3.7 2.5 
Denmark 1.1 2.3 2.5 
Finland 1.8 3.1 4.0 
Germany 0.6 2.3 1.7 
Japan 0.6 0.7 1.2 
Netherlands 1.2 3.9 3.0 
Norway 1.8 1.2 3.1 
Sweden 1.3 3.0 3.4 
Switzerland 0.9 2.4 2.1 
Average 1.1 2.5 2.6 
Source: European Commission's Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG 
ECFIN) AMECO Database (03/05/2016 update). 
Note: See Appendix B2 for a guide on how to calculate annual contributions to GDP growth 
and more information on the data source for the figure. 
 
We can see from the table that there was significant variation in the contribution of 
consumption to GDP growth within the export-led CMEs. Consumption tended to 
make a larger contribution to economic growth in the Nordic CMEs (Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, and Sweden) than it did in the continental European CMEs 
(Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) or Japan. The 
reasons for this within CME variation will be explored further in Sections 3.4 and 
3.5. The right-hand side of the table shows that average GDP growth in the LMEs 
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outstripped that in the CMEs over the Great Moderation, although the fast-growing 
Nordic CMEs had comparable GDP growth rates to the LMEs. 
The only two countries that do not fit well into the growth models dichotomy are 
Norway and Japan. The Norwegian economy is unique among the CMEs because it 
is a major oil exporter. Oil prices rose sharply during the 2000s; the price of Brent 
crude oil went from $28 in January 2000 to $133 in July 2008.22 The IMF (2013, 10) 
report that Norway experienced a “striking loss of market share for non-oil exports” 
during this period due to rapid expansion of the oil and gas sectors, which has 
indirectly burdened the more traditional and lower productivity, non-oil 
manufacturing sectors with rising wage costs. This helps explain Norway’s more 
consumption-led growth model during the Great Moderation. I would argue that the 
Norway should still be considered an export-led economy, however, because the 
contribution of exports to growth was similar to the other CMEs over the broader 
post-Fordist era.23 
The Japanese economy performed considerably worse than the Norwegian 
economy on both the consumption and export dimensions during the Great 
Moderation (see Table 3.1). The 1990s are often referred to as the Japanese 
economy’s “lost decade” (Hayashi and Prescott 2002), as the economy collapsed into 
an extended period of weak domestic demand and anaemic growth following the 
bursting of a huge stock market and property bubble (Callen and Ostry 2003; Koo 
2009). Exports suffered over this period due to short-term shocks, such as the Asian 
financial crisis and the bursting of the dotcom bubble, and longer-term trends, such 
as Japanese exporters being slow to exploit rapidly rising demand from emerging 
economies (e.g. the BRICs) and rising competition from firms in emerging and newly 
                                         
22  Source: US. Energy Information Administration, Crude Oil Prices: Brent - Europe 
[DCOILBRENTEU], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU, 22 July 2016. 
23 Table B.2 in Appendix B1 shows that the average annual contribution of exports to GDP 
growth in Norway was equal to or higher than all of the LMEs over the 1980 to 2007 period. 
The case becomes even stronger if we remove the 2002 to 2007 period of particularly poor 
export performance; Norway was the country with the third biggest contribution of exports 
to GDP growth in the sample (after the Netherlands and Belgium) over the 1980 to 2001 
period (Source: European Commission AMECO Database, 03/05/2016 update). 
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industrialised economies with lower labour costs and increasingly innovative 
products (e.g. Samsung in South Korea) (Kazuhiko 2015). 
Unlike Norway, I would argue that Japan has not pursued an export-led growth 
model during the post-Fordist era, despite often being characterised in that way in 
the varieties of capitalism literature (e.g. Iversen and Soskice 2012).24 In contrast to 
the other CMEs, the improvement in the current account balance (see Table 3.3) 
and the sizeable contribution of net exports to GDP growth (see Figure B.1 in 
Appendix B1) over the Great Moderation reflect the weakness of import demand 
rather than strong export performance. Japan is therefore the one major exception 
within the CME camp and would make an interesting case study for future research. 
One last point to note from Table 3.1 is that consumption made a very low 
contribution to GDP growth in Germany during the Great Moderation, on a par 
with that in struggling Japan. This has to be understood within the wider historical 
context, however, as the German economy experienced a major structural shock 
when East and West Germany reunified in 1990. The post-reunification boom 
caused inflationary pressure to build and the Bundesbank responded by aggressively 
raising interest rates (Clarida and Gertler 1997). This led to an appreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate, which was detrimental to the economically and politically 
important German export sector. The low consumption growth in Germany 
compared to the other European CMEs during the Great Moderation therefore has 
to be seen (at least partly) as a consequence of German firm’s restraining wages in 
order to counteract the one-off loss of competitiveness associated with reunification 
(Dustmann et al. 2014; Hope and Soskice 2016). 
 
 
                                         
24 We can see from Table B.2 in Appendix B1 that exports made a smaller contribution to 
growth than consumption in Japan between 1980 and 2007. In addition, even when the 
Japanese economy was growing extremely fast during the last two decades of the Fordist era, 
it was consumption driving economic expansion rather than exports. As shown in Table B.1 
in Appendix B1, the average annual contribution of consumption to GDP growth was 4.4% 
between 1961 and 1979, compared to just 0.7% for exports. 
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The CMEs and export-led growth 
Recent literature in the varieties of capitalism tradition has recast the CMEs as 
export-led economies (Hope and Soskice 2016; Iversen and Soskice 2010, 2012; 
Iversen, Soskice, and Hope 2016). The organisation of the political economy and the 
institutional apparatus in the CMEs are both geared towards the export sector, 
which directly and indirectly provides a large proportion of the high-value added 
employment, economic growth and tax revenue. Cooperative workforces with co-
specific skills support long-term export viability, along with patient capital and the 
ability to hold down wage costs and safeguard external competitiveness through 
coordinated wage bargaining. The institutional framework of CMEs and export 
sector success are mutually reinforcing. The size and profitability of the export 
sector is essential to underpin the technology transfer and innovation systems, the 
extensive system of vocational training (encompassing technical universities and 
tertiary professional qualifications), a dense network of business associations and a 
myriad of companies that provide intermediate inputs and services to the export 
sector (Hope and Soskice 2016; Iversen and Soskice 2012; Iversen, Soskice, and Hope 
2016). 
The welfare states in the CMEs are also deeply complementary to the skill 
specificity at the centre of the export-led growth model. For workers to commit to 
extensive investment in firm- or industry-specific skills at the start of their careers, 
often foregoing significant earnings while doing so, they require guarantees of 
employment protection, unemployment protection and wage protection in the future 
(Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001; Iversen 2005; Soskice 2007). While the 
continental European CMEs’ Christian Democratic welfare states are more purely 
insurance based and the Nordic CMEs’ Social Democratic welfare states are more 
universalistic, service-based, and redistributive, both offer strong insurance systems 
for regular (permanent) employees (Esping-Andersen 1990; Hope and Soskice 2016; 
Iversen and Stephens 2008). 
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The real exchange rate (both price and cost competitiveness) has a substantial 
influence on the demand for exports (Carlin, Glyn, and Van Reenen 2001; Madsen 
2008), and consequently the main actors in CMEs—firms, unions, business 
associations and the government—are very concerned to avoid excessive wage 
growth that could undermine external competitiveness. The first column of Table 
3.2 shows that the CMEs have a considerably higher degree of coordination in wage 
setting than the LMEs. This reflects the organisation of the political economy and 
the supporting institutions, as well as the growth model. Coordinated unions and 
business organisations cooperate to restrain real wages in the CMEs, which in turn 
promotes export-led growth. Wage restraint not only helps improve competitiveness 
but also ensures that newly trained workers with specialist skills in high-end export 
sectors are absorbed into firms, thus supporting a high-skills equilibrium based on 
exporting (Iversen and Soskice 2010, 2012). Wage restraint is generally reinforced by 
conservative monetary and fiscal policy in CMEs, which helps to discipline large and 
well-organised wage and price setters (Iversen and Soskice 2012; Soskice 2007; 
Soskice and Iversen 2000). The role of government demand-side policies in growth 
models will be discussed in more depth in Section 3.3. 
It is important to note that Carlin, Glyn and Van Reenen (2001) and Madsen 
(2008) both find strong empirical evidence real exchange rates are not the only 
factor influencing export performance. Taken together, they also highlight 
technological progress, innovative activity, human capital accumulation and the 
structure of corporate governance as significant drivers of export performance. This 
suggests that wage restraint alone is not sufficient to pursue an export-led growth 
model—it is just one piece in the wider jigsaw of coordinated capitalism. 
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Table 3.2. LMEs vs. CMEs: Average wage coordination, trade openness and 
household savings rate, 1994-2007 
 
Average coordination 
of wage setting  
(1-5 scale) 
1994-2007 
Average trade 
openness  
(% of GDP) 
1994-2007 
Average net  
household saving  
(as a percentage of 
households’ net 
disposable income) 
1998-2007 
Liberal market 
economies   
 
Australia 2.0 40.0 1.7 
Canada 1.0 72.7 2.8 
New Zealand 1.0 59.7 -2.5 
United Kingdom 1.0 53.4 2.4 
United States 1.0 23.7 4.4 
Average 1.2 49.9 1.7 
   
 
Coordinated market 
economies 
  
 
Austria 4.0 83.3 10.3 
Belgium 4.8 131.6 10.2 
Denmark 3.9 80.1 -2.5 
Finland 4.4 70.7 1.9 
Germany 3.7 58.8 9.8 
Japan 4.3 22.2 4.1 
Netherlands 4.0 117.5 6.6 
Norway 4.1 70.8 5.2 
Sweden 3.7 77.6 5.7 
Switzerland 3.0 92.1 15.0 
Average 4.0 80.5 6.6 
Source: J. Visser, ICTWSS Database. Version 5.0. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for 
Advanced Labour Studies AIAS. October 2015. Open access database at: www.uva-
aias.net/208; OECD Annual National Accounts (data accessed June 2016); OECD National 
Accounts at a Glance, June 2016. 
Note:  The coordination of wage setting measure is variable ‘Coord’ from the ICTWSS 
Database. It measures the degree of wage coordination (regardless of the level it occurs at). 
Higher values indicate a greater degree of coordination. Trade openness = (exports + 
imports) as a % of GDP (all in current prices). Net household savings data is only available 
from 1998 onwards so the average runs from 1998-2007. 
 
The LMEs and consumption-led growth 
The liberal market economies were consumption-led during the Great Moderation. 
They relied on the expansion of domestic demand to drive growth, in part enabled 
by the expansion of credit to households. The key features of the organisation of the 
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political economy in the LMEs—decentralised wage bargaining, flexible and fluid 
labour markets, and education systems with a focus on general skills (especially at 
the tertiary level)—underpinned two major shifts in the economic structure. First, 
the high capacity for radical innovation saw the LMEs experience rapid growth in 
high-end knowledge-intensive services, such as finance, professional services, media 
and software development (Barnes and Wren 2012). Second, the removal in the 
1980s of protections on low-income workers and the associated fall in prices 
facilitated an expansion of low productivity, relatively price and income elastic, and 
largely non-traded service sectors such as personal services, restaurants and hotels, 
and retail (Iversen and Wren 1998; Wren, Fodor, and Theodoropoulou 2013). The 
latter expansion in particular meant that the LMEs have been less successful than 
the CMEs in safeguarding their external competitiveness, and their output and 
employment is typically more concentrated in non-traded sectors (Iversen and 
Soskice 2010). Barnes and Wren (2012) show that employment in low productivity, 
non-traded services is positively correlated with private indebtedness in advanced 
economies. This supports the argument that credit expansion was central to 
propping up consumption of both goods and services in the LMEs during the 1990s 
and 2000s. 
The general skills education system in the LMEs equips workers with skills that 
are highly transferable across firms and industries. Hence, the median voter in the 
LMEs does not demand an extensive system of social protections (Soskice 2007). In, 
fact they are more likely to view the welfare state as redistribution to low-income 
households, and have been shown to be less supportive of welfare state expenditures 
than the median voter in the CMEs (Iversen and Soskice 2001). In combination with 
low employment protection, the liberal welfare state supports the flexible labour 
markets at the centre of the LMEs’ consumption-led growth model.  
The behaviour of households is obviously crucial to explaining the more 
prominent role that consumption plays in growth in the LMEs. The third column of 
Table 3.2 shows the net savings rates of households in advanced economies. We can 
see that households in the LMEs typically save less (and spend more) of their 
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disposable income, which is a key reason the LMEs are more consumption-led. The 
difference is starkest between the LMEs and the continental European CMEs 
(especially Austria, Belgium, Germany and Switzerland), which is likely to be partly 
driven by greater precautionary saving in the latter set of economies (Iversen and 
Soskice 2012). In addition to their demand for social insurance, workers with specific 
skills have a strong incentive to build up a buffer of private savings to help insure 
themselves against periods of unemployment. This motive is particularly pertinent in 
CMEs where the welfare state is going through a period of realignment or 
retrenchment and the future capacity of the state to insure against fluctuations is 
uncertain (Soskice 2007); for example, the extensive Hartz reforms undertaken in 
Germany from 2003 (Carlin and Soskice 2009). Household savings rates in the 
Nordic CMEs are closer to those in the LMEs, which in large part reflects the build-
up of household indebtedness that took place in these economies during the Great 
Moderation. The role of credit in the growth models of the LMEs and the Nordic 
CMEs will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.5. 
The degree of trade openness is another notable difference between the LMEs and 
the CMEs that influences their growth models. The second column of Table 3.2 
shows that the CMEs generally trade more with the global economy than the LMEs 
(relative to GDP). This affects growth models in a very mechanical way because the 
weight of exports and imports in GDP is larger (and consumption smaller) in more 
open economies. This helps to explain why the CMEs are less consumption-led. 
Trade openness can also aid us in trying to unpack the Japanese puzzle. Japan was 
the most closed economy in the entire sample during the Great Moderation, which 
helps explains why exports made such a small contribution to GDP growth over this 
period. The average population of Japan was close to 127 million persons between 
1994 and 2007, which means it possesses a huge internal market to fuel economic 
expansion.25 
                                         
25 Source: OECD Historical Population Data and Projections (1950-2050). 
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Trade openness is not exogenous, however, it is determined by characteristics of 
the national political economy including varieties of capitalism and growth models. 
One noticeable feature of the CMEs is that eight of the ten economies are small 
open economies (only Germany and Japan are not); in fact seven of the eight (only 
Finland is missing) were included in Katzenstein’s (1985) seminal book Small States 
in World Markets. The size of these economies mean they lack the internal markets 
to gain the economies of scale that are crucial to the functioning of an advanced 
economy. They must therefore seek their economies of scale and specialisation by 
focusing on export markets, as well as importing a wider range of goods than larger 
economies (Katzenstein 1985). 
The evolution of trade openness over the Great Moderation was also deeply 
rooted in varieties of capitalism. Figure 3.2 shows the change in trade openness 
between 1994 and 2007. There is a clear divide between the CMEs, where trade 
openness increased dramatically, and the LMEs, where it changed much less.26 The 
jump in openness speaks to both the export orientation of the CMEs’ production 
regimes, as well as their increasing reliance on imported goods. These trends help 
entrench the export-led growth model by boosting the share of exports in GDP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
26 Norway is the one exception, which is likely to do with its unique position among the 
CMEs as a major oil exporter (as discussed earlier in Section 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2. Change in trade openness, 1994-2007 
 
Source: OECD Annual National Accounts (data accessed June 2016). 
Note: Trade openness = (exports + imports) as a % of GDP (all in current prices). The 
colours of the columns correspond to varieties of capitalism. The grey columns are CMEs and 
the black columns are LMEs. 
 
Growth models and external imbalances 
The most obvious macroeconomic consequence of advanced democracies pursing 
different growth models during the Great Moderation was the build-up of current 
account imbalances between the LMEs and the CMEs. The current account balance 
is defined as the trade balance (exports minus imports) plus net profit receipts and 
interest from abroad (Carlin and Soskice 2015). It tracks the net flow of goods, 
services and investment income into an economy. A current account deficit signals a 
country is a net borrower from the rest of the world, and persistent deficits indicate 
the accumulation of external debt. 
Export-led CMEs were typically in trade surplus and consumption-led LMEs 
were typically in trade deficit during the Great Moderation, as shown by the average 
annual contributions of net exports to GDP growth in Figure B.1 in Appendix B1. 
This reflects both the export prowess of the CMEs and the tendency of the 
consumption-driven LMEs to import more goods and services than they export.  
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Table 3.3 shows the current account balances of the LMEs and the CMEs during 
the Great Moderation. The LMEs started the period in deficit and the CMEs started 
in surplus, showing that growth models also diverged in the earlier part of the post-
Fordist era. However, the gap widened significantly between the two groups over the 
course of the Great Moderation; by 2007 the gap between the average current 
account balances of the two groups was ten percentage points of GDP. 
 
Table 3.3. LME vs. CMEs: Current account balances, 1994-2007 
 Current account balance (as a % of GDP) 
 
1994 2007 
Change 
1994-07  
Liberal market economies    
Australia -4.5 -6.7 -2.2 
Canada -2.4 0.8 3.2 
New Zealand -3.1 -6.8 -3.7 
United Kingdom -0.5 -2.5 -2.0 
United States -1.7 -5.0 -3.3 
Average -2.4 -4.0 -1.6 
 
   
Coordinated market economies    
Austria -1.5 3.8 5.3 
Belgium 5.3 1.5 -3.8 
Denmark 2.0 1.4 -0.7 
Finland 1.1 3.8 2.8 
Germany -1.5 6.8 8.2 
Japan 2.7 4.9 2.2 
Netherlands 4.6 6.0 1.3 
Norway 2.9 12.2 9.3 
Sweden 1.0 8.9 7.8 
Switzerland 5.8 10.8 5.0 
Average 2.2 6.0 3.7 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2016. 
 
Many CPE scholars have pointed to different varieties of capitalism and growth 
models as being a major driver of the current account imbalances, both in global 
economy (Iversen and Soskice 2012) and within the Eurozone (Hall 2012, 2014; 
Johnston and Regan 2016). These papers also highlight the central role played by 
the external imbalances in the global financial crisis and the Eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis. The imbalances reflected the build up of dangerous credit and asset price 
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bubbles that left deficit countries exposed to a sudden stop in capital inflows and the 
world economy vulnerable to a financial crisis (Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti 2012; 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2012). 
The fact that growth models are so deeply ingrained in political–economic 
institutions and political systems—that are fixed or slow to change—suggests the 
external imbalances of the pre-crisis period are likely to persist. The immediate post-
crisis period provides some evidence in line with this hypothesis. Table B.3 in 
Appendix B1 shows that the gap in current account balances between the LMEs and 
the CMEs in 2015 was almost identical to the gap on the eve of the financial crisis 
in 2007. The analysis in this paper suggests that coordination among countries 
would be needed to permanently reduce imbalances and governments would need to 
pursue demand-side policies that run contrary to their growth models. Given that 
demand-side policies remain firmly in the hands of national governments and there 
is such a strong electoral incentive to pursue policies that support national growth 
models, external imbalances among advanced democracies are likely to continue to 
be a prominent feature of the world economy. 
 
Growth models and institutional change in an era of deindustrialisation 
The preceding analysis has shown that the CMEs pursued export-led growth models 
during the Great Moderation and the LMEs pursued consumption-led growth 
models. In both cases, the analysis emphasises the importance of political–economic 
institutions in supporting and perpetuating growth models. This is not to say that 
institutions were static over the Great Moderation, far from it. The Great 
Moderation was a period of major structural change in the world economy that 
profoundly affected advanced democracies and their institutional frameworks. 
Despite the winds of change forcing institutions to adapt, this subsection argues that 
national varieties of capitalism and growth models strongly shaped trajectories of 
change, and ultimately remained resilient. As such, it takes issue with approaches 
arguing that the LMEs and CMEs are converging on the liberal model of capitalism 
(Baccaro and Howell 2011; Howell 2003), as well as the argument that the growth 
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models of advanced democracies can no longer be delineated along varieties of 
capitalism lines (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016). 
Since the collapse of the Fordist production regime in the late 1970s, the 
advanced economies have faced a number of major secular trends in the global 
economy, such as globalisation, deindustrialisation, the rise of competition from low-
wage emerging economies, financialisation and the information and communications 
technology (ICT) revolution (Hall 2015; Wren 2013b). These trends have both posed 
problems and created opportunities for advanced democracies. Iversen and Cusack 
(2000) argue that deindustrialisation, or more specifically, the technologically 
induced shift in the employment structure away from manufacturing and towards 
services, is the trend that generates the greatest risks to advanced democracies. 
They show that deindustrialisation is more important than globalisation in 
explaining cross-country differences in the welfare state expansion. Many other CPE 
scholars also treat deindustrialisation as the central driver of institutional and 
political change in advanced democracies (Thelen 2014; Wren 2013a). This 
subsection therefore focuses on how deindustrialisation has affected the political–
economic institutions and growth models of the consumption-led LMEs and the 
export-led CMEs. 
To help build up a picture of the relationship between deindustrialisation and 
varieties of capitalism, Table 3.4 shows the manufacturing sector’s share of 
employment and gross value added (GVA) in 1994 and 2007, as well as the change 
over the period. In both the CMEs and LMEs, the manufacturing sector’s share of 
employment shrunk over the period, continuing a downward trend stretching back 
several decades. At the end of the period in 2007, the average share of 
manufacturing in employment had fallen to 15.1% in the CMEs and just 10% in the 
LMEs. The picture is notably different for the share of manufacturing in gross value 
added. While the LMEs saw a similar drop off in GVA as they did in employment, 
manufacturing’s share of GVA held up much better in the CMEs. 
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Table 3.4. LMEs vs. CMEs: Share of manufacturing in total employment and gross 
value added, 1994-2007 
 
Number of persons engaged 
 in manufacturing (as a 
 % of persons engaged  
in total economy) 
Gross value added  
of manufacturing  
(as a % of gross value  
added of total economy) 
 
1994 2007 
Change 
1994-07 1994 2007 
Change 
1994-07 
Liberal market 
economies       
Australia 13.8 10.0 -3.9 15.1 10.5 -4.6 
Canada 13.8 11.2 -2.6 17.1 13.4 -3.7 
New Zealand - - - - - - 
United Kingdom 14.9 9.3 -5.6 18.6 10.8 -7.8 
United States 14.2 9.7 -4.5 17.7 13.3 -4.4 
Average 14.2 10.0 -4.1 17.1 12.0 -5.1 
 
      
Coordinated market 
economies       
Austria 18.2 15.4 -2.8 19.0 19.9 0.9 
Belgium 17.8 13.5 -4.3 19.3 15.9 -3.4 
Denmark 17.9 13.7 -4.2 16.9 15.0 -1.9 
Finland 18.7 16.9 -1.8 23.1 23.3 0.2 
Germany 21.9 18.1 -3.8 22.4 23.1 0.7 
Japan 21.1 17.2 -4.0 22.8 20.8 -2.0 
Netherlands 13.9 10.3 -3.6 16.3 13.3 -3.0 
Norway - - - - - - 
Sweden 18.2 15.8 -2.4 20.4 20.0 -0.5 
Switzerland - - - - - - 
Average 18.5 15.1 -3.4 20.0 18.9 -1.1 
Source: EU KLEMs Growth and Productivity Accounts: ISIC Rev. 3 November 2009 
Release, updated March 2011 and ISIC Rev. 4 update; O’Mahony and Timmer (2009); 
WORLD KLEMS / Statistics Canada, July 2012. 
Note: No EU KLEMs data is available for New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland. 
 
The less than equivalent drop in manufacturing GVA in the CMEs is likely the 
result of a combination of factors, such as the use of more capital-intensive 
production techniques, strong productivity growth in manufacturing and continued 
movement up the value chain into higher-technology manufactured goods. The table 
suggests that the CMEs have successfully adapted their production regimes in order 
to safeguard the contribution of manufactured (mainly tradable) goods to the 
economy. It is also clear, however, that the proportion of the workforce directly 
employed in manufacturing has fallen in the CMEs, which inevitably puts stress on 
 
 
96 
a model of capitalism that is primarily organised for success in traditional 
manufactured goods industries. 
The varieties of capitalism framework has often been criticised for being overly 
static and rigid and not leaving enough room for the social and political drivers of 
institutional change (Coates 2005; Howell 2003). This is a misconception. Hall and 
Soskice (2003, 246) view institutions as “factors that mediate the relations among 
the core actors of the economy”, meaning that they are “constantly subject to 
negotiation”. So they expect the institutions of coordinated capitalism to be 
renegotiated in the face of new challenges and flexible enough to endure periodic 
economic upheavals. Contrary to Streeck’s (2016) reading of varieties of capitalism 
then, it does permit for (and even expect) conflict in the political arena and between 
different actors in the political economy over national institutional structures. As 
much as power relations and politics may influence the form of institutional change, 
varieties of capitalism does predict that CMEs will solve their problems through new 
modes of coordination and strategic interaction.  
The response of coordinated capitalism to deindustrialisation provides evidence to 
support this view of institutional change. 27  Table 3.5 shows the strictness of 
Employment Protection Legislation for temporary and permanent workers in the 
LMEs and CMEs in 1994 and 2007, as well as the change over the period. A clear 
divide is evident in the employment protection afforded to permanent workers, who 
were much better protected in the CMEs in both 1994 and 2007. In terms of 
temporary workers, employment protection in the LMEs was already very low in 
1994 and stayed low despite a small increase in New Zealand. The employment 
protection of temporary workers in the CMEs starts much higher than that in the 
LMEs but converges towards the low levels seen in the LMEs in six of the ten CMEs 
(and is already relatively low by 1994 in the other four CMEs). The reduction 
between 1994 and 2007 is particularly dramatic in Belgium and Germany. The table 
provides evidence of the increasing dualisation of labour markets in the CMEs, as 
                                         
27 See Hall and Thelen (2009) for a more formal framework for analysing institutional change 
within varieties of capitalism. 
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the labour force bifurcates into insiders, who are securely employed, and outsiders, 
who are not (Emmenegger et al. 2012; Rueda 2005). 
 
Table 3.5. LME vs. CMEs: Employment protection for permanent and temporary 
workers, 1994-2007 
 
Employment Protection  
Legislation for permanent  
workers (0-6 scale) 
Employment Protection  
Legislation for temporary  
workers (0-6 scale) 
 
1994 2007 
Change 
1994-07 1994 2007 
Change 
1994-07 
Liberal market economies       
Australia 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.9 0.9 0.0 
Canada 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 
New Zealand 1.2 1.6 0.3 0.4 1.0 0.6 
United Kingdom 1.1 1.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 
United States 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 
Average 0.9 1.0 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.2 
 
      
Coordinated market 
economies       
Austria 2.8 2.4 -0.4 1.3 1.3 0.0 
Belgium 1.8 1.9 0.0 4.6 2.4 -2.3 
Denmark 2.2 2.1 0.0 1.4 1.4 0.0 
Finland 2.5 2.2 -0.3 1.3 1.6 0.3 
Germany 2.7 2.7 0.0 3.3 1.0 -2.3 
Japan 1.7 1.4 -0.3 1.7 0.9 -0.8 
Netherlands 2.9 2.9 0.0 1.4 0.9 -0.4 
Norway 2.3 2.3 0.0 3.1 3.0 -0.1 
Sweden 2.8 2.6 -0.2 1.8 1.4 -0.3 
Switzerland 1.6 1.6 0.0 1.1 1.1 0.0 
Average 2.3 2.2 -0.1 2.1 1.5 -0.6 
Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics (accessed May 2016). 
Note: Higher values indicate stricter regulation (i.e. it is harder to hire and fire workers). 
 
The core workers in manufacturing industries in the CMEs are typically on 
permanent contracts and benefit from strong employment protection, whereas 
service sector workers, particularly those in low-value added sectors such as personal 
services, restaurants and retail, are increasingly employed on precarious or atypical 
contracts. For example, only about 10 per cent of marginal employment (part-time, 
low-pay work with restricted access to welfare coverage and benefits) in Germany is 
in manufacturing, while more than 80 per cent is in service sector industries (Hassel 
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2014). This pattern of dualisation therefore helps to protect the institutional 
complementarities are the heart of the CME model as core manufacturing workers 
retain the employment protection and social insurance necessary to support their 
deep investments in firm-specific skills (Palier and Thelen 2012). 
Dualisation is an example institutional drift, where institutions and practices that 
were developed for the industrial core are strongly protected but are not actively 
extended to other parts of the economy. The on-going shift of employment from 
manufacturing to services then liberalises the economy-wide industrial relations 
system naturally over time without the need for a specific neoliberal offensive 
(Thelen 2012). The resilience of coordinated institutions and strategic interaction in 
manufacturing industries in the CMEs in spite of significant liberalisation elsewhere 
in these economies provides evidence against claims (see, for example, Baccaro and 
Howell 2011) that industrial relations across advanced economies are being driven 
by a common neoliberal imperative towards LME-type deregulation. 
Aside from the maintenance of coordination and cooperation in the industrial 
core, the CMEs have adapted to deindustrialisation in very different ways. The 
Nordic CMEs with Social Democratic welfare states have consistently higher levels 
of public employment than continental European CMEs with Christian Democratic 
welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990; Martin 2016) (see Table 3.9). The right-hand 
column of Table 3.6 shows that in the latter part of the Great Moderation, the 
Nordic CMEs also (on average) had a higher proportion of total employment in 
knowledge-intensive services than the continental European CMEs; a point also 
emphasised by Wren, Fodor and Theodoropoulou (2013). It is clear, however, that 
the Netherlands stands apart from the other continental European CMEs when 
looking at changes in the employment structure. Deindustrialisation has been as 
acute in the Netherlands as in the LMEs (see Table 3.4) and knowledge-intensive 
services are as important to employment in the Netherlands as they are in the 
Nordic CMEs (see Table 3.6). 
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Table 3.6. Average public expenditure on tertiary education, gross enrolment ratio 
in tertiary education, and employment share in knowledge-intensive services in the 
CMEs, 2000-05 
 
Average public 
expenditure on 
tertiary education  
(as a % of GDP) 
Average gross 
enrolment  
ratio in tertiary 
education (%) 
Average employees 
 in knowledge- 
intensive services  
(as a % of total  
employees) 
2000-05 2000-05 2000-05 
Continental 
European 
 
 
 
Austria 1.4 50.2 33.0 
Belgium 1.3 59.6 38.4 
Germany* 1.1 52.3 34.6 
Netherlands 1.4 56.5 45.1 
Switzerland 1.4 42.2 - 
Average 1.3 52.2 37.7 
 
   
Nordic    
Denmark 2.5 67.2 44.3 
Finland 2.0 86.7 39.1 
Norway 2.1 75.0 - 
Sweden 2.0 76.7 45.8 
Average 2.2 76.4 43.1 
 
   
Other    
Japan 0.6 51.6 30.3 
* The German data for gross enrolment is missing for the 2000-05 period. The German figure 
has therefore been estimated by linearly interpolating the available data. 
Source: David Brady, Evelyne Huber, and John D. Stephens, Comparative Welfare States 
Dataset, University of North Carolina and WZB Berlin Social Science Center, 2014 (accessed 
May 2016); OECD Education Statistics Database (accessed July 2013); UNESCO UIS.Stat 
Education database, June 2016 release; EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts, 
March 2008 and November 2009 releases (accessed April 2012).  
Note: No knowledge-intensive services employment data is available for Switzerland or 
Norway. Public expenditure on tertiary education refers to ISCED levels 5 and 6. The gross 
enrolment ratio in tertiary education is defined as the number of students enrolled in tertiary 
education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population in the 5-year age 
group starting from the official secondary school graduation age. Knowledge-intensive 
services covers a number of services subsectors. For a list of subsectors included see 
Appendix A of the Comparative Welfare States Data Set Codebook available from: 
http://www.lisdatacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/CWS-codebook.pdf 
 
The distinct change in employment structures in the two sets of European CMEs 
has been powerfully influenced by changes in one sphere of the political economy: 
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education and training. The Nordic CMEs have moved further away from a model 
based on vocational training and specific skills than the continental European 
CMEs. The former set of countries has invested heavily in extensive publicly funded 
systems of higher education, which provide mainly general skills, whereas higher 
education (at least in general skills) remains more restricted in the latter set of 
countries (Ansell and Gingrich 2013). We can see from Table 3.6 that the Nordic 
CMEs had considerably higher public expenditure on tertiary education and gross 
enrolment ratios in tertiary education than either the continental European CMEs 
or Japan during the second half of the Great Moderation. 
General skills are highly prized in knowledge-intensive service sectors due to the 
complementarity in production between new information and communications 
technologies and university-educated labour (Thelen 2012; Wren, Fodor, and 
Theodoropoulou 2013). In contrast to specific skills, labour mobility actually 
encourages the acquisition of general skills by ensuring workers are able to attain the 
full value of their educational investment on the labour market (Becker 2009). 
Hence, the liberalisation of the CMEs outside of the industrial core helps to expand 
employment in low-value added services, through the removal of protections on low-
skilled workers, and knowledge-intensive services, through incentivising investment 
in general skills. 
The most striking thing about the CMEs during the era of deindustrialisation, 
given the major differences in how their economic structures have evolved, is that 
they have all remained so firmly export-led (see Table 3.1). This reflects the 
continued coordination in the industrial core but also the growing importance of 
services exports, and knowledge-intensive services exports in particular. Looking 
back at Table 3.1, however, we can see that the contribution of consumption to 
GDP did vary across the CMEs during the Great Moderation. The consumption 
contribution was generally higher in the Nordic CMEs than the continental 
European CMEs. This variation is partly the result of differences in industrial 
profiles (e.g. public sector employment) but also differences in institutions (e.g. 
unions), redistribution and household indebtedness between the two groups of 
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CMEs. The factors driving the variation in the contribution of consumption to GDP 
growth within the export-led CMEs will be explored in detail in Sections 3.4 and 
3.5. It is worth reiterating, of course, that the contribution of consumption to GDP 
growth was still considerably lower in the export-led Nordic CMEs during the Great 
Moderation than it was in the consumption-led LMEs. 
The role of varieties of capitalism in growth models is clearly changing, especially 
in the CMEs where all economies have liberalised to some extent, albeit along 
different lines (Thelen 2014). In traditional manufacturing industries in the CMEs, 
coordinated capitalism is still functioning in much the same way as Hall and Soskice 
(2001) conceptualised at the turn of the century. But outside of the industrial core, 
export success is not so dependent on the institutional framework associated with 
coordinated capitalism. In fact, export success in knowledge-intensive services, which 
is likely to become increasingly important to the CMEs as deindustrialisation rolls 
on, is premised on tertiary-level general skills education and more flexible labour 
markets. This is likely to pose the biggest problem for the continental European 
CMEs, who have been slower to move away from vocational education systems that 
focus on the acquisition of specific skills and have restricted access to tertiary 
education in general skills. In these countries, the expansion of knowledge-intensive 
services risk being held back by an inadequate supply of labour with high-level 
general skills (Ansell and Gingrich 2013; Wren, Fodor, and Theodoropoulou 2013). 
Throughout the Great Moderation—a period of massive adjustment and 
institutional change—the CMEs continued to be strongly export-led. Their long 
history of coordination (Crouch 1993; Iversen and Soskice 2009; Thelen 2004) and 
distinct negotiated political systems (as discussed in the following section) suggest 
that the CMEs will continue to be built around export sector competitiveness and 
success in the future, even if less of the economy is coordinated along traditional 
lines. 
 
 
 
 
102 
3.3 The role of political systems, electoral politics, and government 
demand-side policies in growth models 
 
Governments in advanced democracies support national growth models, and 
advanced sectors in particular, because they want to be re-elected (Iversen and 
Soskice 2012, 2015b) and they know they will be held (at least partially) accountable 
for the state of the economy when voters go to the ballot box (Duch and Stevenson 
2008; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Nadeau, Lewis-Beck, and Bélanger 2013). In 
this section, I argue that the interaction of a nation’s political system and its 
political-economic institutions (which vary across varieties of capitalism) exert a 
strong influence over the long-term electoral viability of different growth models. I 
show how national political systems provide incentives for governments in advanced 
democracies to pursue certain growth models and provide evidence that governments 
pursued demand-side policies that supported national growth models during the 
Great Moderation. 
 
Political systems and electoral politics 
The LMEs and the CMEs have distinct political systems. In Lijphart’s (1984) widely 
used typology, the LMEs have majoritarian political systems and the CMEs have 
consensus political systems (Soskice 2007).28 Majoritarian democracies have plurality 
electoral systems (that usually produce single-party governments), leadership parties 
(where the leader exerts considerable control over policy and decision-making), and 
government control of public policymaking. Consensus democracies have PR 
electoral systems (that usually produce coalitions governments), representative 
parties (where different interest groups within the party negotiate out policy 
positions and collectively make decisions), and public policymaking that incorporates 
                                         
28 Along the executives-parties dimension of consensus democracy (the dimension shown to 
most influence macroeconomic outcomes and democratic quality) all ten of the CMEs come 
out as more consensus-based than (any of) the five LMEs (Lijphart 2012). 
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other actors (such as labour unions and business associations) in the economy 
through effective committee systems (Soskice 2007).29 
Representative parties and the inclusion of interest groups in the policymaking 
process provide unions and business associations with the opportunity to help shape 
the political economy in the CMEs (Martin and Swank 2012). This is particularly 
important for underpinning the export-led growth model in the long-term, which 
requires broad cross-class agreement on institutions such as a strong welfare state, 
coordinated wage setting, the vocational training system, and employment 
protection for core workers. This is not to say that the different actors in the 
political economy have the same ideal set of policies and institutions in these areas 
but the organisation of the CMEs provides a platform for these disagreements to be 
negotiated out between different interest groups, both inside and outside of the 
political system. Representative parties also ensure that the long-term interests of 
different groups are safeguarded, particularly those workers who have made 
substantial investments in specific skills (Soskice 2007). 
In majoritarian systems, the scope for long-term interest groups involvement in 
policymaking is greatly diminished, because parties focus much more on the 
concerns of the median voter in systems where winning elections is a prerequisite for 
governing. The danger of short-sighted governments not protecting the interests of 
workers with specific skills poses little problem in the LMEs, however, where the 
consumption-led growth model is supported by a strong general skills education 
system and highly flexible labour markets (Soskice 2007). 
A label that is often applied to the political economy of the CMEs is ‘corporatist’, 
which broadly refers to a system of coordinated and cooperative management of the 
national economy that includes unions, employers and the state in policymaking 
(Siaroff 1999). However, there is no consensus on the definition of corporatism in 
political science, and the extent to which CMEs such as Japan and Switzerland are 
                                         
29 Table B.4 in Appendix B1 provides empirical evidence that the LMEs have majoritarian 
electoral systems and the CMEs have PR electoral systems. It also shows that electoral 
outcomes were typically more proportional in the CMEs than the LMEs during the Great 
Moderation. 
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corporatist is often subject to disagreement (Siaroff 1999). In order to address these 
inconsistencies, Siaroff (1999, 176) creates an “alternative summary measure of 
economic integration” (analogous to corporatism) that is defined as:30 
a long term co-operative pattern of shared economic management involving 
the social partners and existing at various levels such as plant-level 
management, sectoral wage bargaining, and joint shaping of national policies 
in competitiveness-related matters (education, social policy, etc.)  
On this measure, all ten CMEs come out as more integrated (i.e. corporatist) than 
any of the five LMEs in the mid-1990s (Siaroff 1999). Siaroff (1999, 177) identifies 
export competitiveness and success as key features of the “ideal type” of corporatism. 
Likewise, Katzenstein (1985, 2003) picked out corporatist structures as a defining 
feature of the Europe’s highly open small states (all CMEs), and the source of their 
ability to learn and adapt to the fast-changing conditions of global capitalism. The 
consensus political systems of the CMEs help facilitate the corporatism that is 
essential to a long-term growth strategy based on high-value added exports. 
Electoral politics also strengthens the relationship between varieties of capitalism 
and growth models. There is a voluminous body of work that finds that voters hold 
governments accountable for economic performance; ‘economic voters’ reward 
incumbent parties at the ballot box in good economic times and punish them in bad 
economic times (Duch and Stevenson 2008; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Nadeau, 
Lewis-Beck, and Bélanger 2013). These studies do, however, show significant 
variation in the extent of economic voting across advanced democracies. Powell and 
Whitten (1993) provide empirical evidence that political context needs to be taken 
into account to explain the cross-country differences. They introduce the concept of 
clarity of responsibility, whereby the extent to which voters punish or reward 
incumbent governments for the state of the economy varies depending on how easily 
voters can assign responsibility to the government for economic policies, and 
management of the economy more generally. Many subsequent studies have found 
                                         
30 This excerpt is taken from Siaroff (1999, 189). 
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strong evidence that greater clarity of responsibility leads to more economic voting 
(Anderson 2000; Nadeau, Niemi, and Yoshinaka 2002; Whitten and Palmer 1999). 
The presence of economic voters gives governments in both the LMEs and the 
CMEs a strong incentive to pursue national growth models, because supporting 
advanced sectors is key to spurring innovation and growth (Iversen and Soskice 
2015b). However, clarity of responsibility is typically higher in majoritarian political 
systems that produce strong single-party governments than in consensus political 
systems that produce frequent coalition governments (Lijphart 1984; Powell and 
Whitten 1993). This further reinforces the consumption-led growth model of the 
LMEs by providing governments in LMEs with a clear electoral incentive to pursue 
policies that stimulate domestic demand and boost economic growth in the short 
term. 
Electoral politics in the CMEs and the LMEs is also affected by the 
characteristics of the political system in another way. Rogowski and Kayser (2002) 
and Chang et al.  (2011) adapt an existing model of regulation to show that 
majoritarian electoral systems systematically privilege consumers over producers and 
PR electoral systems systematically privilege producers over consumers. The 
intuition being that consumers provide votes whereas producers provide money and 
votes (or just money), and that politicians will respond more to voters (consumers) 
under majoritarian electoral rules because a small change in vote share can result in 
a large change in seat share. In a single-member district (majoritarian) electoral 
system, where only one candidate is elected to parliament from each constituency, a 
few votes either way can make a big difference to the composition of parliament, 
and consequently who governs. The authors test their model using OECD data on 
real prices and show that, all else equal, prices are systematically lower in countries 
with majoritarian electoral systems (Chang et al. 2011; Chang, Kayser, and 
Rogowski 2008; Rogowski and Kayser 2002). 
 
 
106 
At first this finding may appear at odds with the CMEs’ export-led growth 
model, given that the CMEs generally have PR electoral systems.31 While producers 
in the non-traded sector clearly benefit from higher prices, producers in the traded 
sector do not want to risk undermining competitiveness. However, in relatively open 
economies (such as the CMEs), the regulation limiting competition and raising 
prices is typically restricted to the non-traded sector of the economy (or the non-
traded component of tradable goods) (Chang, Kayser, and Rogowski 2008), and the 
traded sector is largely unaffected. For example, the German (mostly non-tradable) 
services sector is more regulated and has higher barriers to entry than its innovative 
and globally competitive (mostly tradable) manufacturing sector (OECD 2014). The 
combination of comparatively high non-traded prices and internationally competitive 
tradables prices in the CMEs is also highlighted by Iversen and Soskice (2010), but 
in their model it is wage compression and not differences in regulation that is 
driving this outcome. 
Chang, Kayser and Rogowski (2008) do not suggest that their findings imply 
majoritarian electoral systems lead to more favourable outcomes. They note that the 
disadvantages of higher prices need to be weighed up against the more advantageous 
outcomes PR systems produce such as lower inequality and higher wages. The 
importance of the work of Rogowski and Kayser (and their co-authors) to growth 
models is that governments in the CMEs have electoral incentives to privilege the 
interests of producers and governments in the LMEs have electoral incentives to 
privilege the interests of consumers. 
In sum, this subsection argues that political systems and electoral politics both 
help to entrench the dichotomy in growth models between the LMEs and the CMEs. 
Governments in the export-led CMEs with consensus political systems are more able 
to take a long-term perspective on the economy and prioritise competitiveness, as 
they are under less electoral pressure to deliver short-term economic growth. The 
unions and business associations that help craft economic policy in CMEs are also 
                                         
31 See Table B.4 in Appendix B1. 
 
 
107 
deeply concerned with competitiveness. In contrast, governments in consumption-led 
LMEs with majoritarian political systems have more to lose from poor short-term 
performance and need to appeal to the median voter to be elected, so are more likely 
to prioritise consumer spending over long-run competitiveness. 
The theory developed in this subsection fits well with the behaviour of 
governments in advanced democracies during the Great Moderation. One clear 
example of that is the economic strategy of the New Labour government in power in 
the United Kingdom from 1997 until 2010. According to Lee (2008, 20), the Labour 
party under Gordon Brown and Tony Blair emerged as “champion of the City rather 
than manufacturing, and of predominantly consumer rather than producer 
interests”. 32  In the next subsection, I show how governments in advanced 
democracies have a number of policy levers at their disposal, and how they can use 
these levers to act on their electoral incentive to support national growth models. 
 
Government demand-side policies 
Governments on both sides of the partisan divide in advanced democracies are 
acutely aware of the importance of supporting the advanced sectors in which they 
possess a comparative advantage, as they provide important sources of political 
support, high-value added employment and tax revenue (Iversen and Soskice 2012). 
As already discussed, this gives governments strong incentives to champion 
insurance-based welfare arrangements for sectors in which high-skill workers and 
companies have co-invested in the acquisition of specific skills (Iversen and Soskice 
2015b). Another way that governments can support national growth models is 
through demand-side policies. Demand-side policies are policies aimed at affecting 
domestic demand, such as monetary policy, fiscal policy, and the encouragement (or 
mitigation) of credit expansion.33 
Soskice (2007) and Iversen and Soskice (2012)  set out a framework and provide 
supporting empirical evidence for the relationship between macroeconomic policies 
                                         
32 This quote also appeared in Barnes and Wren (2012). 
33 The terms credit encouragement and credit mitigation are borrowed from Fuller (2015). 
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and varieties of capitalism. The cornerstone of these contributions is that fiscal and 
monetary policies are complementary to the organisation of the political economy, 
and hence further reinforce growth models. In the CMEs, wage restraint is used to 
ensure that exports remain competitive. This wage restraint is underwritten by 
conservative monetary policy, which acts to discipline large unions in wage setting 
(Soskice and Iversen 2000). In countries with a small number of large unions, each 
union is aware that their wage settlements influence the aggregate price level. If the 
central bank is conservative—i.e. it responds to above target inflation by 
aggressively raising interest rates—then large unions know that excess wage 
increases are likely to lead to higher interest rates and an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. The latter pushes up the price of exports and reduces their 
competitiveness on world markets. As unions care about both the wages and 
employment of their members, this gives them a clear incentive to moderate their 
wage demands. Hence, non-accommodating monetary policy anchors wage restraint 
and shores up the export-led growth model.  
The incentives for wage restraint that arise from tight monetary policy would be 
undermined without a similarly restrictive fiscal policy. Hence, the two go hand in 
hand in export-led CMEs where wages are bargained at an intermediate level. Note 
that a non-accommodating macroeconomic regime does not support wage restraint 
when wage setting is completely decentralised (because workers do not take into 
account the effect of their wage settlements on aggregate inflation) or completely 
centralised (because a single union can fully internalise the effect of their wage 
settlement on aggregate inflation). As a result of the severe crises of the early 1990s 
in the Nordic countries, their systems of centralised wage bargaining broke down. In 
line with Iversen and Soskice’s theory, the move to more intermediate level 
bargaining in the 1990s coincided with a shift towards more restrictive monetary 
and fiscal policies (Dølvik, Andersen, and Vartiainen 2015; Iversen 1996; Iversen and 
Soskice 2012). 
The influence of government demand-side policies on growth models is not 
limited to their support (or not) of wage restraint. As highlighted in the 
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introduction, two important changes took place in the advanced economies in the 
early stages of the Great Moderation.  
First, monetary policy was taken out of the hands of national governments with 
the move to independent central banking. New Zealand pioneered the shift to 
greater independence from political interference in 1989 and others followed suit 
throughout the course of the 1990s (for example, the UK in 1997 and Sweden in 
1999). These central banks began inflation targeting—adjusting short-term interest 
rates to influence private sector borrowing and savings behaviour with the objective 
of keeping output at equilibrium and inflation at target—and took a largely benign 
view of asset price bubbles and macroeconomic imbalances (Carlin and Soskice 
2015). 
Second, the late 1980s and early 1990s saw a move to financial market 
liberalisation and openness among advanced economies. In the European Union, this 
move was a key proposal in the Delors report of 1989, which was an important 
stepping-stone towards the establishment of the single European currency in 1999 
(Iversen, Soskice, and Hope 2016). Figure 3.3 shows the financial globalisation of the 
advanced democracies between 1980 and 2007. We can see that financial 
globalisation proceeded at a much faster pace after 1994, and expanded remarkably 
quickly from 2005-07. 
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Figure 3.3. Financial globalisation of fifteen advanced democracies, 1980-2007 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using updated and extended version of dataset constructed by 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 
Note: The financial globalisation measure is the combined external assets and liabilities of 
the 15 advanced democracies in the sample divided by their combined GDP. 
 
These two major changes, seemingly paradoxically, granted governments in 
advanced democracies more discretion to use demand-side policies to influence the 
medium-term trajectory of the economy and support the national growth model. 
The move to independent inflation-targeting central banking coincided with a rapid 
reduction in inflation—the average inflation in the fifteen countries in the sample fell 
from 4.9% in 1990 to 1.8% in 1994 and stayed low thereafter, averaging just 1.7% 
between 1994 and 2007.34 With inflation under control and inflation expectations 
closely anchored to target, governments could pursue policies that altered domestic 
demand, safe in the knowledge that the central bank would step in and stabilise 
inflation if it moved away from target. 
Fiscal policy is one avenue that governments in advanced democracies can use to 
affect domestic demand in the era of independent central banking, but it is not the 
only one. A loosening of financial regulation that makes it easier for consumers to 
                                         
34 Source: OECD Key Short-Term Economic Indicators (accessed June 2016). 
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borrow, such as increasing loan-to-value ratios or making home equity loans more 
easily obtainable, is likely to result in a boost to household consumption. Gross and 
Souleles (2002) provide empirical evidence that increasing credit limits in the United 
States led to an immediate rise in debt and consumption, especially in households 
close to the limit. 
The opening of financial markets helped to facilitate cross-border borrowing and 
lending during the Great Moderation and allowed some countries to pursue growth 
models that required foreign borrowing and persistent current account deficits 
(without coming under pressure for external adjustment). Governments in advanced 
democracies would not have been able to pursue growth models of this nature 
without being viewed as credible by financial markets. The two institutional changes 
also helped to enhance credibility and were consequently a critical enabler for 
governments to pursue policies that stimulated domestic demand during the Great 
Moderation (as discussed further in Section 4.4 of Chapter 4 of the thesis). Lastly, 
the dramatic fall in interest rates that accompanied these two major changes greatly 
increased the ability of countries (and individual consumers) to borrow. 
In a simple open economy modern macroeconomic model, of the type developed 
by Carlin and Soskice (2015) and set out in full in Section 4.4 of Chapter 4 of the 
thesis, it is possible to show how government demand-side policies can affect the 
medium-run equilibrium of the economy. In a small open economy with an inflation-
targeting central bank, a boost in fiscal policy (or any other policy that boosts 
domestic demand) will result in an increase in aggregate demand that pushes up 
output and inflation. The forward-looking central bank then steps in to push up the 
real interest rate and put the economy back on the path back to equilibrium output 
and target inflation. However, the forward-looking foreign exchange market sees that 
real interest rates are going to be kept above world real interest rates for some time 
and the exchange rate appreciates as the foreign exchange market takes advantage 
of the arbitrage opportunity. Once the economy returns to equilibrium, the real 
interest rate has returned to the world real interest rate, and the increase in 
government spending has been completely offset by the reduction in net exports that 
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occurs as a result of the exchange rate appreciation. While inflation returns to target 
and output returns to equilibrium, the shock leaves the economy with an 
appreciated real exchange rate and trade and current account deficits (assuming 
they started in balance). In the event of a reduction in government spending (or any 
other policy that reduces domestic demand), the exact opposite chain of events takes 
place and the economy is left with a depreciated real exchange rate and trade and 
current account surpluses (assuming they started in balance). 
The lack of attention policymakers paid to current account imbalances in the pre-
crisis period and the willingness of the current account surplus countries (the CMEs) 
to finance the deficits of the current account deficit countries (the LMEs) meant 
that governments could effectively choose the real exchange rate they desired. The 
preferences of governments over the level of the exchange rate are deeply 
intertwined with their political systems, varieties of capitalism, and growth models. 
Not all actors in the economy want the same exchange rate; some prefer an 
appreciated exchange rate and others prefer a depreciated exchange rate. Individuals 
or consumers will typically prefer an appreciated real exchange rate because it 
boosts their purchasing power (real wages) by reducing the cost of imported goods 
(Walter 2014). The same holds for sheltered sector firms, especially those that use 
imported inputs. One the other hand, firms in tradable industries will typically 
prefer a depreciated real exchange rate because it improves their competitiveness 
(Frieden 1991, 2015). Forbes (2002) examines 12 major depreciations between 1997 
and 2000 using firm-level data from over 13,500 companies from around the world 
and finds that firms with high export exposure have significantly improved 
performance (on a range of measures) following a depreciation. 
The trade-off between competitiveness and purchasing power shows that the level 
of the exchange rate has distributive consequences in the domestic economy. The 
distributional conflict is not along class lines, however, but rather between the 
traded and non-traded sectors of the economy (Broz and Frieden 2001). 
Governments in the export-led CMEs are likely to prefer a depreciated exchange 
rate, as the tradables sector is the main engine of economic growth. This is 
 
 
113 
reinforced by consensus political systems that give powerful traded sector unions and 
employers associations a seat at the policymaking table (Soskice 2007) and PR 
electoral systems that privilege the interests of producers (Chang et al. 2011; 
Rogowski and Kayser 2002). In contrast, governments in the LMEs are likely to 
prefer an appreciated real exchange rate, as high-value added services and non-
tradables are the main drivers of economic growth. This preference is strengthened 
by majoritarian political systems that cater policy to the concerns of the median 
voter (Soskice 2007) and majoritarian electoral systems that privilege the interests of 
consumers (Chang et al. 2011; Rogowski and Kayser 2002). 
Figure 3.4 shows the distinct pattern of change in real exchange rates in 
advanced economies over the Great Moderation. It is clear to see that real exchange 
rates, which take into account nominal exchange rates and relative price levels, 
depreciated in the CMEs and appreciated in the LMEs. Put another way, price 
competitiveness improved in the export-led economies and deteriorated in the 
consumption-led economies, whereas purchasing power decreased in the export-led 
economies and increased in the consumption-led economies. It is worth noting that 
the real exchange rate appreciated less in the United States than the other LMEs, 
which is likely to be related to the relatively loose monetary policy in the United 
States following the bursting of the dotcom bubble and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as 
well as the dollar’s privileged position as a global reserve currency (Obstfeld and 
Rogoff 2009). 
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Figure 3.4. Change in real effective exchange rate (price competitiveness), 1994-2007 
 
Source: European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, Price and Cost 
Competitiveness - Data Section (22 April 2016). 
Note: IC37 includes the EU28 plus Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, 
Switzerland, Turkey and the United States. The colours of the columns correspond to 
varieties of capitalism. The grey columns are CMEs and the black columns are LMEs. 
 
The divergence in real exchange rates was partly driven by government demand-side 
policies, particularly during the latter part of the Great Moderation. In the 1990s, 
both the LMEs and the CMEs sought to consolidate their public finances after the 
recessions of the early 1990s. In Europe, countries in line to join the single currency 
also had to meet the strict convergence criteria set out in the Maastricht Treaty, 
which included limits on both public deficits and debt. However, in the 2000s (prior 
to the crisis), when governments had more scope for fiscal expansion, the fiscal 
stance of the LMEs loosened considerably more than the fiscal stance of the CMEs. 
The change in the cyclically adjusted government primary balance (as a % of 
potential GDP) is often used to measure discretionary changes in fiscal policy, 
because it removes the government’s net debt interest payments and corrects for the 
position of the economy in the business cycle. In fact, Alesina and Ardagna (1998, 
2010) and Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998) define episodes of fiscal adjustment 
(consolidation) and fiscal stimulus based on large changes the cyclically adjusted 
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government primary balance. The average change in the cyclically adjusted 
government primary balance between 2000 and 2007 was -3.1 percentage points in 
the LMEs, compared to just -1.4 percentage points in the CMEs.35 The LMEs also 
supported domestic demand, and consumption especially, by loosening credit 
conditions, which will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.5. 
We know that growth models were largely invariant to partisanship, because the 
CMEs were export-led and the LMEs were consumption-led over the long post-
Fordist period from 1980-2007 (see Table B.2 in Appendix B1). The discussion in 
this subsection also implies that partisanship has little influence on government 
demand-side policies in advanced democracies, as governments of both partisan 
stripes will pursue policies that support the national growth model. This argument is 
in line with the empirical evidence. Clark’s (2003) comprehensive statistical study of 
the relationship between politics and the macroeconomy in open advanced 
democracies finds little evidence that macroeconomic policies or performance are 
affected by partisanship. The argument is also in line with Iversen and Soskice’s 
(2015b) theory that support for advanced sectors of the economy is a valence issue 
for voters, whereas redistribution is a partisan issue. While partisanship does not 
alter the overall growth model, which is deeply ingrained in political and economic 
institutions, it can influence the distribution of income. The distribution of income 
can in turn have second-order effects on growth models, as will be discussed in more 
detail in the next section. 
 
3.4 Growth models, income inequality and redistribution 
 
The pervasive rise in earnings and household income inequality across the OECD 
economies has been one of the major macroeconomic trends of the post-Fordist era 
(Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005; OECD 2008, 2011a). This marked a sharp reversal 
from the post-war Golden Age, where rapid economic growth coincided with falling 
income inequality in advanced democracies (Piketty 2014). The Great Moderation 
                                         
35 Source: OECD Economic Outlook, No. 99, June 2016. 
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was also a period of robust economic growth, albeit at lower rates than the Golden 
Age, but the gains that accrued went disproportionately to those higher up the 
income distribution.36 
The left-hand side of Table 3.7 shows the net Gini coefficient (i.e. post tax-and-
transfer) in 1994 and 2007, as well as the change over the period. A higher value 
indicates a more unequal distribution of disposable income among households. The 
table contrasts the LMEs with three different groupings of CMEs: the continental 
European CMEs, the Nordic CMEs and the other CMEs (Japan). As other CPE 
scholars have argued, these CME groupings help us to better understand patterns of 
inequality and redistribution in the post-Fordist era (Iversen and Soskice 2015a, 
2015b; Pontusson 2005), and their relationship with growth models (Hope and 
Soskice 2016; Martin 2016). 
A few things stand out from the left-hand side of table. First, disposable income 
inequality rose in all countries bar Austria over the period (and it only fell 
marginally in Austria). Income inequality in advanced democracies has been strongly 
affected by the changes in the employment structure during the era of 
deindustrialisation (see Section 3.2), especially at the top end, where wages of 
workers with tertiary (general skills) education have skyrocketed due to their 
complementarity with new information and communications technologies (Autor, 
Katz, and Krueger 1998; Goos and Manning 2007; Wren, Fodor, and 
Theodoropoulou 2013). Second, inequality rose more in the LMEs, the Nordic CMEs 
and Japan than it did in the continental European CMEs. Third, there is a clear 
ordering of the groups along the inequality dimension, with the LMEs being the 
most unequal and the Nordic CMEs the most egalitarian, with the continental 
European CMEs and Japan somewhere in the middle. 
 
 
                                         
36 Comparing the average GDP growth rates of the advanced democracies during the latter 
part of the Golden Age (Table B.1 in Appendix B1) to those in the Great Moderation (Table 
3.1), we can see that growth rates in the earlier period were considerably higher. 
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Table 3.7. LMEs vs. different groups of CMEs: Disposable income inequality and 
relative redistribution, 1994-2007 
 
Net (post tax-and-
transfer) Gini coefficient 
for household income  
(0-100 scale) 
Relative redistribution  
(0-100 scale) 
 
1994 2007 
Change 
1994-07 1994 2007 
Change 
1994-07 
Liberal market economies       
Australia 28.4 31.8 3.4 32.9 34.1 1.2 
Canada 28.4 31.5 3.1 36.7 32.8 -3.9 
New Zealand 32.2 32.6 0.3 30.6 28.0 -2.5 
United Kingdom 33.9 35.7 1.8 36.2 32.9 -3.4 
United States 35.4 37.8 2.4 26.9 22.7 -4.2 
Average 31.7 33.9 2.2 32.7 30.1 -2.6 
       
Continental European CMEs       
Austria 28.1 27.9 -0.1 36.7 34.1 -2.6 
Belgium 25.1 25.6 0.5 46.2 41.0 -5.2 
Germany 27.0 28.8 1.8 41.0 43.3 2.3 
Netherlands 25.9 27.3 1.5 44.6 41.2 -3.4 
Switzerland 28.9 31.5 2.6 24.1 31.4 7.2 
Average 27.0 28.2 1.2 38.5 38.2 -0.3 
       
Nordic CMEs       
Denmark 22.2 23.8 1.6 49.2 45.4 -3.8 
Finland 21.0 26.4 5.3 56.1 43.6 -12.5 
Norway 24.1 24.4 0.3 42.2 44.3 2.1 
Sweden 21.7 24.6 2.9 54.2 48.4 -5.8 
Average 22.2 24.8 2.5 50.4 45.4 -5.0 
       
Other CMEs       
Japan 26.8 30.3 3.5 30.1 34.1 4.0 
Source: David Brady, Evelyne Huber, and John D. Stephens, Comparative Welfare States 
Dataset, University of North Carolina and WZB Berlin Social Science Center, 2014 (accessed 
May 2016); Solt, Frederick. 2014. “The Standardized World Income Inequality Database”. 
Working paper. SWIID Version 5, October 2014 
Note: A higher Gini coefficient indicates a more unequal distribution of disposable income 
among households. Relative redistribution is market-income inequality minus net-income 
inequality divided by market income inequality multiplied by 100 (household income, whole 
population). A higher value indicates more redistribution. 
 
The right-hand side of the table shows that there is also still a clear ranking when it 
comes to government redistribution, which runs exactly opposite to the ranking in 
disposable income inequality. The Nordic CMEs are by far the most redistributive 
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and the LMEs the least, with the continental European CMEs and Japan 
somewhere in the middle. We can see that in ten out of the fifteen advanced 
democracies the tax and transfer system became less redistributive over the course 
of the Great Moderation, which contributed to the rise in disposable income 
inequality in these countries. 
The link between the distribution of income and growth models has not been 
given much attention by scholars of CPE. The one exception is Baccaro and 
Pontusson (2016), who see growth models as being closely associated, as both cause 
and effect, with distributive conflict. Borrowing from the ideas of the late Polish 
economist Michał Kalecki (1944), Baccaro and Pontusson (2016) argue that a 
redistribution of income from rich to poor will raise consumption and aggregate 
demand because the poor spend more of their income than the rich. This arises 
because households lower down the income distribution have a higher marginal 
propensity to consume than households higher up the income distribution (Carroll, 
Slacalek, and Tokuoka 2014; Jappelli and Pistaferri 2014). 
Baccaro and Pontusson’s (2016) argument might lead us to expect that the 
contribution of consumption to GDP growth would be larger in countries with more 
equal disposable income distributions. This is not the case when we look across the 
advanced democracies. Figure 3.5 shows that the highly inegalitarian LMEs are 
considerably more consumption-led than the more egalitarian CMEs during the 
Great Moderation. This is not to say that, ceteris paribus, redistribution from rich 
to poor will not boost consumption but rather that other factors related to varieties 
of capitalism are more important than the income distribution in driving growth 
models. The degree of coordination of wage setting is one such factor. The greater 
level of wage coordination in the CMEs underpins the export-led growth model by 
safeguarding external competitiveness and pricing newly trained workers with 
specialist skills into employment in high-end export sectors (Iversen and Soskice 
2010, 2012) (as discussed in detail in Section 3.2). We saw in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 that 
the CMEs typically have more coordinated wage setting and more export-led growth 
models. 
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Figure 3.5. Average disposable income inequality and the average annual 
contribution of consumption to GDP growth, 1994-2007 
 
Source: David Brady, Evelyne Huber, and John D. Stephens, Comparative Welfare States 
Dataset, University of North Carolina and WZB Berlin Social Science Center, 2014 (accessed 
May 2016); Solt, Frederick. 2014. “The Standardized World Income Inequality Database”. 
Working paper. SWIID Version 5, October 2014; European Commission's Directorate 
General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) AMECO Database (03/05/2016 
update). 
Note: A higher Gini coefficient indicates a more unequal distribution of disposable income 
among households. The markers correspond to varieties of capitalism. The grey squares are 
CMEs and the black circles are LMEs. 
 
Figure 3.6 shows the relationship between coordinated wage setting and disposable 
income inequality. The CMEs group together as countries with coordinated wage 
setting and more egalitarian income distributions. Rueda and Pontusson (2000) 
provide empirical evidence that bargaining centralisation reduces wage inequality.37 
They find that the egalitarian effect of centralisation is more than three times 
greater in the CMEs than the LMEs. This suggests that the complementary 
                                         
37  Recent work by Barth and Moene (2016) has also found evidence that wage equality 
increases the generosity of the welfare state via its effect on political competition, which 
further reinforces the relationship between wage coordination and disposable income 
inequality in the CMEs. 
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institutions of coordinated capitalism, such as long-term cooperation between unions 
and employers’ associations and strong vocational training systems, help to support 
bargaining centralisation and egalitarian labour market outcomes, as well as the 
export-led growth model. 
 
Figure 3.6. Average disposable income inequality and coordination of wage setting, 
1994-2007 
 
Source: David Brady, Evelyne Huber, and John D. Stephens, Comparative Welfare States 
Dataset, University of North Carolina and WZB Berlin Social Science Center, 2014 (accessed 
May 2016); Solt, Frederick. 2014. “The Standardized World Income Inequality Database”. 
Working paper. SWIID Version 5, October 2014; J. Visser, ICTWSS Data base. version 5.0. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies AIAS. October 2015. Open 
access database at: www.uva-aias.net/208. 
Note: A higher Gini coefficient indicates a more unequal distribution of disposable income 
among households. The coordination of wage setting measure is variable ‘Coord’ from the 
ICTWSS Database. It measures the degree of wage coordination (regardless of the level it 
occurs at). Higher values indicate a greater degree of coordination. The markers correspond 
to varieties of capitalism. The grey squares are CMEs and the black circles are LMEs. 
 
Across varieties of capitalism, the Kaleckian mechanism highlighted by Baccaro and 
Pontusson’s (2016) does not appear to be exerting a major influence on growth 
models. If we just concentrate on the CMEs, however, the picture takes on a 
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different complexion. Figure 3.7 removes the LMEs from Figure 3.5 and zooms in on 
the relationship between disposable income inequality and the contribution of 
consumption to GDP growth for the CMEs. There is a clear negative correlation; 
the more egalitarian CMEs are typically more consumption-led. There is also a 
geographical split with the Nordic CMEs typically more consumption-led than the 
continental European CMEs and Japan. 
 
Figure 3.7. Average disposable income inequality and the average annual 
contribution of consumption to GDP growth in the CMEs, 1994-2007 
 
Source: David Brady, Evelyne Huber, and John D. Stephens, Comparative Welfare States 
Dataset, University of North Carolina and WZB Berlin Social Science Center, 2014 (accessed 
May 2016); Solt, Frederick. 2014. “The Standardized World Income Inequality Database”. 
Working paper. SWIID Version 5, October 2014; European Commission's Directorate 
General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) AMECO Database (03/05/2016 
update). 
Note: A higher Gini coefficient indicates a more unequal distribution of disposable income 
among households. 
 
The in-depth analysis at the heart of Baccaro and Pontusson (2016) focuses on four 
countries and only two of them are CMEs: Sweden (a Nordic CME) and Germany 
(a continental European CME). Their argument for Sweden being more 
consumption-led than Germany (as we can see it is from Figure 3.7) goes beyond the 
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fact that Sweden is more egalitarian (as is also clear from Figure 3.7). They posit 
that Sweden was more able to combine solid consumption growth with rapid export 
growth because it moved into less price sensitive export markets, specifically high-
technology manufactured goods and high-ICT services. This means that the Swedish 
export-led growth model doesn’t require the repression of wages and household 
consumption that the German export-led growth model does to remain 
internationally competitive. In other words, because demand for Swedish exports is 
relatively insensitive to price increases, wage restraint is less important for 
underpinning export success in Sweden than in Germany. Their argument suggests 
that earnings inequality at the low-end of the income distribution is central to 
Germany’s export-led growth model. 
Baccaro and Pontusson’s (2016) argument for the difference in growth models 
between Germany and Sweden has already been critiqued on several grounds; most 
pertinently that there is little consensus in the empirical literature that German 
exports are more price sensitive than Swedish exports or that high-ICT services 
exports are relatively price insensitive (Hope and Soskice 2016). How does their 
argument fair if we extend it to the wider sample of CMEs? It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to use econometric analysis to estimate and compare the price 
sensitivity of the exports of the individual CMEs, although that clearly remains an 
important area for future research. However, we can look at the export profiles of 
the CMEs. If Baccaro and Pontusson’s argument holds water, we would expect to 
see high-tech manufactures and high-ICT services making up a greater proportion of 
total exports in the (more consumption-led) Nordic CMEs than the continental 
European CMEs. 
Table 3.8 shows the importance of high-skill and technology intensive 
manufactures (as defined by UNCTAD) and high-ICT services (as defined by Wren 
(2013a)) to total exports. Due to data availability the table just shows a snapshot in 
2005, but this corresponds to the latter part of the Great Moderation when Baccaro 
and Pontusson (2016) suggest the German growth model based on price sensitive 
exports became particularly ingrained. In a straight comparison between Germany 
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and Sweden, we can see that high-ICT services were more important to Swedish 
exports, which lines up with their hypothesis. We can also see that high-tech 
manufactures made up a bigger proportion of exports in Germany than in Sweden, 
which does not line up with their hypothesis. Hence, there is mixed evidence for 
their hypothesis even when looking solely at the two CMEs in their analysis. 
 
Table 3.8. The importance of high-skill and technology intensive manufactures and 
high-ICT services to total exports in the CMEs, 2005 
 
High-skill and technology 
intensive manufactures 
 (as a % of total exports) 
High-ICT services 
(as a % of total exports) 
2005 2005 
Continental European 
  Austria  13.5  9.6  
Belgium  29.4   6.8  
Germany  24.6   6.0  
Netherlands  29.5   8.9  
Switzerland  38.2   14.2  
Average  27.0   9.1  
 
  
Nordic   
Denmark  14.6   6.7  
Finland  24.7   12.3  
Norway  4.4   7.0  
Sweden  19.1   12.8  
Average  15.7   9.7  
 
  
Other   
Japan  27.8   4.9  
Source: Author’s calculations using United Nations UNCTADstat database (accessed 
September 2016). 
Note: All underlying exports data are in $US (current prices, current exchange rates). Data 
on high-skill and technology manufactures exports are directly available from UNCTAD. For 
a list of manufacturing subsectors included in the high-skill and technology manufactures see: 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Classifications/DimSitcRev3Products_Tdr_Hierarchy.pdf.
High-ICT services covers the following sectors: communications; insurance; financial services; 
computer and information; and other business services. Sectors chosen by author from 
UNCTADstat data to match as closely as possible Wren’s (2013a, 13) “dynamic service 
sectors”, which are “ICT intensive and are characterized by relatively high rates of 
productivity growth and increasing international tradedness”. 
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The remainder of Table 3.8 shows that their hypothesis also holds up badly when 
extended to the broader pool of CMEs. On average the continental European CMEs, 
which typically saw a lower contribution of consumption to GDP growth, had much 
higher high-tech export profiles in manufactured goods than the Nordic CMEs, and 
the two groups had similar export profiles in high-ICT services. Switzerland 
especially stands out. It had one of the lowest contributions of consumption to GDP 
growth across all the CMEs but had the most high-end export profile in both 
manufactured goods and services. High-tech manufactures also made up a bigger 
proportion of Japanese exports than they did in any of the Nordic CMEs, and Japan 
had an exceptionally low contribution of consumption to GDP growth during the 
Great Moderation. The key takeaway from the table is that there seems to be no 
systematic relationship among CMEs between the contribution of consumption to 
GDP growth during the Great Moderation and importance of high-end goods and 
services to total exports. 
Returning to Figure 3.7, we can see that the Nordic CMEs are more egalitarian 
than their continental European counterparts (and Japan). If Kaleckian mechanisms 
were indeed at work in the CMEs, then this is likely to be how, rather than through 
the export price sensitivity channel emphasised by Baccaro and Pontusson (2016). 
There are a number of distinctions between the Nordic CMEs and the continental 
European CMEs (and Japan) that are likely to have helped drive the differences 
between the two groups in both the distribution of income and the contribution of 
consumption to GDP growth. Put another way, there are several factors that can 
help explain the negative correlation between income inequality and the contribution 
of consumption to GDP growth observed in Figure 3.7. 
The first factor is that the Nordic CMEs are more redistributive. Iversen and 
Soskice (2015a, 2015b) find evidence that the Nordic CMEs have responded to 
deindustrialisation in a much more inclusive manner than the continental European 
CMEs. More specifically, spending on labour market outsiders has been much more 
responsive to labour market shocks in the Nordic CMEs. As labour market outsiders 
are typically unemployed or in low-paid precarious employment, we would expect 
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them to have a high marginal propensity to consume, so that any redistribution 
toward them helps prop up economy-wide consumption. 
Iversen and Soskice’s (2015a, 2015b) framework finds that the Nordic CMEs are 
more redistributive than the continental European CMEs because of long-standing 
differences in party systems. Both sets of countries have PR electoral systems (see 
Table B.4 in Appendix B1), but the Nordic CMEs have strong independent rightist 
parties, whereas the continental European CMEs have strong Christian Democratic 
(or centrist) parties and weak rightist parties. This constellation of parties means 
that centre-left governments who help safeguard the interests of outsiders are more 
prevalent in the Nordic CMEs than in the continental European CMEs.  
In Section 3.3, I argued that growth models are largely invariant to partisanship. 
This is because governments of both partisan stripes tend to pursue demand-side 
policies that support the national growth model—i.e. supporting the advanced 
sectors of the economy is a valence issue for voters (Iversen and Soskice 2015b). As 
Iversen and Soskice (2015a, 2015b) show, however, redistribution is still a partisan 
issue for voters. In this way, partisanship did exert some second-order effects on 
growth models during the Great Moderation, by influencing the contribution of 
consumption to GDP growth within the CMEs. 
The second factor is that a higher proportion total employment resides in the 
public sector in the Nordic CMEs than elsewhere, as shown by the first column in 
Table 3.9. Rueda and Pontusson (2000) and Pontusson (2005) provide empirical 
evidence that greater public sector employment is associated with more egalitarian 
wage structures in the CMEs, as government employers are sheltered from product 
market competition and are ultimately accountable to elected officials.  Public sector 
employment also directly buttresses household consumption by providing well-paid 
and relatively secure employment for low- and medium-skilled workers (Martin 
2016). In addition, a large public sector has played a major role in expanding female 
labour force participation in the Nordic countries (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2013), 
which helps insulate household income and consequently consumption from the 
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business cycle in dual-earner households in which the spouse works in the private 
sector. 
 
Table 3.9. Average public sector employment and trade union density in the CMEs, 
1994-2007 
 
Average civilian  
government employment  
(as a percentage of the  
working-age population)  
Average trade  
union density  
(%)  
1994-2007 1994-2007 
Continental European 
 
 
Austria 12.0 37.0 
Belgium 10.3 54.0 
Germany 7.5 24.6 
Netherlands 6.3 22.7 
Switzerland 7.9 20.6 
Average 8.8 31.8 
 
  
Nordic   
Denmark 21.8 72.9 
Finland 14.1 75.3 
Norway 22.6 55.2 
Sweden 21.0 79.1 
Average 19.9 70.6 
 
  
Other   
Japan 5.6 21.2 
Source: David Brady, Evelyne Huber, and John D. Stephens, Comparative Welfare States 
Dataset, University of North Carolina and WZB Berlin Social Science Center, 2014 (accessed 
May 2016); Cusack, Thomas R. 2004. Data on Public Data on Public Employment and 
Wages for 21 OECD countries, WZB (Berlin Social Research Center), 
http://www.wzb.eu/en/persons/thomas-r-cusack?s=5662 [accessed 3 Jul 2011], ILO, 
LABORSTA (database), http://laborsta.ilo.org/ [accessed 3 Jun 2013], International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (various years); OECD and J.Visser, 
ICTWSS database (Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State 
Intervention and Social Pacts, 1960-2010), version 3.0 (http://www.uva-aias.net/). 
Note: The working-age population are those aged 15-64. Missing values in government 
employment series for Japan and Switzerland were linearly interpolated before the period 
average was taken. Trade union density corresponds to the ratio of wage and salary earners 
that are trade union members, divided by the total number of wage and salary earners. 
 
The third factor, as shown in the second column of Table 3.9, is that union 
membership has held up much better in the Nordic CMEs. In fact, Thelen (2014) 
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finds that the extent to which groups outside of the core manufacturing industries—
women, services sector workers, salaried professionals, public sector workers—are 
represented in the labour movement is one of the key dividing lines between the 
Nordic and continental European CMEs. Higher union density has been linked to 
lower wage inequality due to the desire of union members for wage compression and 
the role of unions in supporting the wages of low- and semi-skilled workers 
(Pontusson 2005; Rueda and Pontusson 2000). The more solidaristic labour market 
outcomes in Nordic countries further support consumption. 
The relationship between inequality and consumption is complex and ultimately 
dependent on varieties of capitalism. The complementary institutions of coordinated 
capitalism simultaneously support the export-led growth model and a more 
egalitarian distribution of income. The LMEs institutions emphasis on flexibility 
supports the consumption-led growth model but leads to a more inequitable 
distribution of income. Kaleckian mechanisms are therefore not driving the 
differences in growth models among advanced democracies. However, within 
coordinated capitalism, there is evidence that the more egalitarian Nordic CMEs, 
which have managed more inclusive growth in the era of deindustrialisation, have 
seen a higher contribution of consumption to GDP growth than the other CMEs. 
One further dividing line between the Nordic and continental European CMEs 
(that does not alter the distribution of income) is the evolution of household 
indebtedness. The more rapid credit expansion in the Nordic CMEs during the 
Great Moderation helped to facilitate household consumption, as we shall see in the 
following section. 
 
3.5 Growth models, credit and housing 
 
The Great Moderation was characterised by low and stable inflation and low 
interest rates across advanced democracies, which was partly the result of the shift 
to inflation-targeting central banking and open financial markets (see Section 3.3). 
The sole focus of macroeconomic stabilisation policy on inflation and the low cost of 
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borrowing made for an environment ripe for credit and asset price bubbles to build 
up unchecked. Table 3.10 shows just that in the household sector.  
 
Table 3.10. LMEs vs. different groups of CMEs: Household indebtedness, 1995-2007 
 Household debt (as a percentage of net disposable income)  
 
1995 2007 
Average annual 
growth rate (%)  
1996-07 
Liberal market economies    
Australia 105.5 194.2 5.3 
Canada 97.9 145.0 3.3 
New Zealand - -   - 
United Kingdom* 111.2 183.3 5.2 
United States 94.5 143.0 3.5 
Average 102.3 166.4 4.3 
    
Continental European CMEs    
Austria 65.8 88.6 2.5 
Belgium 60.2 87.4 3.2 
Germany 97.2 102.6 0.5 
Netherlands 147.6 261.4 4.9 
Switzerland** 171.1 182.1 0.8 
Average 108.4 144.4 2.4 
    
Nordic CMEs    
Denmark 192.5 324.7 4.5 
Finland 71.0 114.7 4.2 
Norway 123.4 207.2 4.5 
Sweden 89.4 157.4 4.8 
Average 119.1 201.0 4.5 
    
Other CMEs    
Japan 137.4 133.6 -0.2 
* The UK data starts in 1997, hence the data shown in the 1995 column is for 1997 and the 
average annual growth rate is for the 1998-07 period.  
** The Swiss data starts in 1999, hence the data shown in the 1995 column is for 1999 and 
the average annual growth rate is for the 2000-07 period. 
Source: OECD National Account at a Glance, June 2016. 
Note: No household indebtedness data is available for New Zealand. 
 
Household indebtedness expanded between 1995 and 2007 (often sharply) in every 
country in the sample except Japan. The slight fall in indebtedness in Japan likely 
reflects the severely depressed private sector demand in the country during its lost 
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decade (see Section 3.2 and Koo (2009)). The comparison across varieties of 
capitalism and geographical areas in Table 3.10 yields some interesting findings. 
Financialisation and credit expansion to households have been widely associated 
with the LMEs’ consumption-led growth model (Barnes and Wren 2012; Crouch 
2009; Iversen and Soskice 2012). The table reinforces this view, as household 
indebtedness in the LMEs starts relatively high and rises rapidly over the period. 
However, the table also shows that the Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands had 
similarly dramatic growth in household indebtedness and finished the period with 
even higher household indebtedness than the LMEs (on average). 
The CPE literature has been guilty of identifying household debt and credit 
expansion as a uniquely LME phenomenon (Barnes and Wren 2012; Crouch 2009; 
Iversen and Soskice 2012). Barnes (2015, 19) is the exception; she presents evidence 
on household debt trajectories and comes to the conclusion “that the conventional 
wisdom about household debt in liberal market economies does not differentiate the 
two ‘varieties’ of advanced capitalist growth”. The evidence presented in Table 3.10 
supports her view but just looking at the headline household indebtedness figures 
cannot tell us the whole story. It cannot tell us anything about what the credit was 
used for (mortgages or consumer credit), which part of the income distribution it 
went to or the effect it had on the different components of aggregate demand; all of 
which are integral if we want to unpack the role of household indebtedness in 
growth models. In this section, I argue that while household indebtedness may have 
followed similar patterns in some CMEs as it did in the LMEs, it played a very 
different role in their growth models. 
 
Credit and consumption-led growth in the LMEs 
The expansion of credit to households may not have been unique to the LMEs but it 
was ubiquitous among them. No LME (including Ireland and New Zealand) did not 
see a substantial increase in household indebtedness during the Great Moderation. 
The fact some CMEs saw equivalent (or larger) increases in household indebtedness 
does not—as claimed by Barnes (2015)—invalidate the large body of work in CPE 
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and economics that points to the central role that credit played in the LMEs’ 
consumption-led growth model. 
The consumption-led growth model of the LMEs was underwritten by the 
expansion of private credit. In a time of stagnating real wages for the median 
worker, credit was a means of propping up consumption and living standards (Rajan 
2010). Financialisation supported the reorientation of the LMEs towards the low-
skilled non-traded service sectors and high-end knowledge based services during the 
era of deindustrialisation (see Section 3.2). Barnes and Wren (2012) provide 
empirical evidence that private sector indebtedness helped expand employment in 
non-traded private services, such as retail, restaurants and personal services, in 
OECD countries between 1970 and 2000. They suggest this operates through two 
channels. First, a line of credit creates the illusion of additional household wealth, 
and second, credit expansion often fuels house price increases that boost the net 
wealth of homeowners. The LMEs were also uniquely well placed to benefit from 
financialisation at the top end of the labour market. It is no coincidence that 
London and New York are the world’s foremost financial centres. The flexible wage 
setting and focus on general education at the tertiary level in the LMEs facilitates 
radical innovation in high-end services, especially high-risk financial activities 
(including securitisation) (Iversen and Soskice 2012). Unlike the high-level household 
indebtedness figures, the expansion of the financial services sector was greater in the 
LMEs than the CMEs during the Great Moderation (Barnes 2015), just as the 
varieties of capitalism approach would predict. The CPE literature has also more 
broadly highlighted the complementarity of national systems of financial regulation 
with national varieties of capitalism and growth models (Iversen and Soskice 2012; 
Kalinowski 2013). 
There is a political narrative that runs alongside the economic narrative when it 
comes to credit expansion in the LMEs: in the face of stalling wages and living 
standards, and rising inequality, governments in the LMEs deliberately expanded 
credit in order to boost employment and growth, and placate their electorates 
(Barnes and Wren 2012; Calomiris and Haber 2014; Rajan 2010). In the United 
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States, the policy actions taken to support credit expansion were very explicit, 
including the direct provision of subprime mortgages to low-income households 
through the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, as well as a commitment for these institutions to repurchase risky mortgages 
made by commercial banks to low-income households under the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) (Calomiris and Haber 2014). The aggressive government 
lending targets led Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to loosen their underwriting 
standards (i.e. provide riskier loans), and the commercial banks did the same as they 
could resell many of their CRA loans to the GSEs and remove the risk from their 
balance sheets (Calomiris and Haber 2014). In the LMEs in general, government 
policies were less explicit but indirectly fuelled the rise of financial services and risky 
lending, for example, light-touch financial regulation (championed loudly by Gordon 
Brown and Tony Blair in the UK) and publicly-listed banks aggressively pursuing 
high returns (Barnes 2015; Kalinowski 2013). 
Fuller (2015, 258) looks at five different dimensions of government policy that 
can affect the expansion of credit to households and creates a composite index of 
different countries’ “systemic approach to credit” during the 2000s. He finds that the 
United States government encouraged credit expansion more than any other 
government in the advanced democracies. On average, the LMEs were also much 
more encouraging than the CMEs, although the gap between the LMEs and the 
Nordic CMEs was smaller than the gap between the LMEs and the continental 
European CMEs.38 In a number of the continental European CMEs, the government 
actually took steps to actively mitigate the growth of credit to households (Fuller 
2015). 
As discussed at length in Section 3.3, the majoritarian electoral systems of the 
LMEs systematically privilege the interest of consumers (Chang et al. 2011; 
Rogowski and Kayser 2002), force parties to compete for the median voter (Soskice 
2007), and give electorates the clarity of responsibility to hold governments 
                                         
38 Fuller’s (2015) index scores for the fifteen advanced democracies in my sample are shown 
in Table 4.1 in Chapter 4 of the thesis. 
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accountable for short-term economic performance (Anderson 2000; Nadeau, Niemi, 
and Yoshinaka 2002; Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999). Hence, 
the electoral systems of the LMEs provide clear incentives for governments to 
pursue policies that stimulate consumer spending, such as the expansion of credit to 
households. In modern macroeconomics, a rise in consumption will, ceteris paribus, 
result in an appreciation in the real exchange rate and a fall in net exports (see 
Section 4.4 of Chapter 4 of the thesis). The appreciation of the exchange rate will 
further benefit consumers by raising their purchasing power (Walter 2014). The 
downside of real exchange rate appreciation is that it reduces external 
competitiveness, but the LME consumption-led growth model does not require 
maintaining external competitiveness. Hence, pursing policies that expand access to 
credit are very attractive for governments in the majoritarian LMEs. The four-to-
five year electoral cycle and the close association between winning elections and 
governing in majoritarian systems typically outweigh the long-term risks of credit 
expansion to the stability of the financial system and the broader economy. 
 
Credit and export-led growth in the CMEs 
Rapid growth in household indebtedness is not central to the export-led growth 
model. We can see from Table 3.10 that household indebtedness did not rise 
markedly in all the CMEs during the Great Moderation. However, Table 3.10 does 
show that the growth of household indebtedness was similarly spectacular in the 
Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands as it was in the LMEs, which poses some 
interesting questions. Why did household indebtedness rise dramatically in some 
CMEs and not others? Why was the contribution of consumption to GDP growth so 
much lower in the highly indebted CMEs than in the highly indebted LMEs? Why 
did the growth of household indebtedness in the Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands 
not undermine their export-led growth models? This subsection aims to answer these 
questions using the growth models approach set out in this paper and some further 
empirical analysis. 
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The household indebtedness data in Table 3.10 does not give us any information 
about the type of debt households are taking on (mortgages, consumer credit or 
other loans) or the type of households that are taking on debt (low-income, medium-
income, high-income). Mortgage debt (loans for house purchase) typically makes up 
the majority of household debt; mortgage debt averaged just over 70% of total 
household debt across OECD countries in 2005 (Girouard, Kennedy, and André 
2007). A rapid expansion of mortgage debt generally coincides with a rise in house 
prices, as a boost in demand for residential property cannot easily be met with a rise 
in supply, at least in the short term. Houses (and many other financial assets) are 
unlike ordinary goods, as a rise in price typically increases demand (as buyers expect 
prices to go up further in the future). Buyers will therefore make capital gains from 
holding housing as long as expectations of continuously rising prices do not change. 
This makes house prices prone to self-fulfilling bubbles (Carlin and Soskice 2015). 
Figure 3.8 shows that the growth of household indebtedness was mirrored by the 
growth of real house prices during the Great Moderation. In fact, no country had a 
credit boom without also having a house price boom. House price growth in the 
CMEs during the Great Moderation had a distinct geographical pattern. Much like 
the growth of household indebtedness, the Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands saw 
faster house price growth than the other CMEs. 
There are a number of reasons why this was the case. On the supply-side, 
mortgage borrowing was encouraged by high loan-to-value ratios (the Netherlands), 
mortgage interest deductibility (Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden), the availability of housing equity release (Denmark, Finland, Netherlands 
and Sweden) and the development of interest-only loans (Denmark and the 
Netherlands) (André 2010; IMF 2011; Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008). In contrast, 
mortgage borrowing was discouraged in Germany and Switzerland by tighter credit 
conditions, comparatively low homeownership rates and large rental markets (André 
2010). On the demand-side, the economies of the Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands 
grew much faster than the other CMEs during the Great Moderation. The former 
group averaged 3.2% annual GDP growth over the period compared to just 2% in 
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the other CMEs. This may have increased demand for housing directly, as well as 
increased expectations about future house price appreciation, which has been shown 
to contribute significantly to house price booms (Miles and Pillonca 2008). 
 
Figure 3.8 Average annual growth in household indebtedness and real house prices, 
1996-2007 
 
Source: OECD National Accounts at a Glance, June 2016; OECD Analytical House Price 
Indicators (accessed July 2016). 
Note: Average annual growth rates for 1996-2007 for all countries except Austria (2001-
2007), Switzerland (2000-2007) and the UK (1998-2007). No household indebtedness data is 
available for New Zealand so it is excluded from the figure. The markers correspond to 
varieties of capitalism. The grey squares are CMEs and the black circles are LMEs. 
 
The equity in a homeowner’s house (the difference between the market price and the 
price at purchase) is a source of wealth. For low- and middle-income homeowners, 
who typically hold few financial assets (stocks, bonds, etc.), it is often their biggest 
(or only) source of wealth (Mian and Sufi 2014). A rise in house prices pushes up the 
housing wealth of homeowners, which has been found to significantly boost 
household consumption (Benjamin, Chinloy, and Jud 2004; Case, Quigley, and 
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Shiller 2005; Ludwig and Sløk 2004). The difference in house price growth in the 
Nordic CMEs (and the Netherlands) and the continental European CMEs (see 
Figure 3.8) is therefore likely to have been a factor in the larger contribution of 
consumption to GDP growth in the former group. 
Catte et al. (2004) find that the majority of the housing wealth effect on 
consumption runs through the housing equity withdrawal channel. In a rising 
housing market, homeowners build up equity in their homes. In markets with highly 
developed and complete mortgage markets, homeowners can then take out 
additional loans using the equity in their home as collateral. This channel was shown 
to be particularly important for fuelling consumption in Australia, Canada, the 
Netherlands, the UK and the US but had no effect in continental Europe and Japan, 
where home equity loans are much less common (Catte et al. 2004). For example, 
Mian and Sufi (2011) estimate that a total of $1.25 trillion in the rise in household 
debt in the United States between 2002 and 2006 was attributable to home equity 
withdrawals, and that the vast majority of these withdrawals were used to prop up 
consumption expenditures. In related work, Mian, Rao and Sufi (2013) find that 
poorer and more levered households have a higher marginal propensity to consume 
out of housing wealth. Their findings suggest that housing booms facilitate the 
expansion of consumption (when home equity loans are easily obtainable) because 
they loosen the credit constraints on low-income households. 
The average annual contribution of consumption to GDP growth during the 
Great Moderation was 1.4% in the Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands and 2.3% in 
the LMEs.39 In contrast, the average growth of household indebtedness was slightly 
higher in the Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands at 4.6%, compared to 4.3% in the 
LMEs.40 We have already discussed a multitude of institutional and political reasons 
why the LMEs are more consumption-led, but there are also five reasons why the 
                                         
39 Source: European Commission's Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
(DG ECFIN) AMECO Database (03/05/2016 update). 
40 Source: OECD National Account at a Glance, June 2016. 
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rise in household indebtedness in the Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands is likely to 
have affected consumption less than it did in the LMEs. 
The first reason is that homeownership rates were higher (on average) in the 
LMEs than the Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands in the 1990s and early 2000s; the 
average share of owner-occupied dwellings was 69% in the former group and only 
57% in the latter group.41 As some of the effect of credit on consumption operates 
through the house price channel, countries with a lower proportion of homeowners 
are likely to see smaller effects on consumption. 
The second reason is that more low-income households were indebted in the 
LMEs than elsewhere, particularly in Canada, New Zealand and the United States, 
where around 50% of households in the bottom 20% of the income distribution held 
some form of debt in the mid-2000s (Girouard, Kennedy, and André 2007). This 
affects consumption because households at the lower end of the income and wealth 
distributions typically have much higher marginal propensities to consume than 
richer households (Carroll, Slacalek, and Tokuoka 2014; Jappelli and Pistaferri 2014; 
Mian and Sufi 2014). 
The third reason is that more of the expansion in credit to households was used to 
finance consumption in the LMEs.  
Figure 3.9 shows that consumer credit— borrowing used for purchasing goods 
and services such as credit cards and overdrafts—was larger relative to GDP in the 
LMEs than any of the CMEs (data is available for) on the eve of the financial crisis 
in 2007. The figure is particularly striking considering household indebtedness was 
considerably higher in Denmark and the Netherlands than it was in the LMEs in 
2007 (see Table 3.10). The more consumer-focused lending in the LMEs likely 
reflects more developed consumer credit markets and the ease of obtaining (and 
widespread use of) home equity loans (Catte et al. 2004; Schwartz and Seabrooke 
2008), as well as the greater presence of returns-driven banks pursuing high-risk 
strategies (Barnes 2015; Kalinowski 2013). 
                                         
41  Source: Table 1 in Schwartz and Seabrooke (2008). The figures are an average of 
homeownership rates in 1992 and 2002. 
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Figure 3.9. Short-term (up to one year) consumer credit to households, 2007 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using OECD National Accounts and OECD Households’ 
Financial Assets and Liabilities (data accessed July 2016). 
Note: No short-term consumer credit data is available for Finland, Germany, Japan or 
Norway. Consumer credit data for Belgium, Canada, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom are from archived version of OECD Households’ Financial Assets and Liabilities as 
data is not available for these countries in the most recent version. Households includes non-
profit institutions serving households. The colours of the columns correspond to varieties of 
capitalism. The grey columns are CMEs and the black columns are LMEs. 
 
The fourth reason is that the Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands are very open to 
international trade compared to the LMEs. The average trade openness of the 
former group was 83% of GDP between 1994 and 2007, while the equivalent figure 
for the LMEs was just 50% of GDP.42 This means that a higher proportion of any 
increase in credit-financed household spending is likely to be spent on goods from 
abroad in the Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands. The encouragement of credit 
growth as a policy tool to increase consumption is clearly more desirable in the 
consumption-led LMEs, but it also more feasible due to the presence of large 
internal markets (excluding New Zealand). 
                                         
42 Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD Annual National Accounts (data accessed June 
2016). Trade openness = (exports + imports) as a % of GDP (all in current prices). 
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The final reason is that the governments in the Nordic CMEs and the 
Netherlands partially offset the expansionary effects of credit expansion with 
restrictive fiscal policies during the Great Moderation. There is a lot of evidence that 
the Nordic countries switched to non-accommodating fiscal policies after the 
breakdown in centralised bargaining that occurred during the severe economic crises 
of the early 1990s (Dølvik, Andersen, and Vartiainen 2015; Iversen 1996; Iversen and 
Soskice 2012). 
Governments in the CMEs have different incentives to those in the LMEs. As 
discussed in detail in Section 3.3, governments in consensus (PR) political systems 
privilege the interest of producers (Chang et al. 2011; Rogowski and Kayser 2002) 
and labour unions and business associations are heavily involved in the policymaking 
process (Soskice 2007). In addition, parties in coalition governments with low clarity 
of responsibility are held less accountable for short-term economic performance at 
the ballot box (Anderson 2000; Nadeau, Niemi, and Yoshinaka 2002; Powell and 
Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999), so are freer to pursue policies in the long-
term interest of their supporters. These political institutions complement the 
economic institutions that underpin the export-led growth model in the CMEs (see 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3), because they allow the social partners to take a long-term 
view and privilege external competitiveness over short-term economic gains.  
It may then seem paradoxical that the Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands 
allowed household indebtedness to rise so dramatically, and even pursued policies 
that encouraged house price bubbles. However, as discussed earlier, it is only 
expansions of domestic demand that, ceteris paribus, lead to appreciation of the real 
exchange rate and falling external competitiveness (see Section 4.4 of Chapter 4 of 
the thesis). We have already seen that credit growth in these countries likely had a 
smaller effect on consumption than in the LMEs. The effects of credit expansion on 
domestic demand were also partially counteracted by restrictive fiscal policies. 
We saw in Figure 3.4 that the Nordic countries and the Netherlands managed to 
maintain external competitiveness in the face of credit and housing booms. Hence, 
governments in CMEs may be willing to generate housing booms (or at least not 
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take actions to dampen them down) as long as their effects on domestic demand are 
not too large or are counteracted by restrictive macroeconomic policies. Rising house 
prices can be politically useful to governments in CMEs (and of course also LMEs) 
because they increase voters’ housing wealth and can lower voters’ demands for 
social insurance programs and redistribution (Ansell 2012, 2014; Schwartz and 
Seabrooke 2008). The latter channel may be especially important in the Nordic 
economies, which have seen the biggest fall in redistribution over course of the Great 
Moderation (see Table 3.7). 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
The advanced democracies have been through a period of profound change since the 
collapse of the Fordist system in the 1970s. While the wage-led growth model of the 
Golden Age was able to secure both rising living standards and reductions in 
inequality among households, achieving this combination in the post-Fordist era of 
deindustrialisation and skills-biased technological change has proved elusive. 
This paper explores the growth models that advanced democracies have pursued 
during the post-Fordist period, and argues that post-Fordist growth models are 
deeply intertwined with both varieties of capitalism and political systems. The 
LMEs pursued consumption-led growth models, partly driven by credit expansion 
and underpinned by their flexible labour markets and general skills focused 
education systems. In contrast, the CMEs have pursued export-led growth models 
based on external competitiveness and underpinned by coordinated and cooperative 
industrial relations and specific skills focused education systems. The consensus 
political systems of the CMEs and the majoritarian political systems of the LMEs 
further reinforce growth models by providing governments with a strong set of 
incentives to pursue policies that support national growth models. 
Post-Fordist growth models became particularly entrenched during the Great 
Moderation—the long period of low inflation and reduced macroeconomic volatility 
that preceded the global financial crisis. This was the result of two major changes in 
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the macroeconomic regimes of advanced democracies: the introduction of 
independent inflation-targeting central banking and the move to financial market 
openness. These changes, paradoxically, gave governments more discretion to pursue 
demand-side policies that supported national growth models, because they enhanced 
the credibility of governments in financial markets and ensured external deficits 
could be easily financed (without pressure for adjustment).  
Monetary policymakers were unconcerned about the build up of macroeconomic 
imbalances during the Great Moderation. This came back to haunt policymakers 
when the global financial crisis hit in 2008-09. The current account imbalances that 
accumulated between advanced democracies pursuing different growth models 
during the Great Moderation sowed the seeds for the crisis by helping inflate 
dangerous asset price and credit bubbles. 
 The Great Moderation was also a period of divergence in other important areas 
of the macroeconomy. The cross-country differences observed in the distribution of 
income and household indebtedness help to explain how the export-led Nordic CMEs 
generally had a higher contribution of consumption to GDP growth than the export-
led continental European CMEs. Consumption was propped up in the Nordic CMEs 
by high levels of public employment, solidaristic wage outcomes, low inequality and 
credit expansion. Even in the Nordic CMEs, however, the contribution of 
consumption to GDP growth was still well below that in the consumption-led LMEs, 
which suggests that growth models are deeply embedded in varieties of capitalism 
and that these other factors are only of second-order importance. 
This paper uses theory and an empirical analysis of the Great Moderation to set 
out a broad growth models framework. It can only scratch the surface of the 
comparative political economy of post-Fordist growth models, however, so leaves 
many open questions for future research. An obvious starting point would be an 
analysis of growth models in the post-global financial crisis phase since 2010. Despite 
a protracted and slow recovery in most advanced democracies, as well as a turn 
towards austerity policies (particularly in Europe), the high-level evidence points to 
pre-crisis growth models remaining in tact. After a small rebalancing during the 
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crisis, current account imbalances have re-emerged. The average current account 
balance in the LMEs was -3.6% of GDP in 2015, compared to 6% of GDP in the 
CMEs. The gap between the two groups is barely different from the gap on the eve 
of the financial crisis in 2007. 43  The re-emergence of imbalances since the crisis 
clearly needs to be explored further in order to ascertain whether they have been 
driven by the same set of interrelationships set out in this paper. 
Another critical research agenda is how coordinated capitalism and the export-led 
growth model can survive in the long term. Deindustrialisation continues to erode 
the industrial core and success in increasingly important knowledge-intensive service 
sectors seems to depend on flexibility rather than coordination. The Nordic CMEs 
provide reason to be optimistic, as they have shown that the export-led growth 
model can be partially liberalised without undermining solidaristic wage outcomes 
and success in traditional manufactured exports. The newfound success of the 
Nordic countries in knowledge-intensive services and high levels of public 
employment (particularly among women) are both rooted in mass publicly funded 
education systems that have shifted towards a focus on general skills. This suggests 
that the more dualised continental European CMEs (particularly Germany) that 
have doubled-down on traditional manufacturing sectors and vocational training 
systems may have more cause to worry about the long-term viability of their export-
led growth models. That being said, both the Nordic and continental European 
CMEs have a long history of using coordination, cooperation and negotiation to 
underpin a growth model based on success in exporting. It is therefore likely that 
these economies will adapt to future challenges the way they have done in the 
past—by taking the route that safeguards their export-led growth models. 
                                         
43 Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2016. See Table B.3 in Appendix 
B1 for a comparison of current account balances in the LMEs and the CMEs in 1994, 2007 
and 2015. 
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4 
 
Open economy macroeconomics and political 
science: Demand-side policies and external 
imbalances in advanced democracies 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Great Moderation period that preceded the global financial crisis was 
characterised by low and stable inflation, low interest rates and reduced 
macroeconomic volatility. On the surface the shift to a macroeconomic regime 
centred on independent inflation-targeting central banking and open financial 
markets had been a great success but this period also coincided with the build up of 
dangerous imbalances among advanced democracies in real exchange rates and 
current accounts. The dominant models of the macroeconomy used in political 
science cannot explain the variation in macroeconomic outcomes and government 
policies observed during the Great Moderation. They are typically closed economy 
and still rooted in new classical economic theory from the 1970s and 1980s, which 
means they leave no scope for government policy to affect the economy beyond the 
very short term. In this paper, we set out a suite of simple modern open economy 
macroeconomic models to close the gap between the theory and the empirics. We 
then use the models to show how government demand-side policies, such as easing 
access to credit or fiscal policy, can affect the economy in the medium term, and 
how governments pursuing different policies can lead to persistent external 
imbalances even within a system of inflation targeting central banking. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
The Great Moderation—the long period of reduced macroeconomic volatility and 
low inflation that preceded the global financial crisis of 2008-09—saw the build up of 
imbalances in real exchange rates and current accounts among advanced 
democracies.44 These imbalances reflected the build up of dangerous asset price and 
credit bubbles and helped sow the seeds of the global financial crisis and the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis (Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti 2012; Lane 2012; Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti 2012). The use of restrictive demand-side policies by some 
governments and expansionary demand-side policies by other governments was a 
major factor in driving the accumulation of imbalances (Iversen and Soskice 2012). 
Perhaps surprisingly given the immense importance of macroeconomic 
developments over recent decades, political science research using contemporary 
macroeconomic modelling has been very limited. And the variation in 
macroeconomic outcomes and government policies across advanced democracies 
during the Great Moderation is at odds with the dominant macroeconomic models 
still used in political science (Persson and Tabellini 2000). Still rooted in new 
classical theory from the 1970s and 1980s, these models leave no scope for economic 
policies to affect macroeconomic outcomes beyond the very short term (Iversen and 
Soskice 2006b). They are also typically closed economy models—modelling a single 
nation that does not trade or interact with other nations. This is not only unrealistic 
in our highly globalised world but also means existing models cannot analyse 
external imbalances. 
This paper aims to close the gap between the theory and the empirics by setting 
out a suite of simple modern open economy macroeconomic models. Our models 
incorporate important elements of frontier New Keynesian (NK) macroeconomics 
models, such as imperfect competition in product markets and rigidities in wage- 
and price-setting, whose implications have yet to be properly considered in political 
science. However, we also aim firmly for simple, tractable models that closely match 
                                         
44 The term Great Moderation was first introduced by Stock and Watson (2002). 
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real world outcomes, so we abstract from some of the more stringent New Keynesian 
assumptions, such as all agents forming expectations in a forward-looking, fully 
rational manner. This is one of the assumptions that have led modern 
macroeconomics to become so complex as to be all but impenetrable to scholars 
outside of the discipline. Unfortunately, the added complexity has not been driven 
by a desire to better explain how the macroeconomy works but instead by the 
“internal theoretical standards of the academic profession” (Hope and Soskice 2016, 
219). A central aim of this paper is that political scientists can use these simple 
models to study a range of problems, and through that we hope to reinvigorate the 
dormant research agenda at the intersection of macroeconomics and political science. 
The main implications of our open economy macroeconomic models, which build 
on the models developed by Carlin and Soskice (2015), are: (1) permanent changes 
in domestic demand can have lasting effects on real wages and real exchange rates 
(and potentially also output); (2) governments have the discretion to pursue policies 
that affect domestic demand, even when monetary policy has been delegated to an 
independent central bank; and (3) governments pursuing different demand-side 
policies can lead to persistent current account imbalances in the medium run. 
The second implication is particularly striking because the delegation of control 
of monetary policy to independent central banks was designed to tie the hands of 
governments. Our argument, paradoxically, is that central bank independence is a 
critical enabler for governments to stimulate domestic demand for electoral gain 
because it anchors inflation expectations and increases the credibility of governments 
in the eyes of financial markets. This provides an alternative, and arguably more 
plausible, argument than Barro and Gordon’s (1983) modelling of the time-
inconsistency problem in monetary policymaking, as to why a government with an 
output target below equilibrium would voluntarily give up control of monetary 
policy to an independent central bank. 
The analysis in this paper fits closely with the emerging growth models literature 
in comparative political economy (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016; Hope and Soskice 
2016; Martin 2016). This work emphasises the divergent paths of advanced 
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democracies during the Great Moderation, with some pursuing consumption-led 
growth models and others pursuing export-led growth models. Although these 
growth models are rooted in political–economic institutions, they are reinforced by 
government demand-side policies (see Section 3.3 of Chapter 3 of the thesis). The 
novel argument made in this paper about growth models and demand-side policies is 
that deficit-financed fiscal policy is not a pre-requisite for running a consumption-led 
growth model, as credible governments have other policy levers, such as loosening 
credit constraints, which they can freely use to expand the domestic economy. The 
government can use expansive fiscal policy but this approach is often precluded by 
implicit and/or explicit fiscal sustainability rules. It is much simpler for governments 
to use restrictive fiscal policy to support the export-led growth model, however, as 
this does not require the build-up of public sector debt. 
It is worth noting that this discussion in this paper stands apart from the supply-
side led growth theory literature in economics (see Acemoglu (2009) for a 
comprehensive overview of modern growth theory). This literature focuses on the 
proximate sources of long run growth such as the accumulation of capital (human 
and physical) and advancement and diffusion of new technologies and methods of 
production (Carlin and Soskice 2015). In contrast, we are more concerned with the 
demand side of the economy, and specifically, how changes in domestic demand 
affect the economy in the short and medium run. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 uses empirical 
evidence to build a picture of the macroeconomic trajectories of advanced economies 
during the Great Moderation. Section 4.3 charts the evolution of the literature at 
the intersection of macroeconomics and political science. Section 4.4 makes our case 
for building a better macroeconomic model for use in political science. It then sets 
out a suite of simple modern macroeconomic models—starting with a closed 
economy model as a point of comparison and then moving onto our preferred open 
economy models. Section 4.5 gives our high-level view of the politics behind demand-
side policies, before Section 4.6 provides evidence supporting our argument that 
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governments in advanced democracies pursued systematically different demand-side 
policies during the Great Moderation. The final section concludes. 
 
4.2 Macroeconomic outcomes in advanced democracies during the 
Great Moderation 
 
The Great Moderation gained it moniker because it was an extended period of 
reduced macroeconomic volatility. In practical terms, this meant that fluctuations in 
GDP growth were less frequent and/or less dramatic over this period than at other 
times; the macroeconomy was more stable. The volatility of the macroeconomy can 
be calculated by taking the standard deviation of quarterly real GDP growth over a 
given time period (in our case 21 quarters). Figure 4.1 shows the volatility of real 
GDP growth in advanced democracies between the start of 1970 and the middle of 
2012. As in the Chapter 3 of the thesis, the sample of advanced democracies 
comprises the following 15 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States.45 We can see that 
                                         
45 Ireland and the southern European economies (France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) 
are excluded from the sample. The sample is restricted to the LMEs (excluding Ireland) and 
the CMEs identified by Hall and Soskice’s (2001) varieties of capitalism framework. As set 
out in detail in Chapter 3 of the thesis, the political–economic institutions, growth models 
and political systems of the LMEs and the CMEs all reinforce one another to give 
governments in these economies strong incentives to pursue distinct and predictable demand-
side policies. This is not the case in Ireland and southern Europe. Ireland’s institutional 
configuration differs from the textbook LME case. Its wage bargaining was more centralised, 
which along with high levels of inward FDI meant exports made a much bigger contribution 
to growth during the Great Moderation than in the other LMEs, particularly in the 1990s 
(Barnes and Wren 2012). The Irish government therefore did not have clear incentives to 
pursue particular demand-side policies during the Great Moderation. Likewise, the mixed 
market economies (MMEs) of southern Europe (France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) 
lack institutional coherence and (partly as a consequence) did not possess a consistent 
growth model during the Great Moderation. Lastly, the paper focuses on advanced 
democracies and a number of the MMEs were much less developed than the LMEs and 
CMEs at the start of the sample period. The average GDP per capita of Greece, Portugal 
and Spain was $11,521 in 1994, compared to $25,955 for the fifteen countries analysed in the 
paper (Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2016). 
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volatility dropped markedly in the mid-1980s and stayed low for the next 20 years 
or so. 
 
Figure 4.1. Volatility of real GDP growth in advanced democracies, 1970 Q1 – 2012 
Q2 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using OECD Quarterly National Accounts (accessed August 
2016). 
Note: Volatility has been calculated as the standard deviation of the GDP growth rate of our 
combined 15-country sample over a rolling 21-quarter period. The underlying GDP data used 
is gross domestic product (expenditure approach, US dollars, volume estimates, fixed PPPs, 
OECD reference year, annual levels, seasonally adjusted). 
 
In this extended period of low volatility, politicians, policymakers and economists in 
advanced democracies were quick to praise themselves for their part in taming the 
business cycle. In 2002, Gordon Brown, then Chancellor of the Exchequer for the 
United Kingdom, proclaimed:46 
With Bank of England independence, tough decisions on inflation, new fiscal 
rules, and hard public spending controls, we today in our country have 
economic stability not boom and bust. 
                                         
46 This excerpt is taken from Gordon Brown’s speech Manufacturing Matters, which was 
delivered to the TGWU conference on March 28th 2002. 
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In a similar vein, Governor (and later Chairperson) of the Federal Reserve (the 
central bank of the United States) Ben Bernanke stated in 2004 that:47 
My view is that improvements in monetary policy, though certainly not the 
only factor, have probably been an important source of the Great 
Moderation. 
The economics profession also jumped to take credit, with Nobel Prize winning 
economist Robert Lucas Jr. (2003, 1) boasting in his Presidential Address to the 
American Economic Association in 2003 that: 
Macroeconomics was born as a distinct field in the 1940’s, as a part of the 
intellectual response to the Great Depression. The term then referred to the 
body of knowledge and expertise that we hoped would prevent the recurrence 
of that economic disaster. My thesis in this lecture is that macroeconomics in 
this original sense has succeeded: Its central problem of depression 
prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes, and has in fact been 
solved for many decades. 
All these self-congratulatory remarks turned out to be premature. The Great 
Moderation was brought to a dramatic end by the global financial crisis of 2008-09, 
the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Figure 4.1 
shows that macroeconomic volatility jumped back to levels not seen since the early 
1970s as a result of the crisis. This paper is concerned with using simple modern 
open economy macroeconomic models to show how government policies helped fuel 
the dangerous external imbalances that were a crucial precursor to the crisis. We 
therefore concentrate the remaining empirical analysis in this section on the pre-
crisis period. 
                                         
47 This excerpt is taken from Governor Ben Bernanke’s speech The Great Moderation, which 
was delivered at the meetings of the Eastern Economic Association in Washington D.C. on 
February 20th 2004. 
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A major macroeconomic trend during the Great Moderation was the convergence 
of inflation to low and stable levels. Figure 4.2 shows the evolution of inflation in 
advanced democracies between 1980 and the eve of the financial crisis. In 1980, 
inflation was above 10% in many of the countries, and only below 5% in one of the 
fifteen countries in our sample. Inflation dropped substantially between 1980 and the 
early 1990s and remained low thereafter; inflation did not exceed 5% in any of the 
fifteen countries between 1993 and 2007. 
The reduction in inflation was mirrored by a reduction in short-term (and long-
term) interest rates. Figure 4.3 shows the big drop in short-term interest rates from 
1980 to the mid-2000s. Interest rates ticked up briefly in the years directly before 
the global financial crisis but they were still well below their level in the 1980s. The 
inflationary pressure that provoked interest rate increases from the mid-2000s arose 
largely from the massive rise in oil prices over the 2000s. The price of Brent crude 
oil went from $28 in January 2000 to $133 in July 2008.48 
Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 provide evidence that from the mid-1990s until the 
global financial crisis the advanced democracies were operating in a low inflation–
low interest rate environment. As the quotes above demonstrate, politicians, 
policymakers, and economists were quick to attribute this benign macroeconomic 
environment to the governments’ delegation of monetary policy to independent 
central banks. This institutional change put monetary policy in the hands of 
unelected technocrats with no incentive to manipulate the economy for electoral 
gain. For example, Chancellor Gordon Brown gave the Bank of England operational 
independence over monetary policy when New Labour came to power in 1997 
(Carlin and Soskice 2015). The contribution of academic macroeconomics to the case 
for central bank independence will be discussed in Section 4.3. 
 
 
                                         
48  Source: US. Energy Information Administration, Crude Oil Prices: Brent - Europe 
[DCOILBRENTEU], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU, 22 July 2016. 
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Figure 4.2. Consumer price inflation, 1980-2007 
 
Source: OECD Key Short-Term Economic Indicators (data accessed June 2016). 
 
Figure 4.3. Short-term interest rates, 1980-2007 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 99, June 2016. 
Note: Short-term rates are typically the three-month interbank offer rate, or the rate 
associated with three-month government debt instruments (e.g. Treasury bills in the US) or 
certificates of deposit (CDs). 
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The primary focus of central banking during the era of independence was price 
stability, often explicitly through an inflation target. Inflation targeting central 
banks adjusted short-term interest rates in order to keep inflation at target and 
output (or unemployment) at equilibrium. This new macroeconomic regime meant 
that (1) policymakers took a benign view of macroeconomic imbalances and asset 
price bubbles beyond their immediate effect on consumer price inflation (Carlin and 
Soskice 2015); and (2) it was taken as given that international coordination in 
inflation targeting (and monetary policy more generally) was not required (Iversen 
and Soskice 2012). 
The convergence in inflation and interest rates across advanced democracies was 
therefore allowed to coincide with significant divergences in other aspects of the 
macroeconomy. We can see from Figure 4.4 that large external imbalances emerged 
between advanced democracies from the mid-1990s onwards. The divergence in 
current account balances had a distinct geographical pattern, with the English-
speaking countries amassing deficits and the continental and northern European 
countries amassing surpluses. These imbalances made the world economy vulnerable 
to a financial crisis as they reflected the build up of dangerous asset price and credit 
bubbles and left deficit countries exposed to a sudden stop in capital inflows 
(Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti 2012; Lane 2012; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2012). 
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Figure 4.4. Current account balances (as a % of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2016. 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the path of real exchange rates in advanced democracies during the 
Great Moderation. A movement upward in the figure signifies an appreciation of the 
real exchange rate—i.e. a worsening of price competitiveness. We can see that real 
exchange rates diverged, especially during the 2000s. The same geographical divide 
emerges as in current account balances. The real effective exchange rate of all the 
English-speaking countries appreciated between 1994 and 2007. In contrast, the real 
effective exchange rate of the majority of the continental and northern European 
countries (as well as Japan) depreciated. 
The broad real exchange rate trends of the Great Moderation match the 
divergence in current account balances but there is still significant variation within 
the two groups, and especially within the English speaking countries. The 
appreciation of the UK and US real exchange rates took place more in the 1990s 
than the 2000s, whereas the appreciation of the real exchange rates in Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand occurred mainly the 2000s. 
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Figure 4.5. Real effective exchange rate (price competitiveness) index (1994=100), 
1994-2007 
 
Source: European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, Price and Cost 
Competitiveness - Data Section (22 April 2016). 
Note: IC37 includes the EU28 plus Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, 
Switzerland, Turkey and the United States.  
 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) pick out the difficulty of explaining short- and medium-
term fluctuations in exchange rates with movements in macroeconomic fundamentals 
as one of the major puzzles in international macroeconomics. In Section 4.4, we will 
present a simple open economy macroeconomic model that posits a clear link 
between domestic demand and real exchange rates. This simple model fits well with 
the high-level divergence in real exchange rates observed during the Great 
Moderation, but as Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) emphasise, modelling exchange rate 
behaviour is extremely difficult even in complex models. It is therefore necessary to 
look at individual countries more closely to get a better picture of the variation 
within the English-speaking countries. 
One factor that needs to be taken into account when considering the exchange 
rate dynamics of Australia, Canada and New Zealand is the fact that a high 
proportion of their exports are primary commodities. The prices of primary 
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commodities are usually determined on centralised world markets, which provides an 
exogenous source of terms-of-trade fluctuations for these countries (Chen and Rogoff 
2003). Chen and Rogoff (2003, 133) find that “the US dollar price of their 
commodity exports has a strong and stable influence on their floating real rates”, 
especially for New Zealand and Australia. This helps to explain the extent of their 
appreciation in the 2000s, which coincided with a global commodities boom. Figure 
4.6 removes these three countries and Norway (another major primary commodities 
exporter) from the real exchange rate figure; the divergence of the UK and the US 
from the continental and northern European countries and Japan becomes even 
more striking. 
 
Figure 4.6. Real effective exchange rate (price competitiveness) index without major 
primary commodity exporters (1994=100), 1994-2007 
 
Source: European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, Price and Cost 
Competitiveness - Data Section (22 April 2016). 
Note: IC37 includes the EU28 plus Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, 
Switzerland, Turkey and the United States. 
 
Another trend that warrants explanation is the large real exchange rate depreciation 
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loose monetary policy of the Federal Reserve in the wake of the bursting of the dot-
com bubble and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as well as the dollar’s privileged position 
as a global reserve currency (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2009). 
Taken together, Figures 4.1 to 4.6 show us that the period from 1994 to 2007 in 
advanced democracies was characterised by low and stable inflation, low interest 
rates and macroeconomic stability, but also by current account balance and real 
exchange rate divergence. The macroeconomic regime in place in this period was 
built around independent inflation-targeting central banking and open financial 
markets. The foundations of the global financial crisis were laid in this period of 
relative macroeconomic calm. It is therefore the 1994 to 2007 period that we hope to 
shed light on using simple open economy macroeconomic models. As in the previous 
chapter of the thesis, this is the period we will refer to as the Great Moderation. 
The current account and real exchange rate divergence during the Great 
Moderation was underpinned by advanced democracies pursuing different growth 
models. This is the central premise of the previous chapter of the thesis, which 
analyses growth models in more detail. We can see from Figure 4.7 that the average 
annual contributions to GDP growth of consumption and exports varied widely 
across countries between 1994 and 2007. However, the countries cluster into two 
groups. Growth was more driven by consumption in countries in the top left-hand 
corner of the figure, whereas growth was more driven by exports in countries in the 
bottom right-hand corner. In the terminology used in the emerging growth models 
literature in CPE, the countries in the top left-hand corner pursued consumption-led 
growth models and the countries in the bottom right-hand corner pursued export-led 
growth models (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016; Hope and Soskice 2016). 
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Figure 4.7. Average annual contributions of consumption and exports to GDP 
growth, 1994-2007 
 
Source: European Commission's Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG 
ECFIN) AMECO Database (03/05/2016 update). 
Note: See Appendix B2 for a guide on how to calculate annual contributions to GDP growth 
and more information on the data source for the figure. The markers in the figure correspond 
to varieties of capitalism. The grey squares are CMEs and the black circles are LMEs. 
 
Another important thing to take from the figure is that growth models have 
institutional foundations. The markers in the figure correspond with varieties of 
capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001): the black circles are liberal market economies 
(LMEs) (the English-speaking countries) and the grey squares are coordinated 
market economies (CMEs) (the continental and northern European countries and 
Japan). We can see that the LMEs are predominantly consumption-led and the 
CMEs are predominantly export-led. The relationship between varieties of 
capitalism and growth models is discussed at length in the Chapter 3 of the thesis. 
In this paper, we focus more on role of government demand-side policies in the 
growth models and macroeconomic imbalances of the pre-crisis period. 
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4.3 Literature review: Macroeconomics and political science 
 
In the 1970s, the intersection of macroeconomics and political science was a vibrant 
area of research.49 Two different approaches stood at the centre of the field.50 
The first was the political business cycle model developed by Nordhaus (1975), 
Lindbeck (1976), and MacRae (1977). In this model, politicians are opportunistic 
and care only about being elected to office (as in Downs (1957)). They can also use 
fiscal and monetary policies to exploit the trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment. Voters are myopic and judge the incumbent government on the 
economic conditions they produce, regardless of their future consequences. The 
model implies that the incumbent government will use the policy levers at their 
disposal to stimulate the economy and reduce unemployment in the run up to 
elections. Following the election, the government will then slam on the brakes in a 
bid to squeeze the resulting inflation out of the system. In this framework, naïve 
voters can be tricked in this way election after election because they are short-
sighted and do not learn from the past. 
The political business cycle model is on a shaky footing empirically. Nordhaus 
(1975) and MacRae (1977) only found evidence of cycles in macroeconomic outcomes 
in a subset of the countries and time periods (respectively) that they analysed. 
Further single country studies in the United States (Tufte 1978) and five major 
Western economies (Lewis-Beck 1988) also provided little evidence of electorally-
induced cycles in unemployment and inflation, as did studies that pooled 
observations across OECD countries (Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini 1992; Alesina, 
Roubini, and Cohen 1997). 
The second approach was the partisan model developed by Hibbs (1977, 1987). 
Politicians in this framework care about both winning elections and implementing 
                                         
49  For excellent reviews of the evolution of the literature at the intersection of 
macroeconomics and political science see Franzese (2002), Clark (2003), and Iversen and 
Soskice (2006b). 
50 The summaries of the different approaches to macroeconomics and political science in this 
section rely heavily on the work of Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997). 
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their preferred policies. Parties are therefore partly ideologically motivated. Parties 
of the left are assumed to assign more importance to reducing unemployment than 
parties of the right, while parties of the right are more concerned about price 
stability. This is put down to the differing constituencies of left and right wing 
parties. Left wing parties rely on the union movement and the lower middle class for 
political support, whereas the right wing parties rely on the business and financial 
communities and the upper middle class. In other words, left and right wing parties 
have different ideal points on the exploitable trade-off between unemployment and 
inflation. Backward-looking voters also have different preferences over inflation and 
unemployment (or economic growth) and vote for the party located closest to their 
preferred policy. 
There is no empirical consensus when it comes to the partisan model. In his 
original paper, Hibbs (1977) found empirical support for his partisan hypothesis in 
the United Kingdom and the United States. In a follow up book a decade later, he 
then provided evidence of the distributional impact of unemployment and inflation 
in the United States that accorded with the partisan model (Hibbs 1987). 
Particularly striking was the finding that unemployment reduced the income share 
of the lowest two quintiles of the income distribution and boosted the income share 
of the top two quintiles. More recent papers have examined survey-based measures 
of inflation and unemployment aversion across advanced democracies and have 
found evidence that richer respondents (voters) are more inflation averse and less 
unemployment averse than poorer respondents (voters) (Jayadev 2006, 2008; Scheve 
2004). Alt (1985) also found a statistical association between left government control 
and decreasing unemployment using a sample of 12 OECD countries. In contrast, 
more recent cross-country panel data studies have found little evidence of partisan 
effects on macroeconomic outcomes (Clark 2003), or have only found short-lived 
effects immediately following elections (Alesina and Roubini 1992; Alesina, Roubini, 
and Cohen 1997). 
These two models reflected the dominant macroeconomic theories of their time. 
They relied on a stable inverse relationship between unemployment and inflation 
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that could be exploited by governments through policy. In effect, these models 
suggested that governments could choose where to locate on the downward-sloping 
Phillips curve (Phillips 1958). In their simple formalization of the two models, 
Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) also highlight their use of adaptive inflation 
expectations (Phelps 1967, 1968), where current inflation expectations are formed by 
looking at past inflation and incorporating an (often small) adjustment for past 
forecasting mistakes. Crucially, voters do not take into account all available 
information when forming their expectations and do not anticipate the future 
inflationary consequences of today’s government policies. 
 The field of macroeconomics was completely transformed between the late 1960s 
and the early 1980s. There were three major developments that changed the course 
of the discipline. The first was the introduction of a natural or equilibrium rate of 
unemployment by Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968). This meant that while “there 
is always a temporary trade-off between inflation and unemployment; there is no 
permanent trade-off” (Friedman 1968, 11); hence, the Phillips curve is vertical in the 
long run and government policies aimed at pushing unemployment below 
equilibrium will simply result in higher inflation. The second development was the 
widespread adoption of rational expectations in macroeconomic modelling. The 
concept of rational expectations had been around since the early 1960s (Muth 1961) 
but was brought into the heart of mainstream macroeconomics in the 1970s by 
Robert Lucas Jr. (1972, 1973, 1975) and his contemporaries (Barro 1976; Sargent 
and Wallace 1975). When forming inflation expectations in a rational manner, 
individuals are forward-looking, take all available information into account and do 
not make systematic mistakes (Carlin and Soskice 2015). One key consequence of 
these two developments is that only unanticipated changes in policy (and demand) 
can affect output (and unemployment) in the short run, and output is fixed at 
equilibrium output in the medium and long run. 
The third development was the concept of time-inconsistency (Kydland and 
Prescott 1977) and its application to macroeconomic policymaking (Barro and 
Gordon 1983). In the Barro–Gordon (1983) model (as neatly summarised in Iversen 
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and Soskice (2006b)), governments care about both unemployment and inflation and 
can set the rate of inflation using monetary policy instruments. The government is 
assumed to prefer a rate of unemployment that is below the equilibrium rate. As the 
government dislikes inflation, it may seem logical that they would set an inflation 
target of zero and abide by it, but a government commitment to zero inflation 
would not be credible. If the public believed the government’s target then it would 
no longer be in the government’s interest to set inflation at target; once the public’s 
expectations had formed, the government would boost inflation to push 
unemployment below equilibrium. A rational public can see that a zero inflation 
target is not credible and raises their inflation expectations to a level where the 
government has no incentive to use policy to decrease unemployment. The time 
inconsistency problem in monetary policymaking therefore leads to a stable 
equilibrium with unemployment at equilibrium but inflation above the government’s 
target—i.e. the government’s lack of credibility generates an inflation bias.  
The institutional solution to the time inconsistency problem is to delegate control 
of monetary policy to an inflation-targeting central bank free from political 
interference that can credibly commit to targeting equilibrium unemployment 
(Cukierman 1992). This theoretical development made an intellectual contribution 
to the movement towards central bank independence across advanced democracies in 
the 1990s. Taken together, these three developments in macroeconomic theory 
implied that governments were unable to influence the medium and long run 
trajectory of the economy (Iversen and Soskice 2006b). The focus in political science 
therefore shifted to a new generation of models where government policy could only 
exert transitory effects on the economy. 
The political business cycle model takes on a different complexion once inflation 
expectations are formed rationally. Governments are no longer able to create 
inflation surprises before elections in equilibrium, and they also know that forward-
looking voters will factor in the expected future costs of any pre-electoral economic 
expansions when evaluating the performance of the incumbent government (Clark 
2003). In the late 1980s, many versions of the rational political business cycle model 
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emerged. A commonality in the models was the idea that rational voters used all 
available information to make decisions but did not know with certainty the 
‘competence’ of the two parties vying for power. As set out in Alesina, Roubini and 
Cohen (1997), the models defined competence in different ways, such as efficiency in 
the budgetary process (Rogoff 1990; Rogoff and Sibert 1988), the ability to generate 
economic growth without putting pressure on inflation (Persson and Tabellini 1990) 
and the ability to buffer the economy against random shocks (Cukierman and 
Meltzer 1986). There is an informational asymmetry at the centre of all of these 
models; the parties know their own competence and the voters do not. This provides 
an incentive for governments to manipulate policy instruments in the run up to 
elections, because voters will be unable to tell whether the changes are the result of 
greater competency (for example, tax cuts due to newfound efficiencies in the public 
sector) or are the result of politically-motivated expansionary policy prior to the 
election. 
In accordance with rational political business cycle models, evidence of the 
manipulation of macroeconomic policies prior to elections is more robust than 
evidence of the manipulation of macroeconomic outcomes prior to elections. 
Evidence of cycles in fiscal policy (Alesina 1988; Nordhaus 1989; Tufte 1978) and 
monetary policy (Grier 1989) have been found in the United States, as well as in a 
wider sample of OECD countries (Alesina 1989; Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini 1992). 
However, Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) do stress that while cycles in policy 
instruments are common in advanced democracies, they do not occur in every 
election and they are typically not of very large dimensions. 
Alesina (1987) sets out a version of the partisan model with rational expectations 
(see Alesina, Cohen and Roubini 1997 for a simplified version of the model). Again, 
voters take all available information into account when forming inflation 
expectations, but this time, there is uncertainty surrounding the election outcome. 
As a result of incomplete information, voters cannot perfectly predict which party 
will win the election. There is also wage stickiness; nominal wages are bound by 
wage contracts in the short term. Parties still have the same policy preferences as in 
 
 
162 
Hibbs’ (1977) model—left wing parties prefer higher inflation and lower 
unemployment than right wing parties—but cannot influence the economy beyond 
the short term due to rational expectations and a unique equilibrium rate of 
unemployment. In this model, the uncertainty over electoral outcomes means that 
inflation (or deflation) surprises can affect the real economy after the election. 
However, they only persist for the time it takes rational workers (voters) to 
renegotiate their nominal wage contracts. 
Alesina and his co-authors have found macroeconomic evidence consistent with 
the rational partisan model. Using quarterly panel data from OECD countries, they 
find evidence of temporary differences in output and unemployment after a shift to 
left government (Alesina and Roubini 1992; Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 1997). 
These results are stronger and more robust in countries where there is a clear divide 
between parties of the left and parties of the right. 
The other major contribution to the recent literature at the intersection of 
macroeconomics and political science is that on context-conditional electoral cycles.51 
This research agenda takes a different tack from the work rooted in rational 
expectations, it reverts back to adaptive expectations, and explains cross-country 
variation in electoral cycles in macroeconomic policies and outcomes instead through 
differences in the institutional constraints facing government policymakers. Clark 
and Reichert (1998) find that central bank independence and a lack of national 
policy autonomy (through internationally mobile capital and fixed exchange rates) 
reduces the presence of cycles that coincide with the electoral calendar. Cycles are 
only found when both constraints are absent. In further work that leans heavily on 
the Mundell–Fleming conditions, Clark and Hallerberg (2000) and Clark (2003) 
confirm the results of the earlier work but also find that fiscal policy cycles only 
occur in countries with fixed exchange rates (regardless of central bank 
independence). These models therefore find evidence that electoral cycles do occur in 
advanced democracies when the institutional context allows government control over 
                                         
51 For a thorough review of the literature on context-conditional electoral (and partisan) 
cycles see Franzese (2002). 
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the trajectory of the economy. It is worth noting, that Clark’s (2003) work also tests 
for partisan differences but finds no evidence of partisan cycles in either policies or 
outcomes (in any institutional context). 
 
4.4 Building a better model of the macroeconomy for use in political 
science 
 
The macroeconomic trends of the Great Moderation (see Section 4.2) cannot be 
explained using the macroeconomic models that have come to dominate the political 
economy literature (as set out in the previous section). The rational political 
business cycle model and the rational partisan model are both rooted in 
macroeconomic models that leave no room for demand-side policies to impact the 
economy beyond the very short run (Iversen and Soskice 2006b). 
The wider implication of these models and Barro and Gordon’s (1983) modelling 
of the time-inconsistency problem in monetary policymaking is that governments 
hands should be tied when it comes to macroeconomic policies because they can only 
have short run and largely negative effects on the economy (Iversen and Soskice 
2006b). This was the type of argument that led governments to delegate control of 
monetary policy to independent (inflation targeting) central banks in the 1990s. In 
addition, financial markets, including the foreign exchange market, were largely 
liberalised by the early 1990s. The latter policy shift was largely driven by a desire 
to boost foreign investment, but acted as a further disciplining device for 
governments, as they were now likely to be punished by financial markets if they 
accumulated excessive public sector deficits or debts. 
In the earlier political economic models, these two institutional changes weaken, 
or even completely remove, governments’ incentives to pursue expansionary policies 
for political reasons. In reality, they did not. For example, the UK and US 
governments expanded domestic demand in the 1990s and 2000s by promoting the 
widespread easing of credit rules and conditions (Barnes and Wren 2012; Iversen and 
Soskice 2012; Rajan 2010). A central argument of this paper is that, paradoxically, 
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central bank independence and the opening of financial markets were critical 
enablers for governments to stimulate domestic demand in this (tempting) way, 
because they enhanced financial market credibility and helped anchor inflation 
expectations. This argument provides a different, and arguably more plausible, 
explanation for why governments would voluntarily give up their control over 
monetary policy than the standard Barro–Gordon (1983) argument. In the standard 
argument, it is not clear what a government with a preferred level of output below 
equilibrium has to gain from handing over the monetary policy reins to an 
independent central bank (Iversen and Soskice 2006b). 
Governments in advanced democracies pursued different growth models during 
the Great Moderation, which were supported by different demand-side policies (as 
will be explored further in Section 4.6). The opposing policies led to the build up of 
globally significant current account imbalances between consumption-led economies 
and export-led economies (see Figure 4.4). The major contribution of this paper to 
the growth models debate is that our models show that deficit-financed fiscal policy 
is not a pre-requisite for pursuing a consumption-led growth model. Credible 
governments can also loosen credit conditions to boost domestic demand, which has 
identical equilibrium effects on the economy to a fiscal stimulus but is not 
constrained by implicit and/or explicit fiscal sustainability rules. 
This section aims to provide a model of the macroeconomy that can better 
explain government behaviour and macroeconomic outcomes during the Great 
Moderation. We start by discussing why the dominant models of the macroeconomy 
used in the political economy literature are ill suited to explaining the pre-crisis 
trajectories of advanced democracies. We then set out a suite of simple modern 
macroeconomic models and discuss their implications for political science—we first 
present a closed economy model as a point of comparison, before moving onto our 
preferred set of open economy models. 
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Bridging the gap between the theory and the empirics 
 
How have governments of advanced democracies been able to adopt what are widely 
thought of as expansionary or restrictive demand-side policies in light of both the 
earlier political economic literature—still taken by most political scientists as 
received wisdom—and the subsequent institutional changes (central bank 
independence and the opening of financial markets)? We see three major reasons. 
First, macroeconomics has moved on markedly since the new classical economics 
of the 1970s and 1980s that sits beneath the rational political business cycle and 
rational partisan models. New Keynesian (NK) macroeconomics has emerged as the 
dominant macroeconomic paradigm in the past two decades. It emphasises “nominal 
rigidities and a role for aggregate demand” (Blanchard 2016, 1). In NK models, it is 
typically assumed that there are rigidities in wage- and price-setting and imperfect 
competition in product markets, which means that there is a welfare-enhancing role 
for macroeconomic stabilisation policy (Carlin and Soskice 2015; Iversen and Soskice 
2006b). Inflation targeting central banks are also built into NK models, which 
contrasts with the earlier political economy models, where the government directly 
chooses the inflation rate (see the simplified versions of the rational political 
business cycle and rational partisan models in Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997)). 
The developments in macroeconomics since the 1980s have yet to be incorporated 
into the models of the macroeconomy used in political science. This is partly the 
result of the technical complexity of the NK dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DGSE) models that have come to dominate academic macroeconomics.52 
Second, the existing models in the political economic literature are 
overwhelmingly closed economy models. This means they model a single country 
that does not trade or interact with other economies. Not only is this highly 
unrealistic in our increasingly globalised world but it also means that these models 
                                         
52 See Chapter 16 of Carlin and Soskice for an excellent introduction to the Real Business 
Cycle and New Keynesian models (including NK DSGE models), as well as a discussion of 
their limitations and how they differ from simpler versions of the 3-equation model (such as 
the models set out in this paper). 
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cannot shed any light on the external imbalances of the pre-crisis period.  In the 
closed economy, when aggregate demand is equal to equilibrium output (or 
unemployment equal to the natural rate), any sustained increase in real aggregate 
demand—whether public or private—generates increasing inflation with 
accommodating monetary policy. 53  If instead there is an independent inflation 
targeting central bank, the interest rate rises to counterbalance the increase in 
aggregate demand.  If we assume rational expectations (leaving aside time lags and 
incomplete information for now), then these costs are imposed instantaneously and 
all temptation to pursue expansionary policies is removed. This is because the 
economy jumps to the new equilibrium with unchanged output and inflation and a 
higher stabilising rate of interest as soon as the policy is announced. Absent rational 
expectations, these costs are imposed over a longer period of time but with identical 
equilibrium consequences. In sum, governments in advanced democracies have no 
incentives to pursue expansionary (or restrictive) policies in closed economy models. 
Open economy macroeconomics is a vibrant area of research that needs to be 
brought into political science in order to understand the political economy of the 
Great Moderation. In open economy models, a distinction needs to be drawn 
between small and large open economies—though the fundamental analysis and 
conclusions are similar (as we shall see when we go through both models later in the 
section). Focus for now on a small open economy and assume an independent 
inflation targeting central bank. The central bank guarantees that domestic demand 
and net exports are equal to equilibrium output at the target inflation rate. On top 
of that, fully liberalised financial markets and the uncovered interest parity (UIP) 
condition guarantee that the domestic real interest rate is equal to the world real 
interest rate in medium-run equilibrium (Carlin and Soskice 2015). If domestic 
demand is boosted, by a loosening of credit conditions for example, then this is 
completely offset in the medium run by a reduction in net exports—i.e. the extra 
                                         
53  The discussion of the equilibrium effects of economic shocks in the closed and open 
economy in this subsection is based on the models presented later in the modelling section. 
The discussion is also consistent with the macroeconomic models set out in Carlin and 
Soskice (2015). 
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domestic demand is fully financed by lending from abroad. There is no change in 
either the inflation rate or the domestic interest rate in the medium run. As we will 
show later, the increase in domestic demand does raise both the real exchange rate 
and the real wage (and potentially also output) compared to what they otherwise 
would have been. The size of this effect is reduced the higher the proportion of the 
increase in domestic demand that leaks abroad through imports. 
This rather striking result can go along way to explaining the (almost casual) 
way in which the US and UK governments promoted the widespread easing of credit 
rules and conditions in the 1990s and 2000s. However, expansionary demand-side 
policies are only viable in the medium run if financial markets have confidence in 
the government of the country concerned. Three changes in macroeconomic regimes 
enhanced the credibility of advanced democracies in financial markets during the 
Great Moderation. First, central bank independence, which took monetary policy 
out of the hands of governments and anchored inflation expectations. Second, the 
liberalisation of financial markets, which enabled markets to punish governments for 
future actions.54 And third, the use of fiscal policy rules, which required sticking to a 
primary deficit that guaranteed that the public sector debt/GDP ratio did not 
change (or did not rise above a certain level).55 
These three conditions then focus the attention of financial markets on the 
default risks engendered by private loans; and it was not surprising that a huge 
derivatives market developed in credit default swaps. The difficulty in fulfilling these 
conditions makes it unsurprisingly that only advanced economies with no 
(perceived) danger of defaulting on the conditions possess the necessary reputation. 
The role of financial market credibility in pursuing a growth model based on foreign 
borrowing and domestic consumption means that, paradoxically, these three 
                                         
54 One might add: so long as financial markets believe that no future government will restore 
exchange controls. And that doubtless explains why Margaret Thatcher, when she abolished 
exchange controls, publicly required the Bank of England to destroy all the mechanisms for 
re-imposing them. 
55  Fiscal policy rules were not employed in all advanced democracies during the Great 
Moderation but were very prominent in Europe—e.g. the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact. 
See Chapter 14 of Carlin and Soskice (2015) for further discussion of fiscal policy rules.  
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institutional changes, which were meant to tie the hands of governments, acted as a 
critical enabler for governments to expand domestic demand in this (tempting) way. 
On the other side of the coin, it is much easier, at least as far as financial 
markets are concerned, for a country such as Germany to pursue restrictive policies. 
The consequences of restrictive policies are a depreciated real exchange rate and a 
reduction in the real wage. And as if argued in this paper, the German government 
wants to pursue an export-orientated strategy then in can consistently do so. The 
reason that restrictive policies are of less of a concern for financial markets is 
because they do not require the build-up of public or private debt. 
The major exception to the widespread use of closed economy models in the 
political economic literature is the work of William Clark and his co-authors (Clark 
2002, 2003; Clark and Reichert 1998; Clark and Hallerberg 2000). This pioneering 
body of work uses an open economy framework to look at whether electoral cycles in 
macroeconomic policies are conditional on institutional features such as the degree of 
central bank independence and the exchange rate regime. The open economy models 
at the centre of Clark’s work rely on the outdated Mundell-Fleming model of the 
1960s, however, which Carlin and Soskice (2010) claim is unsuitable for analysing 
contemporary open economies. The main problem with the Mundell-Fleming model 
is that it isn’t built around an independent inflation targeting central bank, which 
was a key part of the macroeconomic regime of advanced democracies during the 
Great Moderation. The model also assumes prices are constant, which is unrealistic 
and at odds with modern policymakers’ focus on stabilising prices. Furthermore, the 
model implies that fiscal policy is ineffective outside of a fixed exchange rate regime, 
which we will show is not the case in modern open economy macroeconomic models. 
Lastly, the models in Clark’s (2003) work are game theoretic rather than the 3-
equation models that are used in modern macroeconomics (and will be set out later 
in the section). 
The third and final reason why governments were able to pursue expansionary or 
restrictive demand-side policies during the Great Moderation in spite of the earlier 
political economy literature and institutional changes is because other advanced 
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democracies were pursuing the opposite policies. Governments need to have 
heterogeneous growth models, some pursuing expansionary policies and other 
pursuing restrictive policies, since increasing external deficits and appreciated real 
exchange rates must be balanced by increasing external surpluses and falling real 
exchange rates. Thus, the division of advanced democracies into export-led countries 
and consumption-led countries during the Great Moderation was both appropriate 
and mutually reinforcing. 
In recent decades, serious discussion of the political economy of macroeconomics 
in political science (as well as to some extent in economics) has slowly died off. A 
large part of the blame has to be laid at the feet of the technically complex DSGE 
models that have come to dominate the field and the top macroeconomics journals. 
DSGE models are based on either Real Business Cycle models or more recently NK 
models. 56  The set of modern macroeconomic models that we will set out in the 
remainder of this section will simplify the NK model and relax some of its more 
unrealistic assumptions. A central aim of this paper is to present a simple and 
tractable model of the macroeconomy that political scientists can use to study a 
range of research questions. In this way, we hope to breath new life into the research 
agenda at the intersection of macroeconomics and political science. 
 
A set of simple modern macroeconomic models 
A NK macroeconomic model can be broken down into three main blocks of 
equations, and is therefore part of a group of modern macroeconomic models referred 
to as 3-equation models (Blanchard 2016; Carlin and Soskice 2015).57 The first block 
is the set of equations that determine, y , aggregate demand: the IS equation (in the 
closed and open economy model) and the aggregate demand (AD) equation (only in 
the open economy model). The second block, the Phillips curve, determines inflation 
                                         
56 See Chapter 16 of Carlin and Soskice (2015) for a comparison between RBC, NK and NK 
DSGE models. 
57 The models presented in this section owe much to Carlin and Soskice’s (2015) excellent 
macroeconomics textbook, which simplifies closed and open economy modern macroeconomic 
models for an intermediate undergraduate and graduate audience. 
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and links the two blocks. The Phillips curve relates the difference between inflation 
and expected inflation, π − π E , to the output gap between aggregate demand and 
equilibrium output, y − ye . Within the inflation block are equations governing price 
and wage setting, which together determine equilibrium output, ye , and the 
equilibrium real wage, we . The final block is the monetary rule (MR), which tells 
the central bank the output gap it should set in response to a given move in 
inflation away from target, π − πT . The central bank then uses its control over the 
nominal interest rate (the policy rate) to set the real interest rate required to 
achieve their desired output gap. 
These three blocks form the basis of NK models and the more complicated NK 
DSGE models. The technical complexity of these models arises because of their 
underlying assumptions and the decisions taken about how to model the behaviour 
of individual agents—firms, consumers, the central bank, the foreign exchange 
market, and the government—in the economy. In this subsection we present our 
simplified version of the 3-equation model. We relax some of the more unrealistic 
assumptions of NK models, while keeping the core (and empirically defensible) 
elements of nominal rigidities and imperfect competition. 
Oliver Blanchard, a former chief economist at the IMF, is one of the world’s 
leading macroeconomists. In a piece on the future of DSGE models, Blanchard 
(2016, 1) boldly states that NK DGSE models: 
are based on unappealing assumptions. Not just simplifying assumptions, as 
any model must, but assumptions profoundly at odds with what we know 
about consumers and firms. 
More specifically, Blanchard (2016, 1–2) takes issue with how poorly the specific 
forms of the aggregate demand equation and the Phillips curve used in NK models 
match the real-world empirical evidence: 
At least the first two [equations in the 3-equation model] are badly flawed 
descriptions of reality: Aggregate demand is derived as consumption demand 
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by infinitely lived and foresighted consumers. Its implications, with respect 
to both the degree of foresight and the role of interest rates in twisting the 
path of consumption, are strongly at odds with the empirical evidence. Price 
adjustment is characterised by a forward-looking inflation equation, which 
does not capture the fundamental inertia of inflation. 
In a bid to address Blanchard’s concerns and to make our model simpler, more 
realistic and more tractable, we make two alterations to the basic NK framework. 
Alterations of this type are commonplace in the existing literature and are usually 
employed to make NK macroeconomic models fit more closely with what we observe 
in the real world. The first alteration is the presence of consumers who do not make 
their consumption decisions to maximise lifetime utility (as implied by Friedman’s 
(1957) Permanent Income Hypothesis), but rather “follow a simple rule- of-thumb: 
each period they consume their current labor income” (Galí, López-Salido, and 
Vallés 2004, 740). Campbell and Mankiw (1989) provide empirical evidence that a 
substantial fraction of consumers in the United States and other advanced 
democracies display such non-Ricardian consumption behaviour. 
The second alteration we make is to assume that inflation expectations are 
formed in a backward-looking manner, such that current inflation, π , depends on 
past inflation,  π−1 , and the output gap (as in Carlin and Soskice (2015)). This is due 
the phenomenon of inflation persistence, which arises because “the rate of change of 
the price level tends to remain constant (inflation tends to be persistent) in the 
absence of an economic “force” to move it from its current level” (Fuhrer 2010, 425). 
Empirical evidence has shown that inflation is much more persistent in both the 
United States (Fuhrer and Moore 1995) and other advanced democracies (Fuhrer 
2010) than is implied by models in which inflation expectations are formed in a 
forward-looking, rational manner.58 These models also imply jumps in inflation that 
                                         
58 Although there is some evidence that the degree of inflation persistence has fallen since the 
mid-1980s in advanced democracies (Fuhrer 2010). This could be due to the shift to 
independent inflation-targeting central banking and the effect this has had on anchoring 
inflation expectations.   
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are inconsistent with the time series data on inflation from advanced democracies 
(Estrella and Fuhrer 2002). Estrella and Fuhrer (2002) suggest that models with 
backward-looking components do a much better job of matching actual inflation 
data. 
It is important to note that in the simplified 3-equation models presented in this 
section, “business cycles are disequilibrium phenomena” (Carlin and Soskice 2015, 
583). Supply and demand shocks shift the economy away from equilibrium and the 
central bank steps in and alters interest rates to put the economy back on a path to 
equilibrium. In contrast, all actors in the economy have model-consistent 
expectations in NK models, so that even when the economy is away from steady 
state, it is always in rational expectations equilibrium. Additionally, there is no 
involuntary unemployment in NK models, but there is in our simplified 3-equation 
model (Carlin and Soskice 2015). In sum, the models set out in the following 
sections aim to provide an intuitive understanding of macroeconomics in open 
economies, which NK models so clearly do not. Our 3-equation models are also the 
type of models that are used (informally) by many leading macroeconomists and 
practically by many central banks.59 
 
A simple equilibrium model of a closed economy 
We start by considering a simple equilibrium model of the closed economy that 
produces results in line with the earlier political economic literature. This provides a 
point of comparison for the open economy models that follow, as well as helping 
highlight why it is problematic using closed economy models to model advanced 
democracies. We set out our simplified 3-equation model by going through each of 
the three equations in turn: 
 
                                         
59 See for example: Blanchard and Katz (1997); Gordon (1997); Stiglitz (1997); Allsopp and 
Vines (2000); Krugman (2000); and Frank and Bernanke (2001). As highlighted in Hope and 
Soskice (2016), a number of these leading macroeconomists have also held major policy 
positions in governments or central banks. 
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Equation I: The IS curve 
The first equation, usually referred to as the IS (Investment–Saving) curve, is built 
of several components. Aggregate demand is yD , where, 
yD = c + g + i,            
and c  = aggregate private consumption, g  = government expenditure, and i  = 
investment (all in real terms). 
Next, output, y , responds directly to aggregate demand ( y  is also income by 
national accounting definitions), such that: 
y = yD .  
That output responds directly to aggregate demand, as opposed to inflation or 
price changes responding directly to aggregate demand, is both a basic empirical 
fact, and a fundamental Keynesian idea.  But the competitive market 
microeconomics of the General Theory, 60  in which firms respond to prices not 
demand, do not justify it. New Keynesianism by contrast provides an imperfect 
competition micro-foundation that implies this—individual companies face their own 
downwards sloping demand curve for the differentiated product that they produce 
(Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). An increase in aggregate demand shifts these individual 
demand curves outwards; and given a gap between price and marginal cost it pays 
the individual company to meet increased demand by directly increasing output. 
(This does not of course apply to markets in second hand assets, such as financial 
markets.) 
We assume that households’ consumption depends primarily on current (post-
tax) income y  (equal to output), i.e. they follow a simple rule-of-thumb. This 
replaces the Euler condition in standard NK models; this assumes that households 
maximise the present value of their utility function, and if rational expectations are 
incorporated, this gives rise to unrealistic behaviour by households (as also argued 
                                         
60 Keynes (1936). 
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forcefully by Blanchard (2016)). We also allow that households may be more 
inclined to purchase investment-type goods and consumer durables when interest 
rates are lower: 
 c = ca − crr + cmy,          (consumption function) 
where the right-hand side is equal to autonomous consumption expenditure, ca , 
which comprises expenditure on investment-type goods and consumer durables, less 
its interest sensitivity, crr , plus the marginal propensity to consume times income, 
 cmy.  
We also assume that autonomous consumption expenditure, ca , increases if the 
government takes steps to ease credit conditions. This is in line with Gross and 
Souleles (2002) who find using US credit card data that: (1) an increase in credit 
limits leads to an immediate increase in both debt and consumption; and (2) the 
effect is largest for the credit-constrained individuals that start near their credit 
limit.61 
At this stage we simply assume that investment depends inversely on r .62 Thus: 
i = ia − irr.            (investment function) 
Putting the consumption and investment functions back into the aggregate 
demand equation gives us an equation for the IS curve: 
y = ca + cmy − (cr + ir )r + ia + ga
y = ca
1 − cm
+
ia
1 − cm
+
ga
1 − cm
−
cr + ir
1 − cm
r,
  
which will be written for ease of use (dropping investment) as: 
                                         
61 For further empirical evidence that increasing access to credit increases demand for credit 
and household consumption see Alessie, Hochguertel and Weber (2005) and Leth-Petersen 
(2010). 
62 The model in this chapter abstracts from the very important relation between investment 
and growth. In fact we believe growth expectations with multiple Keynesian coordinating 
equilibria reflecting levels of animal spirits increase investment, and that investment 
increases productivity. But it is not central to the arguments we are making here. 
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y = c + g −αr.                  (IS curve) 
Next, we note the equilibrium condition that equilibrium output, ye , is equal to 
aggregate demand: 
ye = y,  
with the output gap defined as y − ye . If output is greater than equilibrium output 
then there is a positive output gap, and vice versa. 
In medium run equilibrium, the IS curve can be written as: 
ye = c + g −αrS ,       (IS curve, in medium-run equilibrium) 
where the value of r  that brings about y = ye  is referred to as the stabilising (or 
sometimes Wicksellian) interest rate, rS . 
We assume that the government is pursuing a consistent fiscal plan with the 
implication that g  is fixed and for the moment we will write:  
g = g . 
It is evident that, if g  is fixed, consumption must be equal to c = ye − g + αrS  in 
equilibrium. 
Thus if the non-interest sensitive part of consumption, c , increases by Δc  (for 
example by loosening borrowing conditions), then in equilibrium: r  must be 
increased (by the central bank) by  Δc /α ; or alternatively g  must fall. The 
government therefore has no room for manoeuvre to boost consumption in 
equilibrium unless it also pursues an equal and corresponding reduction in 
government expenditure. If that does not happen then the central bank will step in 
and push up the stabilising rate of interest, rS , and completely offset the 
government induced boost in consumption. In the medium run, an increase in 
autonomous consumption therefore has no effect on output or unemployment. 
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There is an analogous result in relation to government changes (up or down) in 
g . Since in equilibrium g = ye − c + αrS , an increase in g  in equilibrium requires 
either a decrease in c  or an increase in rS . 
These two examples make our first important modelling point: in equilibrium in a 
closed economy, the government has its hands tied. Put another way, the 
government cannot affect the macroeconomy in the medium run, which is perfectly 
in line with the findings of the rational political business cycle and rational partisan 
models in the earlier literature. 
Equation II: The Phillips curve and the micro-foundations of wage and price setting 
We also set out the other two equations of the 3-equation model for three reasons: 
(1) to show how the economy transitions to a new equilibrium after a policy change, 
with attention to the central bank’s use of the interest rate to target inflation; (2) to 
explain how a simplified (but complete) version of the 3-equation model works (and 
we generalise it in moving from a closed to an open economy); and most importantly 
(3) to understand the consequences of government demand-side policies for the 
equilibrium real wage. 
The second core element of NK models is that nominal wages and prices do not 
revert immediately to their equilibrium values after a shock: they are sticky, and 
this reflects a second fundamental Keynesian idea. We specifically assume that the 
nominal price level adjusts immediately to cost (wage) changes, but there is a lag 
before wages adjust to price changes. In other words, wages are sticky as nominal 
wage contracts are only renegotiated periodically (e.g. annually) but firms are able 
to adjust their prices immediately following any change in wages. The stickiness of 
wages is clear to see in the real world: using US survey data, Barattieri, Basu and 
Gottschalk (2014) find that wages are most likely to be changed just once per year. 
Wage and price setting: equilibrium output and the equilibrium real wage 
We start by setting out the wage- and price-setting equations, in nominal then real 
terms. We then use them to derive the equilibrium real wage and the equilibrium 
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level of output (or unemployment). We use logs throughout, except in the footnote 
on micro-foundations.63 
The price setting (mark-up) equation is: 
 P
PS = µ +W − λ,         (price-setting equation) 
where µ = η /(η − 1)  is the log of the profit mark-up, with η  the elasticity of 
demand, W  is the nominal wage and λ  is the log of productivity per worker.64  
The micro-foundations in the footnote (see also Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)) show that 
each variety (i.e. good) enters the household utility function symmetrically, which 
means that pi = p = 1 . The real wage implied by price setting (the real wage that 
guarantees business its profit margin) is therefore given by: 
wPS =W − PPS  
→ wPS = λ − µ.               (price-setting real wage equation) 
Wage setters (unions, individual employees bargaining with an employer or a 
potential employer, or employers setting efficiency wages) are also concerned to set a 
real wage given conditions in the labour market. Depending on which actor is setting 
wages, different forms of the wage-setting real wage equation are possible. A simple 
form of this (where the ith union sets a monopoly wage) is: 
wWS = b + β(y − λ),              (wage-setting real wage equation) 
                                         
63  As highlighted by Carlin and Soskice (2015), it is often useful to use natural logs to 
display equations in a simpler manner and make them easier to manipulate. It is important 
to note that taking the natural log of a variable does not change the underlying meaning of 
the data because it is simply a monotonic transformation. A monotonic transformation 
changes the values in a series but preserves the order of the original series. 
64 This can be derived more formally: households maximise a CES utility function across n 
symmetric varieties (i.e. goods), each produced by a single firm; this implies (in real 
numbers) that the demand for the ith variety is yi = n
−1pi
−ηy,  so the ith firm maximises 
 
piyi −wiyiλ
−1 = pi
1−η − pi
−ηwiλ
−1( )n−1y ; this implies 
 
pi =
η
η − 1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
wiλ
−1.  
 
 
178 
where output, y , is a measure of labour market pressure, and β > 0 .  A micro-
founded derivation of this equation is shown in the following footnote.65 
In this simple model, ye  and the real wage, w , are determined by the wage- and 
price-setting equations respectively: 
 
ye = λ +
λ − µ − b
β
we = w
PS = wWS = λ − µ,
  
with wWS = wPS = we  the condition for labour market equilibrium. 
Endogenising ye  in this way enables us to see that it responds positively to 
increases in productivity and negatively to any ‘monopoly restriction’ of output, 
whether via price setters (raising µ ) or wage setters raising β  or b . This means 
that changes on the supply side can alter equilibrium output in the medium run. 
However, in the simple closed economy model, equilibrium output and the 
equilibrium real wage cannot be altered by government demand-side policies, which 
only affect the IS curve. 
The Phillips curve and inflation 
We can also derive the Phillips curve equation from the labour market equations 
with three further conditions (all in logs): 
Condition (i) 
Price setters pass on increased costs immediately so that w = wPS = λ − µ ; hence the 
real wage (under this assumption) is always equal to w = λ − µ . Note that since 
ye = λ + β
−1(λ − µ − b) , these together imply that ye = λ + β
−1(w − b) , and this in 
turn implies that w = b + β(ye − λ) . 
                                         
65 The union (or individual) maximises (in real numbers): 
 
 
we − b e
β+1
β + 1 → w
WS = beβ = b(yλ−1)β ; and in logs:  w
WS = b + β(y − λ) . 
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Wage-setters (employees, unions, employers setting efficiency wages etc.) want 
wWS = b + β(y − λ)  so a key implication is wage-setters want a real wage increase of 
wWS −w = β(y − ye) . Hence, when output is above equilibrium output, wage setters 
require an increase in real wages for their wage expectations to be met, and vice 
versa. 
Condition (ii) 
Second as noted above there is an exogenously imposed time lag (assume of one 
period) between wage settlements; this is (in one form or another) the second core 
Keynesian/New Keynesian assumption. Wage-setters want/aim to get the real wage 
increase, β(y − ye) , in one period’s time: thus they set an increase in the log money 
wage equal to the desired real wage increase plus the expected increase in inflation 
over the period, π E . Hence: 
ΔW = π E + β(y − ye).          (wage inflation) 
Since price-setters immediately update prices as a result of cost increases, we have 
π = ΔW − Δλ + Δµ  and assuming Δλ = Δµ = 0 :  
π = ΔW → π = π E + β(y − ye).         (price inflation) 
Inflation is therefore equal to expected inflation plus a constant times the output 
gap. Hence, output above equilibrium puts upward pressure on inflation and output 
below equilibrium puts downward pressure on inflation. 
Condition (iii) 
Aside from the use of the Euler condition, the modelling of expected inflation has 
given rise to the sharpest critiques of NK theorists.  As pointed out by Blanchard 
(2016) and others (Gordon 1997; Krugman 2000), and borne out empirically by 
Fuhrer and co-authors (Fuhrer 2010; Fuhrer and Moore 1995), there is a large 
degree of inertia in inflation. Estrella and Fuhrer (2002) argue that a simple 
backward-looking expectations function does a better job of capturing the empirical 
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data than the forward-looking, rational expectations function used in NK models. 
We therefore use a simple expectations function in our model that says that 
households expect inflation this period to be equal to last period’s inflation: 
π E = π −1.                (expected inflation) 
New Keynesian (or forward-looking) expectations generate jumps in inflation 
when certain shocks and/or policy changes occur. Jumps in inflation are rarely 
observed in the real world. (This is aside from the (clearly unrealistic) extraordinary 
computing capacity and ability to arrive at complex common knowledge strategies 
that would be required of a great number of wage and price setters). 
Our inflation expectations function can be substituted back into condition (ii) to 
generate the following Phillips curve: 
π = π −1 + β(y − ye).          (Phillips curve) 
Note that the Phillips curve does not explain the level of the inflation rate: it 
shows the condition for a constant rate of inflation; that condition is that the output 
gap is zero, i.e.  y − ye = 0 . When  y = ye  that implies that  π = π−1 . Another way of 
writing the Phillips curve is in terms of the rate of employment or the rate of 
unemployment that produces a constant rate of inflation. The unemployment rate 
associated with constant inflation is referred to as the non-accelerating inflation rate 
of unemployment, or the NAIRU. 
Equation III: Monetary policy and the Taylor rule 
We now turn to explaining how central banks use inflation targeting to determine 
the actual rate of inflation. For that the third equation of the 3-equation model is 
needed, which shows monetary policy. In following a ‘modern’ approach to monetary 
policy, it is assumed there is an independent central bank, whose policy instrument 
is the short-term real interest rate, with a target rate of inflation of π = πT . The 
central bank then conducts monetary policy using a Taylor rule equation: 
r = rS + τ(π − π
T ),              (Taylor rule) 
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which shows the real interest rate the central bank should set in response to a given 
deviation in inflation from its target rate. 
In equilibrium,  π = πT  and r = rS . How the central bank uses r  to generate this 
result is shown below in analysing disequilibrium behaviour; but intuitively if the 
economy is in equilibrium apart from π > πT , the Taylor rule equation implies that 
the central bank raises r > rS , which from the IS equation pushes y < ye . The 
Phillips curve then implies that π < π −1 , so that inflation falls; and this process 
continues until π = πT , at which point r  is restored to rS , inflation is back at 
target and output is back at equilibrium. 
Summary: The closed economy 3-equation model 
The three components of the 3-equation model and the medium-run equilibrium 
conditions are: 
The IS curve: 
y = c + g −αr
y = ye
ye = c + g −αrS
  
The Phillips curve: 
 
π = π−1 + β(y − ye)
we = λ − µ
ye = λ + β
−1 λ − µ − b( )
  
The Taylor rule: 
 
r = rS + τ(π − π
T )
rS ≡ α
−1 c + g − ye( )
  
And the key equilibrium relationships are: 
 
ye = c + g − αrS
we = λ − µ
ye = λ + β
−1 λ − µ − b( ).
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In the closed economy 3-equation model, the comparative statics for a permanent 
increase in autonomous consumption are: Δc > 0 ; Δr = ΔrS = α
−1Δc > 0 ; and
Δwe = Δye = 0 . Thus in a closed economy, the government can use demand-side 
policies (such as easing credit rules) to increase autonomous consumption but it will 
not have medium-run effects on either real wages or output. The rise in consumption 
must be matched by a corresponding fall in government expenditure ( Δc = −Δg ) 
otherwise the central bank will step in and increase r  so that private domestic 
expenditure is unchanged in the new medium-run equilibrium (Δc = αΔr ). 
 
A simple equilibrium model of a small open economy 
The open economy models that follow all assume what are widely seen by political 
scientists as three key conditions that tie the hands of politicians in advanced 
democracies. These conditions are: first, that central banks are independent and 
committed to low rates of inflation; second, that international financial markets are 
fully liberalised and that there are no exchange controls; and third, that neither 
governments nor central banks intervene in foreign exchange (forex) markets to 
attempt to control the exchange rate. 
All the advanced democracies (whom we are investigating) have adopted these 
conditions since the 1990s, with the exception of the members of the Eurozone— 
discussed separately—that have given up their individual currencies. But the 
Eurozone as a whole operates subject to all three conditions. 
In moving to the open economy, we need to formally introduce the concept of the 
exchange rate. A country’s nominal exchange rate, e , is the number of units of 
home currency that can be purchased with one unit of foreign currency. An increase 
in e  denotes a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate and a decrease denotes an 
appreciation (this is a common convention in macroeconomics, see Carlin and 
Soskice (2015)). In order to gauge a country’s price competitiveness, we need to take 
into account both the nominal exchange rate and the relative price of home and 
foreign goods. The real exchange rate is therefore defined as: 
 
 
183 
     
       (real exchange rate) 
where P  is the price level in the home economy and P *  is the price level in the 
foreign economy. For computational ease, we will use the log of the real exchange 
rate, q , in our open economy models. A depreciation of the real exchange rate        
(↑ q ), ceteris paribus, makes home’s goods cheaper abroad and home’s imports more 
expensive, whereas an exchange rate appreciation ( ↓ q ) has the opposite effects. 
Hence, a depreciation represents an improvement in home’s price competitiveness 
and an appreciation represents a deterioration in home’s price competitiveness. 
If we assume a small open economy, which cannot affect the world real interest 
rate, r * , or the world inflation rate, π * , then under the three conditions outlined 
above, we get a very different set of results in equilibrium to those of the closed 
economy when the government increases c  (by for example, loosening borrowing 
rules). 
The medium-run results of an increase in autonomous consumption (and no 
change in government expenditure), i.e. Δc > 0, Δg = 0 , are: (i) there is an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, Δqe < 0;  (ii) the real wage increases, Δwe > 0;  
(iii) the change in equilibrium output is non-negative, Δye ≥ 0 , and apart from 
efficiency-wage setting, Δye > 0;  (iv) there is no change in inflation in equilibrium, 
which is pinned down by the inflation target (of world inflation), 
Δπe = 0, πe = π
T = π *;  and (v) there is no change in the real interest rate in 
equilibrium, which is pinned down by the world real interest rate, Δre = 0, re = r
* . 
The same medium-run results apply to an increase in g , although the scope for 
using government expenditure to boost demand may be restricted by the 
government’s fiscal plan or fiscal rules. In cases where g  is not completely fixed and 
the government is not in danger of running excessive deficits or debt which may be 
penalised by financial markets, then expansive fiscal policy can be used to appreciate 
the real exchange rate and boost real wages (and potentially also output). This runs 
Q = P
*e
P
,
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contrary to the findings of the Mundell-Fleming model at the centre of Clark’s 
(2003) political economy model, which suggests that fiscal policy is ineffective in a 
small open economy with flexible exchange rates. 
What is happening is actually quite intuitive and obvious. When the sometimes 
complex mechanisms of the economy have worked themselves through in 
equilibrium: a large proportion of domestic households are credit-constrained (and 
were through the Great Moderation as well as now), and when governments have 
relaxed rules on borrowing, domestic consumers have been able to increase real 
consumption by borrowing from abroad (via intermediation by creditworthy 
financial institutions), and will do so (in equilibrium).  Because of inflation-targeting 
central banks, inflation does not change in equilibrium.  Because of international 
financial market liberalisation and the absence of both exchange controls and 
intervention in forex markets, as well as central bank inflation targets, markets will 
continue to lend at the world real interest rate, r * . In addition, markets are aware 
of the huge cost a government would face if it imposed exchange controls or changed 
the rules governing its central bank. 
Thus our basic argument is that in open economies, the three conditions—which 
many have seen as tying the hands of governments—have in fact provided 
governments with the temptation to solve their domestic electoral problems 
(indirectly) by facilitating borrowing internationally. This is more the case in 
majoritarian systems, where winning elections is a prerequisite for governing and 
four-to-five year electoral cycles mean that current government leaders get to reap 
the short run benefits of credit expansion without having to worry too much about 
the longer term risks to financial and economic stability. 
We will now go through the main changes to each of the three equations in the 
model as we move from the closed economy to the open economy. We then show 
how the open economy model can explain the equilibrium results we have just 
outlined. 
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Equation I: The Aggregate Demand (AD) curve 
Two changes are necessary to model the goods market in the open economy. First 
we need to add a term to the IS curve that represents net external demand. The 
current external balance, B , increases with world income, y* , and decreases with 
domestic income, y . It also depends on the real exchange rate, q . We assume, as is 
standard in modern macroeconomics (see Carlin and Soskice (2015)), that the 
current external balance increases with a depreciation of q  and falls with an 
appreciation of q —i.e. we assume the Marshall-Lerner condition holds.  For this 
analysis, y  and y*  are taken as given, and we assume for simplicity that the open 
economy IS curve takes the form: 
y = c + g −αr + Bq       (open economy IS curve) 
with B > 0 . 
The second addition is the Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) condition: 
r − r * = qE − q.          (UIP condition) 
The UIP condition states that if an interest gain over a period of time arises from 
holding a (safe) domestic asset r − r *  then that must be balanced by an equivalent 
depreciation of the exchange rate qE − q ; (this may be expressed either in nominal 
or real terms). This condition holds (subject to some assumptions) because the 
sophisticated, forward-looking, foreign exchange market buys and sells domestic and 
foreign assets in order to take advantage of the arbitrage opportunities that arise 
from interest rate differentials between countries. 
If we assume that in medium-run equilibrium: 
y = ye  and q = qe,  
then we can define the Aggregate Demand (AD) curve in equilibrium as: 
ye = c + g −αr
* + Bqe.                         (AD curve) 
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The AD curve is a medium-run equilibrium condition that incorporates both the 
open economy IS curve and the UIP condition. At any point on the AD curve, the 
domestic interest rate is equal to the world interest rate and the real exchange rate 
is constant. 
The AD curve implies that equilibrium q  is:  
qe = B
−1 ye − c − g + αr
*( ),      (equilibrium real exchange rate) 
and this summarises the key comparative static point that if c  increases in 
equilibrium and g  is held at g , and given that r  must be equal to r *  in medium-
run equilibrium, then qe  must appreciate (i.e. decrease). 
Equation II: The Phillips curve and real wage and output equilibrium 
The key change here goes back to the price-setting equation. A simple assumption is 
that export prices are equal to domestic (consumption) prices, so the domestic price-
setting equation now needs to incorporate the unit cost of imports. In real numbers: 
PPS = µ lW +mP *e( ),       (open economy price-setting equation) 
where l  is the unit labour requirement or reciprocal of labour productivity, i.e. 
l = λ −1 , and m  is the unit import requirement. We can see that the domestic price 
level is now a combination of the price of domestic goods and the price of imports. 
Still in real numbers not logs, dividing both sides of the price-setting equation by 
P  and using the definition for the real exchange rate we find that: 
1 = µ(lwPS +mq),  
which can then be rearranged to provide the price-setting real wage equation for the 
open economy: 
wPS = l −1 µ −1 −mq( ).            (open economy price-setting real wage equation) 
Since there is no time lag between cost changes and price changes (in that order), 
this relationship holds continuously as well as in equilibrium.  
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If we substitute l −1  for λ , we can therefore write the equilibrium condition (in 
real numbers) as: 
we = λ µ
−1 −mq( ),  
and in logs as:66 
wPS = we = λ − µ − (m + q),             
so that the equilibrium real wage rises when the real exchange rate appreciates. This 
is because a real exchange rate appreciation makes imports cheaper and increases 
workers’ purchasing power (for a given nominal wage). 
Next, there is no necessary change in the wage-setting real wage equation and 
hence in the wage-setting real wage: 
wWS = b + β(y − λ),             (wage-setting real wage equation) 
so with the equilibrium condition wWS = wPS  we have 
we = w
PS = λ − µ − (m + q) = wWS = b + β(ye − λ),   
implying in equilibrium in the open economy:  
 
 
b + β(ye − λ) = λ − µ − (m + q)
→ ye = λ + β
−1 λ − µ − b − (m + q)( ).  
As in the closed economy, ye  increases with labour productivity and is reduced 
by the bargaining power of labour expressed as β  and b , but now it is also 
increased by an appreciation of the real exchange rate, q . 
This dependence of ye  on q  does not hold in general. For example, with a simple 
model of efficiency-wage setting, the ith firms sets the ith real wage relative to the 
                                         
66  Note that when we move from real to logs, the logs are approximations. We can 
approximate in real numbers logarithmic formulae by a first order Taylor expansion. Thus 
expanding log x  around x = 1 , we have: log x ≈ log1 + (x − 1) = x − 1 . More generally, 
expanding  log(ax + b)  around  x = (1 − b) /a , we have: 
log(ax + b) ≈ log(1) + a
a + b
(x − 1) = a
a + b
(x − 1).  
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expected (or perceived) market real wage; it is set high when the labour market is 
tight  (y  high) to retain and or motivate staff, and vice versa: hence 
wi
WS = wWS ,E + βy − δ . 
In equilibrium, wi
WS = wWS ,E = wWS  so that we = w
WS = wPS = λ − µ − (m + q)  and 
ye = β
−1δ . Hence, ye  is not dependent on q  under efficiency wage setting.  
The response of ye  to changes in domestic demand in the open economy therefore 
depends on how we choose to model wage setting; ye  increases in response to a rise 
in c  when we assume wages are set by unions or individual employees bargaining 
with an employer, whereas ye  is unaffected when we assume employers set efficiency 
wages. It is important to note, however, that the main findings of the paper 
continue to hold whichever model of wage setting is used, i.e. they do not rely on 
equilibrium output increasing in response to changes in domestic demand. 
Finally we turn to the relevant modifications of the Phillips curve.  Exactly as on 
closed economy lines, we have (in logs): 
 
w = wPS = we = b + β(ye − λ)
wWS = b + β(y − λ)
→ wWS −w = β(y − ye)
ΔW − π E = β(y − ye)
ΔW − π−1 = β(y − ye).
  
But in the open economy—reverting to real numbers—the price-setting equation is 
given by: 
PPS = µ lW +mP *e( ).       (open economy price-setting equation) 
If we assume that µ , l  and m  are constant, then we can use the price-setting 
equation to find an expression for the change in prices, ΔP : 
ΔP = µ lΔW +m(ΔP *e + P *Δe)( ).
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The intuition of the equation is that the change in prices is equal to the change 
in each of the non-constant right-hand side variables multiplied by their weights in 
the price-setting equation. To make the price change equation more manageable, we 
next multiply each Δ  component on the right-hand side by one, i.e. W
W
 for the 
ΔW  component, P
*
P *
 for the ΔP *  component and so on, which gives: 
ΔP = µ lW ΔW
W
+mP *e ΔP
*
P *
+ Δe
e
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ .
 
The next stage in deriving the open economy Phillips curve is to note that 
inflation is equal to ΔP
P
. Hence, we can divide both sides of the price change 
equation by P  to get the following equation for inflation: 
π = ΔP
P
= µ lW
P
ΔW
W
+m P
*e
P
ΔP *
P *
+ Δe
e
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ .
 
We can now simplify the equation by defining σL  as l
W
P
 and σM  as mq , such 
that: 
π = µσL
ΔW
W
+ µmq ΔP
*
P *
+ Δe
e
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= µσL
ΔW
W
+ µσM
ΔP *
P *
+ Δe
e
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
,
 
and by substituting in the equation derived earlier (converted into real numbers): 
ΔW
W
− π −1 = β(y − ye),
 
we have that:
 
π = µσLπ −1 + µσLβ(y − ye) + µσM
ΔP *
P *
+ Δe
e
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
.  
The final step in deriving the open economy Phillips curve is to make the 
assumption that there is a lag from import price increases to the increase in 
domestic prices, such that: 
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π = µσLπ −1 + µσLβ(y − ye) + µσM
ΔP *
P * −1
+ Δe
e −1
− π −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+ µσMπ −1,   
where µσMπ −1  has been added and subtracted from the equation. We can now use 
the fact that µσL + µσM = 1  to arrive at the Phillips curve in the open economy 3-
equation model: 
π = π −1 + µσLβ(y − ye) + µσM π −1
* + Δe
e −1
− π −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
.      (open economy Phillips curve) 
Equation III: Monetary policy and the Taylor rule 
The Taylor rule is largely unaffected by the move to the open economy, although 
there is no stabilising rate of interest, as the real interest rate is pinned down by the 
world real interest rate, and the target inflation rate is the world inflation rate. 
Hence, the Taylor rule becomes: 
r = r * + τ(π − π *),            (open economy Taylor rule) 
One other notable change in the Taylor rule in the open economy is that the τ  
coefficient is reduced. This reflects the fact that the foreign exchange market 
shoulders some of the burden of adjustment to economic shocks in the open 
economy. If the central bank wants to achieve a given negative output gap in the 
open economy it requires a smaller increase in the real interest rate because the 
accompanying exchange rate appreciation will also help dampen aggregate demand. 
Summary: Medium-run effects of an increase in autonomous consumption in the 
open economy 
Now that we have set out the open economy version of the 3-equation model, we can 
use the model to look at the medium-run equilibrium effect of a permanent increase 
in autonomous consumption (via an easing of credit conditions) on the economy: 
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(a) In equilibrium qe = B
−1 ye − c − g + αr
*( ),  and given ye , c  and g , Δqe = 0 . A 
permanent increase in consumption of Δc  therefore implies an appreciation of the 
exchange rate of Δqe = −B
−1Δc . 
(b) To satisfy the UIP condition, r = r *  in the new medium-run equilibrium and the 
exchange rate is constant at the new appreciated level (as q = qE ). 
(c) From the equilibrium real wage condition (in logs), we = λ − µ − (m + q) , the 
increase in c  increases the equilibrium real wage. In logs Δwe = −Δqe = B
−1Δc   
(d) Since (under standard wage-setting conditions, not under efficiency wages) 
ye = λ + β
−1 λ − µ − b − (m + qe)( ) , so an appreciation of q  increases ye ; with 
efficiency wages ye  remains constant. Whichever assumption is made about wage 
setting, ye ≥ 0 . 
(e) At the new medium-run equilibrium, y = ye  and Δq = 0 , so the Phillips curve 
reduces to stable inflation π = π −1 + µσLβ(y − ye) = π −1 . 
(f) The Taylor rule then eventually produces π = π *  (which implies that 
Δqe = 0→ Δe = 0 ). 
To summarise, in the new medium-run equilibrium: consumption is higher, the 
exchange rate is appreciated, real wages are higher, the external balance has 
deteriorated, output is either higher or unchanged, inflation is at the world inflation 
rate and the real interest rate is at the world real interest rate. Looking back at the 
United States and the United Kingdom (as well as the other LMEs) in Figures 4.1 
to 4.6, we can see that they evolved in much this manner during the Great 
Moderation—low inflation and interest rates coincided with real exchange rate 
appreciation and the accumulation of current account deficits. As emphasises in 
Figure 4.7, they also had strongly consumption-led growth models during this 
period. We saw in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3 of the thesis, that the consumption-led 
LMEs also had the highest levels of disposable income inequality among advanced 
democracies during the Great Moderation. This further strengthens the incentive of 
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politicians to expand the growth of credit, particularly to poorer areas, and to boost 
real wages by holding down the price of imports (through real exchange rate 
appreciation), as will be discussed further in Section 4.6. 
It is useful to note that if the government is able to use fiscal policy, i.e. when 
they are not bound by strict fiscal rules and are not already running high deficits, to 
expand domestic demand (Δg > 0 ), then this has exactly the same set of medium-
run equilibrium effects as an increase in autonomous consumption. 
Conversely, if the government chooses to pursue restrictive fiscal policies, i.e. 
Δg < 0 , then this has the exact opposite set of medium-run equilibrium effects. 
Looking back at Figures 4.1 to 4.6 we can see that this fits well with the coordinated 
market economies of continental and northern Europe (as well as Japan) during the 
Great Moderation. These countries also had low and stable inflation and interest 
rates, but in contrast to the LMEs, saw real exchange rate depreciation and the 
accumulation of current account surpluses. As emphasised in Figure 4.7, these 
countries pursued strongly export-led growth models during this period. 
Transitions between equilibria in a small open economy: Intuition 
In the previous subsection, we looked at the medium-run effects of an increase in 
consumption of Δc.  Let’s define cold  as the level of consumption before the 
government eases credit conditions and cnew  as the level of consumption afterwards, 
so that Δc = cnew − cold . How does the economy move from the initial equilibrium 
associated with cold  to the new equilibrium associated with c
new ? There are three 
‘stories’ one can tell about the adjustment of the economy, which depend on the 
assumptions made about time lags and whether or not the nominal exchange rate is 
fixed in the simple open economy model set out above. In all three cases, we assume 
efficiency wage setting, such that ye  is not dependent on q . This makes the analysis 
simpler but also reiterates that none of our main findings are reliant on equilibrium 
output changing as a result of demand-side policies. 
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Version 1: fixed exchange rate 
If the exchange rate is fixed or the economy is a small member state of a common 
currency area (and there are no exchange controls), then the national central bank 
cannot use the interest rate as a policy lever; the interest rate is fixed at the world 
interest rate, i.e. r = r *  at all times. We also assume that fiscal policy is bound by a 
consistent fiscal plan so that g  is fixed at g . 
Figure 4.8 shows the adjustment of the economy to the increase in consumption. 
Assume that the economy is initial at point A, with π = π *  and y = ye.  (To make 
the argument simple also assume that π E = π * , i.e. inflation expectations are firmly 
anchored to world inflation throughout.) 
The increase in consumption from cold → cnew  shifts the IS curve outwards from 
IS : y = cold + g −αr + Bqe
old  to I ′S : y = cnew + g −αr + Bqe
old . The economy moves to 
point B on I ′S , and output rises to y1 . From the Phillips curve we know that 
y > ye  leads to π > π
* . The real exchange rate, q , therefore falls by π − π * , which 
reduces the output gap, y − ye . The economy moves along the r = r
*  line back 
towards the initial equilibrium as the appreciated real exchange rate reduces net 
exports, and consequently aggregate demand. Hence, next period π  still exceeds π *  
but by less than in the previous period. Again there is a real exchange rate 
appreciation but by less than before. This process continues for a number of periods 
until a new equilibrium is reached at point C, where output is back at equilibrium 
and inflation is back at world inflation. The IS curve at the new equilibrium is
I ′′S : y = cnew + g −αr + Bqe
new , which is in the same position as the initial IS curve 
but the composition of aggregate demand has changed; consumption is higher and 
the external balance has deteriorated. The equilibrium appreciation of the real 
exchange rate exactly offsets the affect of the rise in consumption on output, i.e. 
qe
new − qe
old = −B −1(cnew − cold ) . 
In an economy with a fixed exchange rate, or in a small member of a common 
currency area, all the adjustment of the real exchange rate to its new medium-run 
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equilibrium level following the boost in consumption takes place through the change 
in the domestic price level because the nominal exchange rate, e , is fixed 
throughout. As we shall see, however, the new medium-run equilibrium is exactly 
the same as it would be in a flexible exchange rate economy. Hence, demand-side 
policies can affect the medium-run trajectory of advanced democracies both inside 
and outside of the Eurozone. 
 
Figure 4.8. Adjustment to an increase in autonomous consumption in the 3-equation 
open economy model with a fixed exchange rate, r = r *  ; Δe = 0  
 
 
Version 2: flexible exchange rates, no time lags 
This is very simple. Forex market participants have rational expectations and know 
immediately that cold → cnew .  Hence, they know at once that the new equilibrium q  
is given by qe
new = qe
old −B −1(cnew − cold ) .  They therefore instantaneously appreciate 
the nominal exchange rate e,  such that Δe = qe
new − qe
old = −B −1(cnew − cold ).  The 
economy jumps to its new medium-run equilibrium because there are no time lags. 
Nothing else happens.  
Figure 4.9 shows the adjustment of the economy to the increase in consumption. 
The economy initially starts at point A with output equal to equilibrium and 
inflation equal to world inflation. The initial IS curve is IS : y = cold + g −αr + Bqe
old . 
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As soon as consumption increases, the economy jumps to the new equilibrium at 
point B; nothing happens to output or inflation. In the new medium-run 
equilibrium, the IS curve is given by I ′S : y = cnew + g −αr + Bqe
new . In a flexible 
exchange rate economy with no time lags, all the adjustment in the economy takes 
place immediately, through a jump in the nominal exchange rate, e . 
 
Figure 4.9. Adjustment to an increase in autonomous consumption in the open 
economy 3-equation model with flexible exchange rates and no time lags 
 
 
Version 3: flexible exchange rates, time lags as in the closed economy model 
Analysing the transition from the old to the new equilibrium is much more complex 
in this case. We set out an explicit model in the next subsection using the three time 
lags assumed here (in wage-setting, in the impact of r , and in the lag of external 
prices in price setting).  Forex markets form expectations in a fully rational manner 
but only have access to information about the change in c  after inflation has 
increased; equally the central bank cannot eliminate the inflationary consequences of 
the increase in c  (even without an information lag) since there is a time lag between 
the central bank’s immediate response in raising r  above r *  and its effect on 
aggregate demand. Modern central banks conduct monetary policy taking account of 
the lags in transmission. For example, the Bank of England states “the maximum 
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effect of a change in interest rates on output is estimated to take up to about one 
year”.67 
The adjustment process is thus of the Dornbusch type with exchange rate 
overshooting, and lags in the wage-setting/price-setting process as inflation is 
gradually restored to π *  and r  to r * . The increase in c  results in a period where 
the central bank must hold home’s interest rate above the world interest rate in 
order to squeeze the resulting inflation out of the system. The foreign exchange 
market knows this and the exchange rate therefore overshoots its equilibrium 
appreciation (i.e. appreciates more) so that it can depreciate over the period that 
r > r * . This happens so that the UIP condition holds in each period as the economy 
adjusts to the new medium-run equilibrium. The real exchange rate depreciates until 
it reaches the equilibrium appreciation, which is the exchange rate that restores 
aggregate demand to equilibrium. In the new equilibrium, the increase in c  has been 
exactly offset by an increase in the external deficit. 
Figure 4.10 shows the adjustment of the economy to the increase in autonomous 
consumption. The economy starts at point A with output at equilibrium and 
inflation at world inflation. The initial IS curve is IS : y = cold + g −αr + Bqe
old . The 
increase in the exogenous component of domestic private demand c  (which in our 
narrative is induced by the loosening of credit rules) generates excess aggregate 
demand, which moves the IS curve out to I ′S : y = cnew + g −αr + Bqe
old . The 
economy moves to point B, with output at y1 > ye , which in turn pushes inflation 
above world inflation, π * ; π − π * > 0  directly appreciates the real exchange rate, i.e. 
Δq < 0 , since Δq ≡ π * + Δe − π . The real exchange rate also appreciates via 
monetary policy: the central bank responds to π > π *  via the Taylor rule by raising 
r  to r1 . 
 
                                         
67 This excerpt is from the page How does monetary policy work? on the Bank of England’s 
website (accessed August 31st 2016). Available from: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Pages/how.aspx   
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Figure 4.10. Adjustment to an increase in autonomous consumption in the open 
economy 3-equation model with flexible exchange rates and time lags 
 
 
The Dornbusch overshooting mechanism is then brought into operation, leading to a 
further real appreciation through the nominal exchange rate, e . With rational 
expectations: (i) forex operators believe that in the new equilibrium  π = π *  and 
Δqe = −B
−1(cnew − cold ) ; thus to bring q  to the new equilibrium, Δe  has to appreciate 
(i.e. fall) by −B −1Δc + (π − π *)  since the rise in π  has already led to a real 
appreciation of −(π − π *) ; but in addition (ii) forex operators expect r  will be 
greater than r *  for a period of time as inflation comes back to π * . The latter means 
that for UIP to hold during that adjustment period the exchange rate must be 
depreciating, and for that to happen subsequently the initial appreciation has to 
overshoot the equilibrium appreciation to allow for this depreciation. 
Thus q  appreciates to q1  due to a combination of the burst of higher inflation 
and the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. As we shall see in the next 
subsection, the initial appreciation of the real exchange rate to q1  includes both the 
equilibrium appreciation and the overshooting. The economy moves to point C, with 
output below equilibrium at y2  and the interest rate above the world interest rate at 
r1 . The IS curve shifts to I ′′S : y = c
new + g −αr + Bq1  as a result of the fall in net 
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exports. The negative output gap puts downward pressure on inflation and the real 
exchange rate depreciates. This is reinforced by the central bank slowly lowering 
interest rates as the economy moves back towards equilibrium output. The process 
continues until the new equilibrium at point D is fully established with r  back to 
r * , π  back to π * , and Δq = Δqe = −B
−1Δc . The IS curve at the new medium-run 
equilibrium is I ′′′S : y = cnew + g −αr + Bqe
new . At the end of the adjustment process, 
the real wage has been increasing to a new equilibrium (still in logs) of 
Δwe = −Δqe = B
−1Δc  since we = λ − µ − (m + q) . 
 
An explicit model of transition (in Version 3) 
The adjustment process works by the central bank using interest rate policy, and 
the forex market anticipating the central bank’s behaviour (actually a Nash 
equilibrium game). 
Assume that the increase in autonomous consumption takes place in period 1, 
such that Δc = c1 − c0 . A positive output gap therefore opens up in period 1, which 
is equal to the change in aggregate demand between the two periods: 
 
y1 − ye = (c1 + g − αr0 +Bq0)− (c0 + g − αr
* +Bqe,0)
y1 − ye = c1 − c0.  
The change in the output gap is simply the change in consumption because the 
real interest rate and the real exchange rate remain at their initial levels in the 
period of the consumption increase, i.e. r0 = r
*  and q0 = qe,0 . 
Turning to the open economy Phillips curve, we have that: 
π1 − π
* = µσLβ(y1 − ye) = µσLβΔc,  
since π 0 = π
* , and therefore we can use the open economy Taylor rule to find the 
interest rate response of the central bank (in period 1) to the rise in inflation caused 
by the increase in autonomous consumption: 
r1 − r
* = τ(π1 − π
*) = τµσLβΔc. 		
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We know that the UIP condition, r − r * = qE − q , must hold in every period in 
the open economy. After the increase in consumption the forex market knows the 
central bank will hold the real interest rate above the world real interest rate for 
several periods. The sum of all the deviations of the real interest rate from the world 
interest rate from the period of the change in consumption through to the new 
medium-run equilibrium therefore need to equal the over-appreciation (overshooting) 
of the real exchange rate in period 1. As explained above, this is so that the real 
exchange rate can depreciate to its new equilibrium value over the period when 
r > r * . In mathematical terms this means that: 
rt − r
*
1
∞∑ = −(q1 − q2E + q2E − q3E + ..... − qe,1) = qe,1 − q1.   
If we then assume that the deviations in the real interest rate from the world real 
interest rate decline at a constant rate, i.e. rt − r
* = η(rt−1 − r
*) , then we can simplify 
the expression, such that: 
→ rt − r
*
1
∞∑ = r1 − r
*
1 −η
= qe,1 − q1,  
and then multiplying each side by minus one and substituting the value of r1 − r
*  
calculated from the Taylor rule, we have that: 
q1 − qe,1 = −
r1 − r
*
1 −η
= −
τµσLβ
1 −η
Δc.
   
   (real exchange rate overshoot) 
This is the amount by which q  appreciates (i.e. falls) below the new equilibrium 
real exchange rate. In other words, the amount it overshoots the new equilibrium. 
This happens so that the gradual depreciation of the real exchange rate to the new 
equilibrium will parallel the interest gains from holding home currency for that 
period of time. 
In the new equilibrium, output has not changed (if we assume efficiency wage 
setting), such that: 
ye = c1 + g −αr
* + Bqe,1 = c0 + g −αr
* + Bqe,0,  
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but the composition of output has changed. In the new equilibrium, consumption is 
higher and the external balance is lower due to the appreciation real exchange rate. 
The equilibrium change in the exchange rate is equal to: 
qe,1 − qe,0 = −B
−1Δc,  
hence the total appreciation of q  in period 1 is equal to: 
q1 − qe,0 = −
τµσL
1 −η
+ 1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
B −1Δc = − τµσLB
−1
1 −η
Δc −B −1Δc,  
where the first term on the right-hand side is the overshooting and the second term 
the equilibrium change in q . 
Large economies and global imbalances 
As discussed earlier, a precondition for one country running an external deficit is 
that others run a corresponding surplus.  It is simplest to see this in the case of a 
world of two economies, both of which start in external equilibrium, and in one (say 
A for the US) Δc > 0 , and in the other (say G for Germany) Δg < 0 .   
If the net addition to world aggregate demand is positive, i.e. if Δc − Δg > 0 , then 
Δr * > 0 , and vice versa. As the two economies comprise the entire world economy 
any demand-side policies that alter world aggregate demand require a change in the 
world interest rate to keep inflation at target (much like in the closed economy 
model). In equilibrium, the real interest rate must be equal in both countries in 
order to satisfy the UIP condition. 
  There is only one exchange rate in the two-country world, q , which is the real 
dollar exchange rate. If q  increases this amounts to a depreciation of the US real 
exchange rate and an appreciation of German real exchange rate, and vice versa. 
The AD curves for the two blocs can be written as: 
 
A :   ye = c1
A + gA − αr1
* +Bq1
G :   ye = c
G + g1
G − αr1
* −Bq1
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We then introduce an increase in autonomous consumption in the US and a 
reduction in government spending in Germany, such that: 
ΔcA > 0,ΔgG < 0,ΔcG = ΔgA = 0.  
In the new medium-run equilibrium, the AD curves are: 
 
A :   ye = c2
A + gA − αr2
* +Bq2
G :   ye = c
G + g2
G − αr2
* −Bq2.
 
As equilibrium output in both countries is unchanged in the medium-run 
(assuming efficiency wages), we know that the changes in domestic demand in each 
country must be offset by changes in the real interest rate and the real exchange 
rate, such that: 
 
ΔcA = α(r2
* − r1
*)−B(q2 − q1)
ΔgG = α(r2
* − r1
*)+B(q2 − q1).
 
We can then use these two equations to find the equilibrium changes in both the 
world real interest rate and the real exchange rate: 
 
ΔcA + ΔgG = 2α(r2
* − r1
*)
→ (r2
* − r1
*) = Δc
A + ΔgG
2α
ΔcA − ΔgG = −2B(q2 − q1)
→ q2 − q1 = −
ΔcA − ΔgG
2B → Δq < 0.
  
Hence, the world real rate of interest, r * , will rise or fall or remain unchanged 
depending on whether the net increase in world aggregate demand, ΔcA + ΔgG , is 
> 0,< 0,= 0 . In contrast, the real exchange rate, q , necessarily falls, which means 
that the US real exchange rate appreciates and the German real exchange rate 
depreciates. 
The real wages in A and G are given by: 
 
wA = β−1(λ − µ − b − (m + q))
wG = β−1(λ − µ − b + (m + q)).
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So ΔcA > 0→ ΔwA > 0,ΔwG < 0  and also ΔgG < 0→ ΔwA > 0,ΔwG < 0 . Hence, the 
changes in domestic demand in the two countries are mutually reinforcing, both 
pushing up real wages in the US and reducing real wages in Germany (through their 
effects on the real exchange rate). 
This simple model suggests that global imbalances can arise despite successful 
inflation targeting if two large groups of countries are pursing opposing, but 
ultimately complementary, demand-side policies. Looking back at Figure 4.7, we can 
see that advanced democracies pursued different growth models during the Great 
Moderation, with the CMEs pursuing export-led growth and the LMEs pursing 
consumption-led growth. As predicted by the large economies model, this led to 
imbalances emerging between the two groups of countries in real exchange rates and 
current accounts, as shown by Figures 4.4 and 4.5. We will explore how demand-side 
policies varied between the CMEs and LMEs during the Great Moderation in 
Section 4.6. 
 
Possible objections: (1) International Risk Sharing 
If households are identical across all countries, the common Euler conditions result 
from maximising: 
U = β t logct∑
ptct
(1 + rt )
∑
 
These conditions imply that: c = c* + q .68 
Since ye = c + g −αr
* + Bq  in equilibrium, the international risk sharing (IRS) 
uniquely determines ye  since it implies that: 
ye = c
* + q + g −αr * + Bq ,  
so that, 
 qe = (1 +B)
−1 ye − c
* − g + ar *⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ . 
                                         
68 For further explanation of the international risk sharing condition, see Appendix C1. 
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This equation for the real exchange rate invalidates the arguments set out in our 
simple open economy 3-equation model because it implies that a change in c  has no 
effect on the equilibrium exchange rate, qe . Hence, if IRS holds, the government is 
unable to borrow internationally to boost consumption and push up real wages (and 
potentially also output). 
For three reasons, we do not see the IRS as an issue for our argument: 
(i) Analytically, our model rules out Euler conditions because of credit-
constrained households, so IRS does not apply. 
(ii) Empirically, as Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) highlight, IRS is one of the six 
theoretical conditions in international macroeconomics that are factually 
problematic.  They refer to it as the puzzle of why consumption is not more 
highly correlated across advanced economies, where consumers in different 
economies face the same set of world markets. They attribute it to 
differential costs of trade in the broadest interpretation.  We refer to 
differential costs of borrowing and household access to capital markets. 
(iii) Even if the other conditions of our model met the conditions for the IRS 
condition to hold, any change in the conditions underlying the consumption 
decision in the home country, for example a taste shift, imply c = γ + c* + q  
so that now qe = (1 + B)
−1 ye − γ − c
* − g + ar *⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ . The introduction of country 
constant, γ , does provide scope of policies aimed at boosting consumption 
(e.g. credit easing) to affect the real exchange rate through γ . 
 
Possible objections: (2) Absence of home bias in small Ricardian models 
We take the extreme case to make this objection clear: assume that all goods and 
services are traded (so no non-traded sector), and that each small economy in a 
large-N world economy has the Ricardian capacity to produce a unique 
differentiated product (say because it has workers with the requisite specific skills).  
The credit rules for our consumers are now relaxed, and they increase consumption 
 
 
204 
by Δc . But only an infinitesimal amount of the increased consumption consists of 
the differentiated product they produce.  Hence, imports rise by Δc . 
In equilibrium terms the economy moves from: 
ye = c0 + g −αr
* + Bqe,0,  
with  qe,0 = B
−1 ye − c0 − g +αr
*( )  to: 
ye = c0 + Δc + g −αr
* + (Bqe,1 − Δc) , with 
qe,1 = B
−1 ye − c0 − Δc − g + αr
* + Δc( )
= B −1 ye − c0 − g + αr
*( ) = qe,0.
 
In this special case, of small Ricardian economies, with no sheltered sector and no 
home bias in trade, there is no change in the equilibrium real exchange rate, because 
all the increase in consumption goes on imports, and the increased negative external 
balance immediately and exactly counterbalances the increased aggregate demand 
generated by the increase in consumption expenditure.  But it is only in this special 
case that (at least in extensions to our simple model) that an increase in 
consumption implies no appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
The first of Obstfeld and Rogoff’s (2000, 341) six puzzles in international 
macroeconomics is the “home bias in trade” puzzle: “Why do people seem to have 
such a strong preference for consumption of their home goods?” (Obstfeld and Rogoff 
2000, 339).  And in fact the economies we are empirically concerned with are large 
and have correspondingly large sheltered sectors, in addition to their home bias in 
trade. (This is also true of changes in government expenditures in these countries.)  
Our concern here is not to solve the home bias puzzle, but to use it to give strong 
empirical support to our argument. 
 
4.5 The politics of demand-side policies 
 
The main focus of this paper is on bringing the latest advances in macroeconomics 
back into political science. It is therefore beyond the scope of the paper to set out a 
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full model of political behaviour. However, we strongly believe that politics played 
an important role in the macroeconomic trajectories of advanced democracies during 
the Great Moderation. This section briefly sets out our view of the politics behind 
governments’ demand-side policies, as well as contrasting our view with the way 
politics was modelled in the earlier political economy literature (as set out in Section 
4.3). The following section then provides some high-level empirical evidence on the 
demand-side policies of advanced democracies during the Great Moderation that fits 
nicely with our central argument. 
Politicians are assumed to be motivated by different goals in political business 
cycle models (Lindbeck 1976; MacRae 1977; Nordhaus 1975) and partisan models 
(Hibbs 1977, 1987) (as discussed in Section 4.3). In the former, winning elections is 
the sole motivation of politicians and they choose policies to maximise their chances 
at the ballot box. On the other hand, politicians in partisan models have preferences 
over policies and want to obtain office so they can implement their desired policies. 
In our view, politicians are both office seeking and ideologically motivated but in 
a different way to politicians in the traditional partisan model. There is no 
exploitable trade-off between unemployment and inflation in our model. This rules 
out politicians on the left and right being differentiated by their relative aversion to 
inflation and unemployment (as they are in partisan models). Governments cannot 
affect inflation in the medium run in advanced democracies, as independent central 
banks ensure that inflation is kept at the target rate. 
As we saw in the previous section, government demand-side policies in open 
economies can affect both the real exchange rate and real wages (and potentially 
also output) beyond the short term. Instead of left and right parties within countries 
having different preferences over real exchange rates and real wages, we see parties 
across countries with different growth models having distinct preferences. This is 
because different combinations of the real exchange rate and real wages support 
different growth models; an appreciated real exchange rate and higher real wages 
support the consumption-led growth model and a depreciated real exchange rate and 
lower real wages support the export-led growth model. 
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As explored in detail in the Chapter 3 of the thesis, the incentive for politicians 
to support particular growth models in liberal market economies (LMEs) and 
coordinated market economies (CMEs) is reinforced by their political systems. The 
majoritarian electoral systems of the LMEs systematically privilege the interests of 
consumers (Chang et al. 2011; Rogowski and Kayser 2002), who prefer appreciated 
exchange rates because they raise purchasing power (Walter 2014). In contrast, the 
PR electoral systems of the CMEs systematically privilege the interests of producers 
(Chang et al. 2011; Rogowski and Kayser 2002), who typically prefer depreciated 
exchange rates because they are beneficial for the export sector (Frieden 1991, 
2015). 
National growth models have deep institutional roots and have been in place over 
the long period since the collapse of Fordism in the late 1970s (see Chapter 3). We 
therefore see promotion of national growth models, and especially advanced sectors, 
as a valence issue for voters (as in Iversen and Soskice (2015b)). Advanced sectors 
are important sources of economic growth, tax revenue and high-value added 
employment (Iversen and Soskice 2012),  so policies to support them “typically 
garner broad cross-class support” (Iversen and Soskice 2015b, 77). Parties of the 
both the left and the right have to show competence in managing the economy in 
order to be re-elected—the large ‘economic voting’ literature finds that voters 
reward governments at the ballot box for good economic performance and punish 
them for bad economic performance (Duch and Stevenson 2008; Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier 2000; Nadeau, Lewis-Beck, and Bélanger 2013). We therefore expect 
parties all along the political spectrum to pursue policies that support advanced 
sectors and the national growth strategy. This holds in both consumption-led and 
export-led economies. 
Our models stand apart from political business cycle models in that governments 
are not trying to ‘fool’ voters by inflating the economy in election years. Instead, we 
posit that governments pursue policies that support the national growth model 
throughout their terms in office and not just in election years. 
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There is an area outside of macroeconomic outcomes, however, where 
governments on different sides of the partisan divide do have different preferences: 
redistributive outcomes. In advanced democracies with class-based parties 
governments can influence the distribution of income through many channels such as 
the progressivity of the tax system; the size, responsiveness and coverage of the 
welfare state; and the education system (Iversen and Soskice 2006a, 2015a; Iversen 
and Stephens 2008). We therefore assume that left wing parties, which represent 
voters lower down the income distribution than right wing parties, prefer relatively 
higher redistribution than right wing parties. As discussed at length in Section 3.4 of 
Chapter 3 of the thesis, redistribution only has second order effects on 
consumption—i.e. the effects are insufficient to alter the overall growth model. In 
short, the level of government redistribution is likely to contribute to differences in 
the contribution of consumption to GDP growth in the export-led CMEs, but is 
unlikely to change the general stance of government demand-side policies, which are 
typically expansionary in the LMEs and restrictive in the CMEs. 
 
4.6 Demand-side policies during the Great Moderation 
 
In this section, we explore the use of government policies to influence domestic 
demand in advanced democracies. Focusing on credit expansion (or mitigation) and 
fiscal policy, we find ample support for our argument that governments in the 
consumption-led LMEs and the export-led CMEs pursued systematically different 
demand-side policies during the Great Moderation. 
 
Credit expansion or mitigation 
The key modelling section of this paper focused on the effect of an expansion in 
autonomous consumption on the medium-run equilibrium of a small open economy. 
We show that permanent changes in autonomous consumption can lead to lasting 
changes in the real exchange rate and real wages, which fits well with the 
macroeconomic data from the Great Moderation presented in Section 4.2. 
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One principal way in which governments can boost household consumption is by 
increasing the supply of credit. For example, raising credit card limits in the United 
States has a significant positive effect on both debt and consumption (Gross and 
Souleles 2002). Having access to a line of credit can increase consumption by 
creating the illusion of household wealth (Barnes and Wren 2012). It can also boost 
consumption by stimulating the housing market and pushing up house prices. Many 
studies have found that higher house prices (and consequently household wealth) 
increase household consumption (Benjamin, Chinloy, and Jud 2004; Case, Quigley, 
and Shiller 2005; Ludwig and Sløk 2004). 
Governments are not directly in control of credit in advanced democracies. 
Lending to households is typically carried out by commercial banks, which in the era 
of liberalised global finance are typically large and powerful, and often operate 
across national borders. However, governments can use the policy levers at their 
disposal and their control over the national regulatory framework to encourage or 
mitigate credit growth (Fuller 2015). For example, a government wanting to expand 
credit to households could introduce legislation to make it easier for households to 
obtain credit or provide added incentives for households to take on debt. Fuller 
(2015, 251) identifies five key dimensions of government policy that can affect the 
expansion of credit to the households: 
(1) interest rate restrictions on household borrowing; (2) capital gains rules 
on the transfer of households’ assets; (3) a society’s comfort or institutional 
capacity to accept high debt loads, as indicated by the ratio of typical 
mortgage loans to the value of the property purchased; (4) mortgage 
subsidies; and (5) the size of a secondary market for household debt. 
Fuller’s (2015, 251) chosen dimensions “place a heavy emphasis on mortgages and 
the market for residential real estate”, because mortgages make up the majority of 
lending to households in advanced democracies (as also shown in Girouard, 
Kennedy, and André (2007)). On each of these five dimensions, Fuller (2015) gives 
each of the 32 countries in his sample a score based on the extent to which the 
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government mitigates or encourages credit expansion. He then adds up the scores 
(assuming all dimensions are of equal importance) to create a composite index of 
each country’s “systemic approach to credit” in the 2000s (Fuller 2015, 258). The 
Index is shown for each of the advanced democracies in our 15-country sample in 
Table 4.1. We can see that the LMEs typically have higher scores on the index than 
the CMEs, which indicates that (on average) governments in the LMEs pursued a 
set of policies and regulations in the 2000s that were more favourable to credit 
expansion than governments in the CMEs. 
 
Table 4.1. National Index of Approach to Credit during the 2000s 
   
National Index of Approach  
to Credit during the 2000s 
Liberal market economies  
Australia -1 
Canada 0 
New Zealand 0 
United Kingdom 1 
United States 3 
Average 0.6 
 
 
Coordinated market economies  
Austria -5 
Belgium -3 
Denmark 0 
Finland -1 
Germany -5 
Japan -2 
Netherlands 2 
Norway -1 
Sweden -1 
Switzerland -4 
Average -2 
 
Source: Table 6 in Fuller (2015). 
Note: The maximum score on the National Index of Approach to Credit is 3 and the 
minimum score is -7. Higher scores indicate more government credit encouragement and 
lower scores indicate more government credit mitigation. 
 
The table shows that it was the United States government that most encouraged 
credit expansion across our sample of advanced democracies. This fits with the 
popular narrative of the pre-crisis period that faced with rising inequality and 
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stagnating wages, the United States government used credit to boost employment, 
consumption and growth, and placate the electorate (Calomiris and Haber 2014; 
Rajan 2010). A similar argument has been made about the role of credit in the 
United Kingdom (Barnes and Wren 2012), as well as in the wider sample of LMEs 
(in Chapter 3 of the thesis). 
In the United States, the Clinton (1993-2001) and Bush administrations (2001-09) 
were very open about their policy of extending credit to the poor. One channel 
President Clinton used to expand credit was the Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA). Boasting about the Act’s appropriation and extension during his time in 
office, President Clinton (1999) said in a speech at a Democratic National 
Committee Dinner:69 
The law was passed in 1977. But it was pretty well moribund until we took 
office. Over 95 per cent of the community investment, $17 billion, made in 
the 22 years of that law have been made in the 6 and a half years that I've 
been in office—investing money into poor areas and in neighborhoods and to 
businesses that normally couldn't get credit. 
In 1995, the Clinton administration revised the CRA so banks faced greater 
consequences for failing to comply with the Act. They also had leverage over the 
banks as the wave of mergers that were sweeping the banking industry required 
regulator, and therefore effectively government, approval (Calomiris and Haber 
2014). The government intervention did not stop there. They also directly expanded 
the credit supply through the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac (Rajan 2010). These institutions were implicitly guaranteed by the 
US government and provided mortgages directly to US households, including 
subprime mortgages to low-income households. They also committed to re-purchase 
subprime loans that commercial banks had made to meet their CRA commitments. 
The aggressive government targets for the GSEs subprime lending, as well as the 
                                         
69 A shortened version of this quote also appeared in Calomiris and Haber (2014, 217–18). 
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ability of banks to offload their risky mortgages onto the GSEs, led to a 
deterioration in lending standards and a massive expansion of lending to low-income 
households, particularly in the 2000s (Calomiris and Haber 2014). President George 
W. Bush made the extent of US government influence over the GSEs clear during 
National Homeownership Month in 2002:70 
I've called -- yesterday, I called upon the private sector to help us and help 
the homebuyers. We need more capital in the private markets for first-time, 
low-income buyers. I am proud to report that Fannie Mae has heard the call, 
and, as I understand, it’s about $440 billion over a period of time. They’ve 
used their influence to create that much capital available for the type of 
homeowner we’re talking about here. It’s in their charter; it now needs to be 
implemented. Freddie Mac is interested in helping. I appreciate both of those 
agencies providing the underpinnings of good capital. 
The governments in the other LMEs were not as explicit about their policy of 
extending credit, although we can see from Table 4.1 they did take measures to 
encourage credit expansion. For example, in the United Kingdom, light touch 
regulation, especially in financial services, was a key pillar of Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Gordon Brown’s macroeconomic policy framework, as he made clear at 
the launch of the government’s Better Regulation Action Plan in 2005:71 
In a risk based approach there is no inspection without justification, no form 
filling without justification, and no information requirements without 
justification. Not just a light touch but a limited touch. Instead of routine 
regulation attempting to cover all, we adopt a risk based approach which 
targets only the necessary few. 
                                         
70 This excerpt is taken from President George W. Bush’s speech to HUD Employees on 
National Homeownership Month in Washington D.C. on June 18th 2002. Also quoted in 
Rajan (2010, 37) and Calomiris and Haber (2014, 252). 
71  This excerpt is taken from Chancellor Gordon Brown’s speech to business leaders at 
Downing Street at the launch of the Better Regulation Action Plan on 24th May 2005. 
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As set out in Fuller (2015), courting the City of London was a central part of New 
Labour’s strategy to build up their economic credibility and electoral support in the 
early 1990s. A crucial step in Tony Blair and Gordon Brown’s charm offensive was 
convincing the City they would not overturn the deregulations that came out of 
Margaret Thatcher’s Big Bang. Once in office, they then set up a single entity to 
regulate financial institutions—the Financial Services Authority—whose guiding 
principle was light touch regulation that allowed banks to manage much of their 
own risk. These actions solidified their political support with business leaders and 
the electorate, while simultaneously supporting the UK’s consumption-led growth 
model by easing access to mortgage and consumer credit (Barnes and Wren 2012). 
The UK and US experiences show that politicians on both the left and the right 
of the political spectrum pursued policies that encouraged credit growth while in 
office. This suggests that LME governments pursued demand-side policies that 
supported the consumption-led growth model irrespective of partisanship. 
There is strong evidence that governments in the LMEs encouraged credit 
expansion during the Great Moderation, but as Barnes (2015) points out the CPE 
literature has been guilty of portraying the rise in household indebtedness as a 
uniquely LME phenomenon (for example, Barnes and Wren (2012); Crouch (2009); 
Iversen and Soskice (2012)). In fact, household indebtedness grew slightly faster in 
the Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands than it did in the LMEs between 1995 and 
2007.72 We can see from Table 4.1 that the governments in the Netherlands and the 
Nordic CMEs were also relatively credit encouraging when compared to the 
governments in the continental European CMEs (excluding the Netherlands) and 
Japan, although still less encouraging than the LMEs (on average). However, as we 
saw in Section 4.2, the Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands had substantially lower 
contributions of consumption to GDP growth than the LMEs during the Great 
Moderation and managed to successfully safeguard their external competitiveness. 
                                         
72 Source: OECD National Accounts at a Glance, June 2016. See Table 3.10 in Chapter 3 of 
the thesis for country-level data on household indebtedness. 
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The experience of the Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands seems at odds with the 
model presented in the previous section. In order to square the circle we need to 
consider the extent to which credit expansion impacts domestic demand in these 
countries and in the LMEs. Only in countries where credit expansion produces a 
sizeable increase in domestic demand (that is not offset by other macroeconomic 
policies) would we expect to see the exchange rate appreciation and current account 
deterioration predicted by our model. There are five main reasons why credit 
expansion is likely to have boosted domestic demand more in the LMEs than in the 
Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands. These reasons are explored in detail in Section 
3.5 in Chapter 3 of the thesis, so we just provide a brief summary here. 
First, homeownership rates were on average higher in the LMEs than in the 
Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands in the 1990s and 2000s (Schwartz and Seabrooke 
2008). As some of the effect of credit on consumption operates through the house 
price channel, countries with a lower proportion of homeowners are likely to see 
smaller effects on consumption. Second, more low-income households were indebted 
in the LMEs than elsewhere (Girouard, Kennedy, and André 2007), and households 
at the lower end of the income and wealth distributions typically have much higher 
marginal propensities to consume than richer households (Carroll, Slacalek, and 
Tokuoka 2014; Jappelli and Pistaferri 2014; Mian and Sufi 2014). Third, more of the 
expansion in credit to households was used to directly finance the purchase of goods 
and services in the LMEs (see Figure 3.10 in Chapter 3 of the thesis). Fourth, the 
Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands are very open to international trade compared to 
the LMEs. The average trade openness of the former group was 83% of GDP 
between 1994 and 2007, while the equivalent figure for the LMEs was just 50% of 
GDP. 73  This means that a higher proportion of any increase in credit-financed 
household spending is likely to be spent on goods from abroad in the Nordic CMEs 
and the Netherlands. Lastly, governments in the Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands 
                                         
73 Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD Annual National Accounts (data accessed June 
2016). Trade openness = (exports + imports) as a % of GDP (all in current prices). See 
Table 3.2 in Chapter 3 of the thesis for country-level data on trade openness.  
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partially offset the expansionary effects of credit expansion through restrictive fiscal 
policies (which will be explored further in the next subsection). 
The first three reasons suggest that any government loosening of credit 
constraints is likely to have a smaller effect on consumption in the Nordic CMEs 
and the Netherlands than the LMEs, i.e. ΔcLME > ΔcNordic > 0 . The fourth reason 
suggests that more of any credit expansion leaks abroad in the Nordic CMEs and 
the Netherlands. Household spending on imports does not boost the domestic 
economy and hence does not shift the IS curve outwards in the same way that a 
boost in consumption does. The fifth reason suggests that the positive effect on 
credit expansion on consumption in the Nordic CMEs, ΔcNordic > 0 , was at least 
partially offset by a reduction in government spending, ΔgNordic < 0 . In combination, 
the five reasons suggest that domestic demand rose less as a result of credit 
expansion in the Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands than it did in the LMEs, which 
in our model results in a smaller appreciation of the real exchange rate and a smaller 
rise in real wages, i.e. ΔqLME < ΔqNordic ≤ 0 ;  ΔwLME > ΔwNordic ≤ 0 . 
Governments in the LMEs encouraged the expansion of credit to boost 
consumption during the Great Moderation—credit was a key support of the LMEs’ 
consumption-led growth model (see Section 3.5 of Chapter 3 of the thesis). The long-
term viability of a growth model centred on the expansion of credit and borrowing 
from abroad may be debatable but in the short and medium-term the economic 
benefits for the LMEs are clear. The incentives for LME governments to pursue 
policies that encourage credit expansion are further reinforced by majoritarian 
electoral systems and four-to-five year electoral cycles, which mean that short-term 
growth is often privileged over longer-term financial and economic stability.  
 Governments in some CMEs also encouraged credit growth, but for the reasons 
outlined above it had less effect on domestic demand, and hence did not lead to the 
real exchange rate appreciation that would risk undermining their export-led growth 
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models. 74  Figures 4.4 and 4.5, which show that the Nordic CMEs and the 
Netherlands had depreciated real exchange rates and current account surpluses 
throughout the Great Moderation, provide further evidence to support this 
assertion. 
 
Fiscal policy 
The government has another tool in its arsenal to influence domestic demand: fiscal 
policy. The government can stimulate domestic demand using a deficit-financed 
expansion of government spending. Likewise, the government can use restrictive 
fiscal policies to dampen down domestic demand. We saw in Section 4.4 that when 
government spending is not completely fixed by a fiscal rule it has the same effects 
on the economy as a change in autonomous consumption. 
The use of fiscal policy to support growth models is not as simple as loosening 
credit conditions because it requires policymakers to have discretion over fiscal 
policy. The ability of policymakers to use fiscal policy to affect demand can be held 
back by strict fiscal rules but is also restricted by high public sector debts and 
deficits. Policymakers want to avoid high debt and deficits because they could lead 
to punishment from financial markets (i.e. higher borrowing costs). In extreme cases, 
when the public finances are viewed as unsustainable, the government may be 
denied credit altogether. Hence policymakers have less scope to use expansionary 
fiscal policy that worsens the government finances when debt and deficits are 
already elevated. 
Table 4.2 shows the change in the cyclically adjusted government primary 
balances (as a % of potential GDP) in advanced democracies between 1994 and 
2000, and 2000 and 2007. The cyclically adjusted government primary balance 
corrects for the position of the economy in the business cycle and removes the 
government’s net debt interest payments. Changes in this measure are therefore 
                                         
74 The incentives for the Nordic CMEs and the Netherlands to encourage the expansion of 
mortgage credit are likely to rest with the benefits to (both CME and LME) governments of 
rising house prices. See the discussion in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3 of the thesis. 
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commonly used to measure changes in discretionary fiscal policy—Alesina and 
Ardagna (1998, 2010) and Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998) define episodes of 
fiscal adjustment (consolidation) and fiscal stimulus based on large changes the 
cyclically adjusted government primary balance. A positive change in Table 4.2 
indicates a tightening of discretionary fiscal policy and a negative change indicates a 
loosening of discretionary fiscal policy. 
The public finances were under stress in a large proportion of advanced 
democracies following the economic downturns of the 1990s, which were particularly 
severe in Sweden and Finland. This resulted in a number of the LMEs and CMEs 
pursuing large fiscal consolidation (austerity) packages in the first half of the Great 
Moderation. In Europe, there was also pressure to run tight fiscal policies during the 
1990s to comply with the strict Maastricht convergence criteria for entry into the 
single currency. We can see from Table 4.2 that discretionary fiscal policy tightened 
in all countries in our sample except New Zealand and Japan between 1994 and 
2000. The fiscal expansion in Japan is unsurprising given relatively poor state of 
their economy in this period. In fact, the 1990s were such a period of economic 
malaise for the Japanese economy that they have become known as the “lost decade” 
(Hayashi and Prescott 2002, 206).  
In the 2000s up to the financial crisis, the Eurozone was up and running and the 
public finances of most advanced democracies had been returned to a stable footing. 
Hence governments had more discretion to pursue expansionary fiscal policies. The 
right-hand column of Table 4.2 shows that on average governments in the LME 
provided more fiscal stimulus than governments in the CMEs between 2000 and 
2007, especially in the UK, the US and Canada. 
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Table 4.2. Change in cyclically adjusted government primary balances, 1994-2000 
and 2000-2007 
 
Change in cyclically adjusted government primary balance  
(percentage points of GDP)  
   1994-2000 2000-2007 
Liberal market economies   
Australia 1.8 -1.0 
Canada 5.9 -3.9 
New Zealand -2.8 0.3 
United Kingdom 6.2 -6.0 
United States 1.9 -4.7 
Average 2.6 -3.1 
 
  
Coordinated market 
economies   
Austria 0.8 -0.2 
Belgium 0.7 -3.3 
Denmark 2.7 0.6 
Finland 7.8 -4.8 
Germany 3.0 -1.8 
Japan -2.3 2.1 
Netherlands 1.5 -3.0 
Norway 5.3 -0.9 
Sweden 8.3 -3.3 
Switzerland 1.6 0.5 
Average 2.9 -1.4 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 99, June 2016. 
 
The relative changes in cyclically adjusted government primary balances in the 
2000s fit with the Iversen and Soskice’s theory (explored in detail in Chapter 3 of 
the thesis) that fiscal policy is more restrictive in CMEs in order help facilitate the 
wage restraint that underpins the export-led growth model (Iversen and Soskice 
2012). Tight macroeconomic policies (both fiscal and monetary) are most needed to 
discipline wage setters when wages are bargained at an intermediate level (Iversen 
and Soskice 2012; Soskice 2007; Soskice and Iversen 2000). This theory is supported 
by the fact that the Nordic countries shifted to non-accommodating macroeconomic 
regimes when centralised collective bargaining collapsed in the early 1990s (Dølvik, 
Andersen, and Vartiainen 2015; Iversen 1996; Iversen and Soskice 2012). 75  For 
                                         
75  The policy shift occurred slightly earlier in Denmark than elsewhere. Restrictive 
macroeconomic policies were introduced by the bourgeois coalition that came to power in 
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example, the social democratic government that came to power in Sweden in 1994 
introduced a comprehensive (and at the time radical) set of fiscal rules that (at the 
time) formed part of the biggest fiscal consolidation seen in any OECD country 
since (at least) the early 1970s (Erixon 2011). 
The Swedish experience also accords with the macroeconomic models presented in 
the previous section. In those models, a reduction in government spending, ceteris 
paribus, leads to a depreciation of the real exchange rate and a reduction in real 
wages. The idea that fiscal policy should not be used for stabilization and that 
restrictive fiscal policies supported the export sector was accepted on both sides of 
the partisan divide in Sweden by the early 1980s, as highlighted by Lindvall (2006, 
262): 
All economic policy bills presented by the center-right governments between 
1980 and 1982 contained sections on the need for decreased public spending. 
When the social democrats took over, they did not consider expansionary 
policies either. The government instead opted for a "third way": a final, big 
devaluation, followed by austere fiscal policies that were expected to transfer 
resources from sheltered economic sectors, including the public sector, to the 
export-oriented sector. 
This shift in ideas changed the tone of Swedish debates on fiscal policy but the 
restrictive fiscal policy regime was not properly institutionalised until after the 
severe economic crisis of the early 1990s and the shift to intermediate level 
bargaining that followed (Erixon 2011; Iversen 1996; Lindvall 2006). 
The reaction of Germany to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis of 2010-11 (hereby 
referred to as the euro crisis) provides another example of the belief among CME 
policymakers that tight fiscal policy is an essential pillar of a successful export-led 
growth model. Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel openly refers to Germany as “an 
                                                                                                                   
1982. However, wage bargaining had already moved to the intermediate level in Denmark by 
the early 1980s (Iversen 1996). 
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export nation”.76 The German reaction to the euro crisis has been to push for greater 
fiscal discipline through the introduction of more stringent fiscal rules for the whole 
of the EU such as the Fiscal Compact. 77  German Federal Minister of Finance 
Wolfgang Schäuble nicely sums up the strong link in the minds of German 
policymakers between fiscal discipline and international competitiveness:78 
European Monetary Union won’t succeed if a number of countries 
persistently run deficits and weaken their competitiveness at the expense of 
the Euro’s stability … [Deficit countries need to] develop a rules based 
approach to improve competitiveness and strengthen fiscal policy within the 
Eurozone. 
The Economist reported that this viewpoint on the crisis and the proposed solution 
is shared by both major parties in the Bundestag:79 
All mainstream German politicians share Mrs Merkel’s broad strategy 
because they interpret recent German history in much the same way that she 
does. As they see it, the key to economic success is export prowess, achieved 
by keeping budgets tight and wages competitive. In short, the rest of Europe 
needs to become more like Germany. 
The reason for the consensus is that the major political parties, the social partners 
and the electorate in Germany all stand firmly behind the country’s export-led 
growth model (Armingeon and Baccaro 2015). 
                                         
76 This excerpt is taken from Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel’s speech at the Museum of 
Islamic Art in Doha on May 27th 2010. 
77 For more information on the Fiscal Compact and other post-euro crisis fiscal governance 
measures in the EU see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/governance/2012-03-14_six_pack_en.htm  
78  This excerpt is taken from German Federal Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble’s 
speech A Comprehensive Strategy for the Stabilization of the Economic and Monetary Union, 
delivered at the Brussels Economic Forum 2011 on 18th May 2011. 
79 This excerpt is taken from The Merkel Plan, which appeared in The Economist magazine 
on June 15th 2013. 
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The evidence presented in this subsection shows the important supporting role 
that fiscal policy played in growth models during the Great Moderation, particularly 
in the export-led CMEs. As shown in the open economy macroeconomic models in 
Section 4.4, ceteris paribus, a reduction in government spending, Δg < 0 , leads to a 
depreciation of the exchange rate and a reduction in real wages, Δq > 0 ; Δw < 0 . 
Both of these outcomes are beneficial for the exposed sectors of the economy and 
governments in CMEs can consistently pursue these policies should they wish to. An 
expansion of government spending has the opposite effects and therefore can be used 
to promote a domestic demand-led growth model as we saw in the LMEs in the 
2000s. However, the use of fiscal policy for expansionary purposes is restricted by 
implicit and/or explicit fiscal sustainability rules. The 1990s show that fiscal policy 
is also clearly not a pre-requisite for running a consumption-led growth model, as 
the governments has other policy levers, such as loosening credit constraints, which 
it can freely use to expand the domestic economy. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
The Great Moderation was such a period of macroeconomic tranquillity that the 
economy and macroeconomic policy fell well down the political agenda. Then the 
global financial crisis hit, which led to the worst downturn in the world economy 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s and a sovereign debt crisis that nearly tore 
the Eurozone apart. These events have thrust macroeconomics, and macroeconomic 
policy in particular, back into the spotlight; debates about fiscal stimulus and 
consolidation, the role of independent central banks, and financial regulation now sit 
firmly at the top of the political agenda. Given the immense importance of 
macroeconomic developments in the last decade, it is both surprising and 
disappointing that political science research using modern macroeconomic modelling 
has been almost non-existent. This paper aims to fill that gap by providing a set of 
simple, tractable macroeconomic models, which political scientists can use to shed 
light on a whole host of policy issues facing advanced democracies today. 
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The macroeconomic models presented in the paper are open economy and 
incorporate the main elements of frontier New Keynesian macroeconomics while 
moving away from the unrealistic assumptions that have led modern 
macroeconomics to become so technically complex and impenetrable to outsiders. 
Our model provides important insights into the dangerous macroeconomic 
imbalances that built up between advanced democracies during the Great 
Moderation, as well as contesting the dominant macroeconomic models used in 
political science (Persson and Tabellini 2000), which still suggest that government 
demand-side policies cannot have lasting effects on the economy. 
The central implications of our macroeconomic model (developed from Carlin and 
Soskice (2015)) are that: (1) permanent changes in domestic demand can have 
lasting effects on real wages and real exchange rates (and potentially also output); 
(2) governments have the discretion to pursue policies that affect domestic demand, 
even when monetary policy has been delegated to an independent central bank; and 
(3) governments pursuing different demand-side policies can lead to persistent 
current account imbalances in the medium run. 
The model helps explain the macroeconomic trends of the Great Moderation, 
where export-led CMEs saw real exchange rate depreciation and the build up of 
current account surpluses and consumption-led CMEs saw exchange rate 
appreciation and the build up of current account deficits. It shows how government 
demand-side policies, such as credit encouragement in the LMEs and restrictive 
fiscal policies in the CMEs, can led to persistent current account divergences within 
a system of independent inflation targeting central banking and open financial 
markets. We argue that governments on both sides of the partisan divide pursued 
demand-side policies that supported national growth models because it paid 
dividends at the ballot box. 
Another important implication of our model is that it provides a plausible 
alternative explanation to Barro and Gordon’s (1983) influential argument for 
central bank independence based on the time-inconsistency problem. Their argument 
implies governments have an incentive to tie their own hands because they cannot 
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affect the economy in the medium run and want to minimise inflation bias. We show 
that governments in open economies can have lasting effects on the economy, and 
argue, paradoxically, that central bank independence is a critical enabler for 
expansionary policies. This is because it enhances government credibility in financial 
markets and anchors inflation expectations. The discretion central bank 
independence offers governments over policies to stimulate demand provides a very 
clear incentive for governments that desire output above equilibrium to give up the 
reins of monetary policy. 
This paper hopes to provoke discussion, and ultimately, aims to revive the 
research agenda at the intersection of political science and macroeconomics. It is 
only a starting point but provides many exciting avenues for future research. 
Directly building on the paper, our macroeconomic model clearly requires proper 
econometric testing using OECD macroeconomic data from the Great Moderation. 
Two plausible modelling approaches would be a dynamic simultaneous equations 
model (SEM) or a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model. The political side 
of our argument is also underdeveloped and would benefit from some formalisation. 
The other clear avenue for future research is to take our model of the 
macroeconomy and use it to shed light on other time periods and contexts. The 
post-crisis period, where restrictive fiscal policies have been pervasive, seems like an 
obvious and interesting place to start. 
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5 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
The papers in this thesis shed new light on the globally significant current account 
imbalances that built up between OECD countries prior to the global financial crisis 
of 2008-09. They fill a prominent gap in the literature by focusing on the political 
(and political economic) drivers of the imbalances. More specifically, they investigate 
the role of institutions, political systems and electoral politics, and government 
demand-side policies in the imbalances. 
The empirical analysis in first paper (Chapter 2) finds causal evidence that the 
introduction of the European Monetary Union (EMU)—an unprecedented change in 
the institutional frameworks of the countries that joined—drove the current account 
imbalances between the north and south of the currency union during its first 
decade. The second paper (Chapter 3) maps out the complex set of 
interrelationships between political–economic institutions (varieties of capitalism), 
growth models, and political systems in advanced democracies. The new approach to 
comparative political economy (CPE) that I develop in the paper provides a 
theoretical framework that can help explain the current account divergence between 
the export-led coordinated market economies (CMEs) and the consumption-led 
liberal market economies (LMEs) during the Great Moderation. The third paper 
(Chapter 4) brings modern macroeconomics back into political science. The paper 
sets out a suite of simple open economy macroeconomic models and uses them to 
show how governments pursuing different demand-side policies can result in 
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persistent current account imbalances between countries, even within a system of 
independent inflation-targeting central banking. 
  In this final chapter of the thesis, I start by summarising the substantive 
contributions of my three papers, as well as highlighting their policy implications. I 
then go onto look at the current account balances of OECD countries in the post-
global financial crisis phase in order to show that my research can also provide 
valuable insights outside of the Great Moderation period. I bring the thesis to a 
close by discussing the limitations of my analyses and suggesting possible avenues 
for future research. 
 
Substantive contributions and policy implications 
Chapter 2 of the thesis makes a major contribution to the empirical literature on the 
Eurozone’s current account imbalances. The existing literature has yet to come to a 
consensus about whether the introduction of the EMU was responsible for the 
current account divergence between the north and the south (Arghyrou and 
Chortareas 2008; Belke and Dreger 2013; Schmitz and von Hagen 2011), or whether 
factors external to the currency union also played an important role (Chen, Milesi-
Ferretti, and Tressel 2013; Guerrieri and Esposito 2013). 
The synthetic control method used in Chapter 2 is an improvement on much of 
the existing empirical literature for two reasons. First, it does not rely on the model-
dependent extrapolation that is common in regression-based analyses (Abadie, 
Diamond, and Hainmueller 2015, 3; King and Zeng 2006); and second, it is a 
counterfactuals-based approach, so allows me to directly estimate the causal effect of 
the EMU on the current account balances of individual member states. 
The results of the synthetic control analysis show that the average effect of the 
EMU on the current account balances of France, Greece, Italy, and Spain from when 
they joined until 2010 was -4 percentage points of GDP. This suggests that joining 
the EMU drove the accumulation of current account deficits in southern Europe. 
The equivalent figure for Austria was 3.6 percentage points, which shows that the 
EMU helped improve the Austrian current account balance. The Austrian result also 
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suggests that the EMU drove the current account surpluses of the other northern 
European countries in the single currency (Belgium, Finland, Germany and the 
Netherlands), due to the similar ways in which their political economies are 
organised. Chapter 3 of the thesis, which argues and empirically demonstrates that 
the northern European countries in the Eurozone are all CMEs with export-led 
growth models, adds further weight to this assertion. 
The substantive contribution of Chapter 3 of the thesis is the development of a 
new approach to CPE. Baccaro and Pontusson (2016) recently set out their growth 
models approach to CPE, which pitches itself as a demand-side alternative to Hall 
and Soskice’s (2001) highly influential, supply-side dominated, varieties of capitalism 
approach. The alternative approach set out in Chapter 3 is built around the idea 
that you need to incorporate both the demand side (demand drivers of growth and 
government demand-side policies) and the supply side (political–economic 
institutions) of the economy, as well as political systems, in order to understand the 
macroeconomic trajectories of advanced democracies during the Great Moderation.   
The simple modern open economy macroeconomic model that sits at the heart of 
Chapter 4 shows how governments can use demand-side policies to affect real 
exchange rates and real wages (and potentially output) in the medium run. The 
model also shows how persistent current account imbalances and successful inflation-
targeting central banking are perfectly consistent with one another in advanced 
democracies. The chapter brings modern macroeconomics back into political science 
at a time when macroeconomic policy is back at the top of the political agenda. The 
simple, tractable models set out in the chapter provide political scientists with a 
toolkit for exploring a whole range of salient political economic questions. 
The overarching policy implication of my thesis is that politics, institutions, and 
policies need to be taken into account if policymakers hope to avoid the build up of 
current account imbalances in future. In the remainder of this subsection, I will 
briefly discuss the key policy implications of each of my papers. 
Chapter 2 provides reason to be sceptical that the Macroeconomic Imbalances 
Procedure (MIP) put in place following the euro crisis will be enough to stop 
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imbalances re-emerging between the north and south of the Eurozone. The MIP 
aims to identify, prevent and address potentially harmful macroeconomic 
imbalances, including those in current accounts. 80  The results of the synthetic 
control analysis in Chapter 2 suggest that fundamental changes to the EMU 
institutional framework—which are not currently on the table—may be required to 
avoid imbalances arising in the future, and not just better monitoring of imbalances 
and the threat of sanctions (an approach that has already proved itself to be wholly 
ineffective with the Stability and Growth Pact). 
Chapter 3 argues that political systems and political–economic institutions 
reinforce one another to provide strong electoral incentives for governments to 
pursue policies that support the national growth strategy. We have seen that this 
leads to current account divergence between the export-led CMEs and the 
consumption-led LMEs. The framework laid out in the chapter suggests that elected 
policymakers will not unilaterally take action to correct current account imbalances. 
International cooperation in demand-side policies would likely be required to reduce 
imbalances, although the chances of that happening are slim because these policies 
currently remain firmly in the hands of national governments (aside from in the 
Eurozone periphery). 
Chapter 4 argues that independent central banking and open financial markets 
have not tied the hands of governments as earlier theories (e.g. Barro and Gordon 
1983) predicted they would. In fact, paradoxically, these institutional changes have 
been critical enablers of expansionary demand-side policies such as boosting 
consumption by loosening credit constraints. Further restrictions on government 
behaviour (over and above a consistent fiscal plan) may be needed if the advanced 
democracies are to avoid persistent external imbalances in the future. Although, the 
political will to voluntarily restrict the use of demand-side policies is likely to be low 
                                         
80  For more information on the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/macroeconomic_imbalance_pr
ocedure/index_en.htm 
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considering that pursuing policies that support the national growth model is so 
crucial for electoral success. 
 
Current account balances in the post-crisis phase 
Figure 5.1 shows the path of current account balances in the advanced democracies 
from 1990 to 2015. We can see that current account balances went through a brief 
period of rebalancing during the crisis. This is unsurprising. In a severe economic 
downturn, current account balances tend to move toward balance in both surplus 
and deficit countries. In the deficit countries, import demand falls and foreign 
borrowing often becomes more difficult, and in the surplus countries, export demand 
falls as a result of the contraction in world demand. This is not to say that the 
global financial crisis permanently corrected the external imbalances among 
advanced democracies, far from it. Figure 5.1 shows that after the initial phase of 
rebalancing, current account balances have re-emerged. 
Looking first at the LMEs in the figure, we notice that they are all still running 
substantial current account deficits in the post-crisis period. This suggests that the 
global financial crisis has not permanently damaged the LMEs’ credibility in 
financial markets; they retain the ability to borrow internationally. In addition, it 
speaks to the strong political incentives that governments in the LMEs have to 
pursue consumption-led growth models (as set out in Chapter 3). The post-crisis 
phase in the UK also reflects a point made forcefully in Chapter 4 that deficit-
financed fiscal expansion is not a pre-requisite for pursuing a consumption-led 
growth model. Fiscal policy has been restrictive during the post-crisis period of 
austerity in the UK, but their current account deficit was bigger in 2015 than it was 
on the eve of the financial crisis in 2007. 
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Figure 5.1. Current account balances, 1990-2015 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2016. 
Note: The southern European economies and Ireland are not included in the figure to make 
it clearer. 
 
Turning our attention to the CMEs, we can see that they are still characterised by 
large current account surpluses. What is particularly striking is that current account 
surpluses have been on a steep upward trajectory in the post-crisis phase in some of 
the northern European CMEs—e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany. The 
large surplus in Germany, by far the most economically important Eurozone 
member, has led to criticism from some prominent economists. Krugman (2013a, 
2013b) argues strongly that Germany has intellectually misunderstood 
macroeconomics because it will not aid adjustment in the south by taking steps to 
expand domestic demand (Iversen, Soskice, and Hope 2016). However, the new 
approach to CPE set out in Chapter 3 of the thesis points to an alternative view of 
the post-crisis surplus in Germany. As Germany is a CME with a consensus political 
system, Angela Merkel’s government has a strong electoral incentive to pursue 
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restrictive demand-side policies (e.g. austerity) that support the country’s export-led 
growth model. It is certainly not the case that Germany’s policies are in line with 
what is best for the Eurozone as a whole, but Germany is at least rationally 
pursuing its own self interest as an export-led CME (Iversen, Soskice, and Hope 
2016). The deeply ingrained preferences for restrictive demand-side policies in the 
northern European economies provides further reason to be pessimistic that 
governments in these economies will actively take steps to reduce their current 
account surpluses. 
The southern European economies and Ireland (who are excluded from Figure 5.1 
for clarity) are the one set of countries to have been through major rebalancing in 
the post-crisis phase. The current account balances of France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain were all in or very close to surplus in 2015, which is a 
staggering turn around considering the size of their current account deficits just 
prior to the global financial crisis (see Figure 1.1 in the introduction to the thesis).81 
The rebalancing is partly because they have not been free to choose their own 
demand-side policies, and consequently growth models, since the euro crisis. This 
has happened for two reasons. First, fiscal policy has been largely dictated (often 
explicitly through Troika adjustment programmes) by actors outside their domestic 
political systems, most prominently the northern European creditor economies. 
Second, the euro crisis has badly damaged the southern European economies 
credibility in financial markets, which pushes up borrowing costs and reduces their 
ability to borrow from abroad to pursue expansionary demand-side policies. 
The path of current account balances in the southern European economies since 
the crisis provides support for the argument set out in Chapters 3 and 4 that 
financial market credibility is a critical enabler of consumption-led growth models 
because it facilitates international borrowing. The path fits less well with the large 
negative effect of the EMU on current account balances of the southern European 
economies found in the synthetic control analysis in Chapter 2. It is not yet clear 
                                         
81 Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2016. 
 
 
230 
whether the post-crisis rebalancing in the south will be permanent. As they emerge 
from their prolonged economic slumps and government balance sheets are put back 
on a sustainable footing, they will reclaim some control over fiscal policy. Whether 
the EMU has a similar effect on current account balances in southern Europe as it 
did in the pre-crisis period in the future, however, is likely to largely depend on 
whether these economies can regain the financial market credibility they possessed 
during the first decade of the single currency. 
 
Limitations and future research 
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of my thesis, as this helps to identify 
important areas for future research. The synthetic control analysis in Chapter 2 
provides valuable causal evidence that the EMU drove the current account balances 
in the single currency’s first decade but is unable to explicitly test the causal 
mechanisms. It is essential for effective policymaking in the post-crisis world that 
future empirical research uncovers the mechanisms at work. The variation in the 
current account balances gaps in the southern European economies in my analysis 
provides a starting point by suggesting that multiple mechanisms were involved. 
The methodology is also unable to produce good synthetic control units for all 
member states, which leaves a gap for a rigorous piece of quantitative analysis that 
tests my claim that the Austrian result in my analysis can be extended to the other 
northern European member states. 
The new approach to CPE presented in Chapter 3 of the thesis provides a 
platform for a range of important future work. A clear starting point would be to 
look at whether the same set of interrelationships I have identified for the Great 
Moderation are driving the re-emergence of imbalances in the post-crisis period (see 
Figure 5.1). Chapter 3 would suggest that they are likely to be, due to strong 
complementarities identified between varieties of capitalism, growth models, and 
political systems. Another interesting research question that comes out of the 
analysis in Chapter 3 is why Japan, classified as a CME in Hall and Soskice’s (2001) 
framework, has not pursued an export-led growth model during the post-Fordist 
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era? This question may be best answered with an in-depth case study of the 
Japanese political economy. Lastly, the discussion of institutional change in the 
chapter clearly needs elaboration. One particularly pertinent question is whether the 
coordination and strategic interaction that underpin the CMEs export success in 
manufactured goods is also driving their emerging export capacity in knowledge-
intensive services? This will get to the heart of one of the major questions on the 
CPE research agenda: will the coordinated model of capitalism survive in the long 
term? 
The macroeconomic models set out in Chapter 4 of the thesis help to dispel some 
long-standing beliefs about the role of the government in the macroeconomy in the 
political economy literature. The paper is meant as a starting point and is aimed at 
reinvigorating the research agenda at the intersection of macroeconomics and 
political science. The chapter shows that the models fit well with the high-level 
macroeconomic data for the Great Moderation but does not test the model 
empirically. The logical next step would therefore be to use quarterly 
macroeconomic data from the OECD countries to do some rigorous econometric 
testing—such as a SVAR model or a dynamic SEM—to show that the relations in 
the model hold up on an equation-by-equation basis. More formal testing of the 
divergence in demand-side policies between the LMEs and the CMEs during the 
Great Moderation would also help increase confidence in the central argument of the 
chapter. A major aim of the chapter was to provide political scientists with a simple, 
tractable model of the macroeconomy that they could use to investigate a range of 
political economic questions. We expect that taking the model and using it to 
provide a fresh perspective on time periods and contexts outside of the one 
investigated in the chapter will be a fruitful and important avenue for future 
research. 
Overall the papers in this thesis provide important new insights on the political 
(and political economic) drivers of the pre-crisis current account imbalances. They 
also supply a new approach the CPE and a simple macroeconomic model that can 
form the basis of a wealth of valuable political science research in the future. 
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Appendix A 
 
A1. Additional tables and figures 
Table A.1. Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Data source 
GDP per capita (PPP,  
current international dollars) IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2015 
Trade openness (%) =  
merchandise exports and  
imports as a share of  
GDP at current PPPs 
Penn World Tables 8.1 
Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar, and Marcel P. 
Timmer. 2015. "The Next Generation of the Penn World 
Table." American Economic Review, 105(10): 3150-82, 
available for download at www.ggdc.net/pwt 
Domestic absorption growth 
(constant prices, 2005 $US,  
annual percentage change) 
Penn World Tables 8.1 
Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar, and Marcel P. 
Timmer. 2015. "The Next Generation of the Penn World 
Table." American Economic Review, 105(10): 3150-82, 
available for download at www.ggdc.net/pwt 
Price level of exports  
(relative to US prices, price  
level of US GDP in 2005 = 1) 
Penn World Tables 8.1 
Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar, and Marcel P. 
Timmer. 2015. "The Next Generation of the Penn World 
Table." American Economic Review, 105(10): 3150-82, 
available for download at www.ggdc.net/pwt 
GDP growth (constant prices,  
annual percentage change) IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2015 
Total investment (as a % of GDP) IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2015 
Public debt  
(as a % of GDP) 
IMF Historical Public Debt Database, September 2012 
Abbas, S.M. Ali, Nazim Belhocine, Asmaa El-Ganainy 
and Mark Horton (2010) "A Historical Public Debt 
Database", IMF Working Paper WP/10/245, 
Washington, DC, available for download at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk
=24332.0 
Government primary balance  
(as a % of GDP) 
IMF Historical Public Finance Dataset, 2013 
Paolo Mauro, Rafael Romeu, Ariel Binder and Asad 
Zaman, 2013, "A Modern History of Fiscal Prudence and 
Profligacy," IMF Working Paper No. 13/5, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, available for download 
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/histdb/ 
Domestic credit to private sector  
(as a % of GDP) World Bank World Development Indicators, March 2015 
Current account balance  
(as a % of GDP) IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2015 
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Table A.2. Weights for current account balance predictors in synthetic control units 
 
Synthetic control unit 
Austria France Greece Italy Spain 
GDP per capita (PPP,  
current international dollars) - 7.1% 17.8% 0.1% 0.4% 
Trade openness (%) =  
merchandise exports and  
imports as a share of  
GDP at current PPPs 
- 0.7% 25.7% 1.0% 11.5% 
Domestic absorption growth  
(constant prices, 2005 $US,  
annual percentage change) 
0.1% 1.8% 0.7% 11.3% 10.3% 
Price level of exports  
(relative to US prices, price  
level of US GDP in 2005 = 1) 
0.4% 47.5% 8.1% - 5.7% 
GDP growth (constant prices,  
annual percentage change) 11.1% 1.8% 0.7% 28.3% 19.9% 
Total investment  
(as a % of GDP) 50.5% 0.2% 1.6% 27.4% 17.9% 
Public debt  
(as a % of GDP) 3.9% 1.4% - 2.8% 12.2% 
Government primary balance  
(as a % of GDP) 4.5% 1.2% 41.9% - - 
Domestic credit to private sector  
(as a % of GDP) 2.3% 1.8% - 0.3% 5.4% 
Current account balance  
(as a % of GDP) 27.2% 36.5% 3.6% 28.9% 16.6% 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure A.1. Current account balance gaps (in percentage points of GDP) between 
Austria, France, Greece, Italy and Spain, and their synthetic control units, with full 
donor pool and donor pool excluding middle-income countries: 1980 to 2010 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: The middle-income countries in the sample are Chile, Hungary, Mexico, Poland and 
Turkey. The vertical dotted lines show when countries joined the EMU. All countries joined 
in 1999 except Greece, which joined in 2001.  
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Figure A.2. Current account balance gaps (in percentage points of GDP) between 
Austria, France, Greece, Italy and Spain, and their synthetic control units, with full 
donor pool and donor pool including Bulgaria and Romania: 1980 to 2010. 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: Bulgaria and Romania have poor data availability for some current account predictors, 
therefore public debt is only included in the analysis from 1992, the government primary 
balance is only included from 1995 and domestic credit to the private sector is only included 
from 1996. The vertical dotted lines show when countries joined the EMU. All countries 
joined in 1999 except Greece, which joined in 2001. 
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Appendix B 
 
B1. Additional tables and figures 
 
Table B.1. LMEs vs. CMEs: Average annual contributions of consumption and 
exports to GDP growth, and the average annual GDP growth rate, 1961-1979 
 
Average annual 
contribution of 
consumption to  
GDP growth (%) 
1961-1979 
Average annual 
contribution of 
exports to  
GDP growth (%) 
1961-1979 
Average annual  
GDP growth (%) 
1961-1979 
Liberal market 
economies 
 
 
 
Australia 2.3 0.8 4.1 
Canada 2.5 1.3 4.7 
New Zealand 1.7 0.9 3.0 
United Kingdom 1.6 1.1 2.9 
United States 2.6 0.3 3.9 
Average 2.1 0.9 3.7 
 
 
 
 
Coordinated market 
economies  
 
 
Austria 2.4 2.2 4.3 
Belgium 2.5 3.4 4.1 
Denmark 2.1 1.4 3.7 
Finland 2.3 1.4 4.4 
Germany - - - 
Japan 4.4 0.7 7.5 
Netherlands 2.7 2.9 4.2 
Norway 2.1 1.9 4.5 
Sweden 1.6 1.4 3.4 
Switzerland 2.0 1.4 2.9 
Average 2.5 1.8 4.3 
Source: European Commission's Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG 
ECFIN) AMECO Database (03/05/2016 update). 
Note: German data is missing from the table because no AMECO GDP data is available for 
Germany during the pre-reunification period. 
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Table B.2. LMEs vs. CMEs: Average annual contributions of consumption and 
exports to GDP growth, and the average annual GDP growth rate, 1980-2007 
 
Average annual 
contribution of 
consumption to  
GDP growth (%) 
1980-2007 
Average annual 
contribution of 
exports to  
GDP growth (%) 
1980-2007 
Average annual  
GDP growth (%) 
1980-2007 
Liberal market 
economies 
 
 
 
Australia 2.0 0.9 3.4 
Canada 1.6 1.6 2.7 
New Zealand 1.6 1.3 2.7 
United Kingdom 2.0 1.1 2.5 
United States 2.2 0.5 3.0 
Average 1.9 1.1 2.9 
 
 
 
 
Coordinated market 
economies  
 
 
Austria 1.2 2.1 2.4 
Belgium 1.0 2.9 2.2 
Denmark 0.9 1.9 2.1 
Finland 1.4 2.1 3.0 
Germany - - - 
Japan 1.2 0.7 2.5 
Netherlands 0.9 3.2 2.5 
Norway 1.4 1.6 3.0 
Sweden 0.8 2.1 2.4 
Switzerland 0.9 1.7 1.9 
Average 1.1 2.0 2.4 
Source: European Commission's Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG 
ECFIN) AMECO Database (03/05/2016 update). 
Note: German data is missing from the table because no AMECO GDP data is available for 
Germany during the pre-reunification period. 
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Table B.3. LMEs vs. CMEs: Current account balances, 1994-2015 
 Current account balance (as a % of GDP)  
  1994 2007 2015 
Liberal market 
economies 
 
 
 
Australia -4.5 -6.7 -4.6 
Canada -2.4 0.8 -3.3 
New Zealand -3.1 -6.8 -3.0 
United Kingdom -0.5 -2.5 -4.3 
United States -1.7 -5.0 -2.7 
Average -2.4 -4.0 -3.6 
 
 
 
 
Coordinated market 
economies  
 
 
Austria -1.5 3.8 3.6 
Belgium 5.3 1.5 0.5 
Denmark 2.0 1.4 6.9 
Finland 1.1 3.8 0.1 
Germany -1.5 6.8 8.5 
Japan 2.7 4.9 3.3 
Netherlands 4.6 6.0 11.0 
Norway 2.9 12.2 9.0 
Sweden 1.0 8.9 5.9 
Switzerland 5.8 10.8 11.4 
Average 2.2 6.0 6.0 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2016. 
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Table B.4. Electoral systems and the average proportionality of electoral outcomes, 
1994-2007 
 
Electoral system  
for legislative elections  
Average Gallagher disproportionality 
index (0-100 scale) 
1994-2007 1994-2007 
Liberal market  
economies 
  Australia Majoritarian 10.0 
Canada Majoritarian 11.3 
New Zealand Mixed 2.5 
United Kingdom Majoritarian 17.0 
United States (Presidential) - 7.6 
United States (House) Majoritarian 2.4 
   Coordinated market 
economies 
  Austria Proportional 1.9 
Belgium Proportional 3.6 
Denmark Proportional 1.2 
Finland Proportional 3.4 
Germany Mixed 3.0 
Japan Mixed 11.6 
Netherlands Proportional 1.1 
Norway Proportional 3.1 
Sweden Proportional 1.7 
Switzerland Proportional 3.1 
Source: Bormann and Golder (2013); Author’s calculations using Gallagher, Michael, 2015. 
Election indices dataset at: 
http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/index.php, accessed 
July 2016. 
Note: Lower values for the Gallagher disproportionality index indicate more proportional 
electoral outcomes. The average is taken across all national legislative elections between 1994 
and 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
244 
Figure B.1. Average annual contributions of consumption and net exports to GDP 
growth, 1994-2007 
 
Source: European Commission's Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG 
ECFIN) AMECO Database (03/05/2016 update). 
Note: See Appendix B2 for a guide on how to calculate annual contributions to GDP growth 
and more information on the data source for the figure. The markers in the figure correspond 
to varieties of capitalism. The grey squares are CMEs and the black circles are LMEs. 
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B2. Calculating annual contributions to GDP growth 
 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (calculated via the expenditure approach) is equal 
to the sum of the four components of aggregate demand—consumption, investment, 
government spending and net exports (exports minus imports). Algebraically, GDP 
can be written as follows: 
 GDP =C + I +G + (X −M )                       (B1) 
where, C = consumption, I  = investment, G  = government spending, X  = 
exports, M  = imports, and (X −M ) = net exports. 
The growth rate of GDP provides a measure of how quickly the economy is 
expanding. The annual growth rate of GDP is calculated using the following 
formula: 
GDP growth in period t = GDPt −GDPt−1
GDPt−1
,                      (B2) 
where GDPt  = GDP in constant prices in period t , and GDPt−1  = GDP in constant 
prices in period t − 1 . 
The change in GDP between period t  and period t − 1  (the numerator in 
Equation B2) is simply the sum of the changes in the four components of GDP. This 
means that the growth rate of GDP can also be expressed in the following form: 
 
GDPt −GDPt−1
GDPt−1
=
Ct −Ct−1
GDPt−1
+
It − It−1
GDPt−1
+
Gt −Gt−1
GDPt−1
+
Xt − Xt−1
GDPt−1
−
Mt − Mt−1
GDPt−1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
.         (B3) 
All variables in Equation B3 are in constant prices. The four terms on the right-
hand side of the equation are the annual contributions of the different components 
of aggregate demand to GDP growth. The term for net exports is broken down into 
exports, which contribute positively to GDP growth, and imports, which contribute 
negatively. 
The two variables at the centre of the paper are the contribution of consumption 
to GDP growth, Ct −Ct−1
GDPt−1
, and the contribution of exports to GDP growth, 
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Xt −Xt−1
GDPt−1
. The data source for these two variables is the European Commission's 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) AMECO 
Database (03/05/2016 update). The consumption contribution variable used is 
CVGD0, which is the contribution to the increase of GDP at constant market prices 
of private consumption. Private consumption covers the consumption expenditures 
of both households and non-profit institutions serving households. The exports 
contribution variable used is CVGD6, which is the contribution to the increase of 
GDP at constant market prices of exports of goods and services including intra EU-
trade (percentage of GDP of preceding year). The AMECO Database calculates the 
contributions of consumption and exports to GDP growth using the method set out 
in Equation B3. 
The AMECO Database can be accessed online at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/ameco/index_en.htm 
A full list of variable definitions for the AMECO Database can be accessed online 
at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/ameco/documents/list_of_va
riables.pdf 
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Appendix C 
 
C1. The international risk sharing condition 
 
If this condition holds (as it is assumed to do in NK open economy models—e.g. 
Galí and Monacelli (2005)), it closes the open economy model, implying that c  is 
given (i.e. fixed). The condition assumes that consumers have the same utility 
function everywhere, in the example with constant relative risk aversion; and access 
to the same capital markets.  Thus, in a simple 2-period model, we have: 
UH =
C /P( )t
1−ρ
(1 − ρ)
+ β
C /P( )t+1
1−ρ
(1 − ρ)
& UF =
C * /P *e( )t
1−ρ
(1 − ρ)
+ β
C * /P *e( )t+1
1−ρ
(1 − ρ)
→ 1 = β
(1 + r)
C /P( )t+1
−ρ
C /P( )t
−ρ
& 1 = β
(1 + r)
C * /P *e( )t+1
−ρ
C * /P *e( )t
−ρ
→
Ct+1
Ct
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
=
C *t+1
C *t
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
qt+1
qt
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
→Δc = Δc * +Δq,
  
where the last line is in logs. 
Thus the difference between countries is simply one of scale, say κH , so that: 
c = κH + c * +q
( → Δc = Δc * +Δq ),
  
and in equilibrium: 
ye = c + g −αr
* + Bq
= κH + c
* + q + g −αr * + Bq
qe = (1 + B)
−1[ye −κH − c
* − g + αr * ].
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The foremost critique of the international risk sharing condition is that it is not 
borne out empirically. One these grounds, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) pick it out as 
one of the six major puzzles of international macroeconomics. 
Analytically, it assumes that households have costless access to borrowing and 
saving at the world interest rate.  In the open economy model used here, it is 
assumed that (at least most) households are ‘hand-to-mouth’ consumers; and this 
seems empirically the correct assumption to make (see Campbell and Mankiw 
(1989)). 
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